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INTRODUCTION
Since the late-1980s technological progress and a changing political and corporate
climate have profoundly affected traditional views on public electricity supply. Emphasis
has been placed on achieving greater efficiency in electricity supply at lower prices by
introducing competition in market segments, such as generation and deliveries to end-
users. At the same time however, features such as redundant and expensive
infrastructure and the need for a high level of coordination among market players
required the introduction of proper regulation. Further regulation was required to
achieve non-economic objectives of the government such as the provision of universal
services to all consumers, equal prices across geographical regions, and ensuring security
of supply.
Bulgaria does not remain outside the world tendency of changes in the electricity
sector. The aim of the ongoing restructuring in the sector is, by replacing state
administration with regulation and, in some instances, with market competition to
contribute to the improvement of the competitiveness of the national economy as well
as to guarantee a secure supply to the population. The reforms must contribute as well
to Bulgarias efforts to join the European Union (EU) and respectively the EU
requirements should serve as a guiding light for decisions of the Bulgarias administration.
Furthermore, as the EU Members have already made some or even significant progress
in the restructuring of their electricity markets and industries, their experience has to
guide Bulgarias ongoing reforms.
Reforms in the electricity sector raise the question about their social affordability.
The topic of households as part of the electricity market often remained outside the
general discussion for the development of the sector in Bulgaria during the last years.
Accounting for 40% of domestic electricity consumption, households pose one of the
7most important challenges to the transition from a state-administered to a regulated
energy sector: how the normal market logic to be combined with the social interests of
households.
Taking into consideration the challenges to the Bulgarian electricity sector, the Center
for Economic Development (CED) in collaboration with the Institute of Energy
Economics (EWI) at the University of Cologne and with the financial support of Phare
Access Programme 1999 of the Delegation of the European Commission have analyzed
the status and perspectives to consumer protection during the reforms. The goal of this
book is, by presenting the results of our research, to outline both opportunities and
threats to the social affordability of the reforms in the sector.
The analysis has been prepared on the basis of expert assessments, comparative
analysis and sociological studies. Statistical and factual data from national and
international organizations are used as primary information. In order to present more
completely and precisely the challenges to the social affordability of the reforms, CED
with the assistance of Vitosha Research conducted a nationwide, representative survey
of Bulgarian perceptions and expectations for electricity prices and quality.
Under normal conditions, the protection of electricity consumers is ensured by the
mutual influence of three factors. The first is competition in the marketplace that forces
suppliers to offer better price and quality to consumers. The second is the regulation of
electricity suppliers with the aim to ensure security and quality of supply to all consumers
at reasonable prices. The third is the influence of consumer organizations that
communicate and defend the interests of those whom they represent to regulatory
bodies and suppliers.
This study focuses on the interplay of these three factors in Bulgaria. Given that
competition in the electricity market is unknown in Bulgaria, our emphasis is on the
ongoing restructuring of the marker organization and corporate property. The capacity
of the regulatory body in the sector - State Energy Regulatory Commission - and of
consumer associations to protect the interests of household electricity consumers is
analyzed as well.
In order to improve the knowledge of Bulgarian institutions, corporations, and society
of the requirements and practice in the European Union with regard to consumer
8protection in deregulated energy markets, special attention is paid to the common EU
policy in this area as well as to the experience of Sweden, Finland, Germany and the
United Kingdom. The selection of the countries is not random but is based on their
achievement of full liberalization in their energy sectors.
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF PROTECTION OF
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS
1. Definition of Consumer Protection
Consumer protection is not a precisely defined term. Recently a general
understanding has developed that it comprises four major consumer interests1 : (1)
health, (2) safety, (3) economic interests, and (4) the right of consumers to be supplied
with information and education and to organize themselves in order to safeguard their
interests.2
In this study, we will focus exclusively on the consumer protection with regard to
economic interests of households, their right to information and education and their
right to organize themselves in order to safeguard their interests. Economic interests of
consumers include their financial interests and their legal and practical autonomy in
the formation of their relations to their market counterparts.
2. Concepts of Consumer Protection in a Market Economy
In economic theory, consumer protection policies are based on different concepts,
of which the most important are:
n The concept of free markets with functioning competition (neo-classical
concept);
n The liberal model of competition and information;
n The concept of counter-force.
The neo-classical economic theory (especially in its interpretation by the Chicago School
of Economics) argues that a well functioning competition alone is sufficient for protecting
the rights of market participants, both producers and consumers. Similarly, within the
1 See the EU-Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 153 (ex Article 129a).
2 The consumers right to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interest was newly added in the EU-Treaty
in 1997.
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neo-liberal economic theory of the Freiburg School of Economics, consumer sovereignty
is considered sufficient and renders consumer protection policies unnecessary. The
main objection to these theories is that they postulate perfect competition including
the presumption of perfect information being available to all market participants. As
recognition has grown of the absence of these conditions, consumer protection policies
and theories have been developed.
One of these concepts is the liberal model of competition and information, which argues
that the number and complexity of goods available in todays marketplace, combined
with asymmetric information flows, necessitates a specific consumer policy as part of
the general competition policy. Proponents of this theory favour the provision of
information to consumers (for example, via publicly financed consumer education or
product testing) as a main instrument of the consumer protection policy.
During the 1970s the so-called concept of counter-force was developed. It argues that
consumer protection policy is independent of, and on the same footing as competition
policy. The development of this theory reflects the belief that the liberal model of
competition and information was inadequate to protect the interests of consumers.
Within the counter-force theory, means of protecting the latter include support of
consumer organizations, regular provision of information and education to consumers,
and stronger legal consumer protection.
Both the liberal model of competition and information and the concept of counter-
force were developed as reactions to the evidence of information asymmetries and the
need for external intervention into the marketplace. These concepts have each become
established in different national policies to varying degrees.
3. Consumer Protection in a Monopolistic Market
In a monopolistic market, consumers are served by mostly integrated utilities with a
government-granted franchise area, in which they are the sole, monopoly distributor
and supplier of electricity. In Europe a wide range of industry structures have been
observed. In France for example, a single state-owned, fully-integrated utility (ElectricitØ
de France) served most customers3 . By contrast, in Germany up to 1000 public, mixed
public and private, and private fully or partly integrated utilities, each with its exclusive
3 In addition, there are several smaller suppliers with a negligible combined market share.
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monopoly area operated.
In a monopolistic market, consumers cannot select among different suppliers but
have to contract with the incumbent franchise area supplier. The rights and obligations
of electricity supply companies and consumers are specified either in general terms of
trade applicable to all businesses regardless of their scope of work, or in electric utility
specific terms of trade.
In a monopolistic market, tariffs for electricity consumption are differentiated only
to a small extent. Tariff structures and levels are regulated and usually amended on a
recurrent basis with the approval of a regulatory body. Regulation mostly take place on
a cost-plus basis which grants utilities a reasonable rate-of-return for their investments,
and makes price risks for consumers very small. Usually, several tasks that are considered
public service obligations (such as supporting renewable energy sources or energy
efficiency measures) are tied to tariff regulation.
Obviously, regulation of monopoly electric utilities is the major instrument used to
protect consumers in a monopolistic market.
4. Effects of Liberalization for Consumers
The value-added chain of electricity supply consists of a number of distinct functions.
In the order of vertical stages we identify electricity generation (including the provision
of ancillary services), dispatch/settlement, system control, electricity transmission
(including system control), wholesale trade, distribution, and retail supply. Across all
levels of the vertical supply chain we find activities of metering and risk management.
Liberalization may take place along most of the steps in the electricity value-added
chain.
Whereas in most European countries generation and wholesale supply markets are
open effectively for most consumers, retail markets are liberalized to a different extent.
In Norway, Sweden, Finland, England, Austria, and Germany all customers are currently
able to choose their supplier. Households in Denmark and the Netherlands will have
similar rights in 2003, while other European countries have not yet decided, whether
to fully open their markets (see Table 1).
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Country
England & Wales
Germany
Sweden
Finland
France
Spain
Norway
Denmark
Austria
Italy
Belgium
Time
April 1990
April 1994
Sept. 1998 - May 1999
April 1998
2000
January 1996
November 1999
January 1995
January 1997
November 1998
February 2000
January 2001
January 2003
January 1999
July 2000
January 2003
January 1991
January 1998
April 2000
December 2000
January 2003
February 1999
February 2000
October 2001
March 1999
January 2000
January 2002
July 2000
January 2001
January 2003
January 2006
Eligibility
(Max. yearly demand-
threshold)
> 1MW
> 100 kW
All
All
Introduction of load-profiling
All, hourly metering required
Abolishment of hourly meter
requirement
> 500 kW
All, hourly metering required
Abolishment of hourly meter
requirement
> 40 GWh
> 16 GWh
> 9 GWh
Full liberalisation not yet
decided
> 5 GWh
> 1 GWh
All
All
‡ 100 GWh
‡ 10 GWh
‡ 1 GWh
All
‡ 40 GWh
‡ 20 GWh
All
‡ 30 GWh
‡ 20 GWh
‡ 90 GWh
Full liberalisation not yet
decided
‡ 20 GWh
‡ 10 GWh
‡ 1 GWh
All
Legal degree of
market opening
Eligible customers share
of domestic consumption
30
48
100
100
100
57
100
30
35
38
32
54
100
100
90
100
100
30
35
40
35
52
100
Table 1: Electricity Market Opening in Selected European Countries
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Apart from the legal conditions necessary for opening a market, other practical and
economic conditions have to be fulfilled for a well functioning competition to exist for
the household sector. Transaction costs for the change of the supplier, for instance,
must not be prohibitive. Specific meter requirements resulting in excessive metering
costs have to be avoided as well. As a means to foster competition in the household
sector, metering may be based on load profiling, which renders expensive meters
unnecessary.
When the electricity market is not opened to households, the franchise monopoly
incumbent remains the sole supplier. Tariffs for non-eligible customers or those that do
not change their supplier and choose to stick to their former tariff contract remain
regulated. However, the responsibility for tariff regulation may be shifted from the
government to a different institution, for example, to an independent regulatory body.
In theory, there is no consensus regarding the advantages of full market opening.
Newberry, for example, argues that there may be considerable advantages in retaining
a franchise monopoly for smaller customers. These include: 4
n A monopoly supplier will be a viable counterpart for medium to long-term
4 Newberry, D.M., Issues and Options for Restructuring the ESI, Information Paper, October 11, 2001, available at http://
www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/people/newbery/output.htm
Source: Eurelectric, Implementation of the Internal Electricity Market Directive in the EU Member
States, Brussels, June 2002; EU, First benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and
gas market, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2001)1957, Brussels, March 2002, own calculations of EWI
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
February 2001
February 2000
January 2003
1995
February 1999
2002
‡ 100 GWh
Full liberalisation not yet
decided
‡ 4 GWh
n.a.
‡ 100 GWh
‡ 9 GWh
> 1 kV
34
28
32
30
49
Country Time
Eligibility
(Max. yearly demand-
threshold)
Legal degree of
market opening
Eligible customers share
of domestic consumption
Table 1: Electricity Market Opening in Selected European Countries
(Continuated)
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contracts.
n Provided that final tariffs are well regulated, contracting costs may be reduced
without sacrificing the benefits of competition.
Joskow5  argues that benefits of full market opening depend on the existence of
competitive wholesale markets, retailing costs associated with marketing and billing
for electricity, customer switching costs, and the intensity of competition among retailers.
A total opening of the retail market should be based on a careful cost-benefit analysis
of lower prices, reduced cross-subsidies, and greater consumer-orientation, compared
to the extra costs, which may easily overcompensate the benefits. Joskow adds that
overall, it is not at all obvious to me that smaller customers reap any net social gain from retail
competition without real-time meters compared with a regime where they are given direct
access to the competitive wholesale market by their UDCs [utility distribution companies].6 .
In addition, he points to the large advertising, marketing, and billing costs that competing
sellers will likely pass on to consumers, further reducing the chances of the latter reaping
any net savings from the reforms.
In order to consider all of the effects of an open market on consumers, we will
assume in the following that even households have free access to the market, though
some of the effects of liberalization may appear even if the market is not fully opened.
In a fully opened market households are granted a free choice of supplier. Whereas
under monopoly conditions, there is only one supplier available, in a liberalized market
consumers may select a supplier according to individual preferences. However, the
choice is restricted to the suppliers competing on the relevant residential market. In
order to make this choice, consumers either inform themselves or are informed about
their options by a third party.
With the opening of the electricity market, consumers are inevitably faced with
price and delivery risks. The extent to which consumers are exposed to the former depends
on the contract they negotiate with their supplier. With liberalization, prices on the
wholesale electricity market become more volatile. The increased volatility is either
directly passed on to consumer prices or taken into account through risk premiums.
5 Joskow, P.L., Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector; in: Peltzman, S., Winston, C. (eds.):
Deregulation of Network Industries - What·s Next?: Washington, D.C, 2000, p.176
6 Joskow, P.L., Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector; in: Peltzman, S., Winston, C. (eds.):
Deregulation of Network Industries - What·s Next?: Washington, D.C: 113-189, 2000, p.181
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Delivery risks include the possibility that the chosen supplier bankrupts or fails to
deliver for other reasons. In general, buyers assume the risk of non-delivery and may
ultimately turn to the court in case of non-delivery. As electricity is often considered to
be an essential good, there are several instruments to protect the customer against this
risk of non-delivery.
One of the aims of the energy market liberalization is to increase efficiency within the
industry. Increased efficiency means reduced costs per unit of output. If competition is
working effectively, reduced costs should lead to lower electricity prices.
From the viewpoint of households, two price effects that have an impact on the
disposable income have to be distinguished:
n direct price effects: lower electricity prices reduce household electricity bills
and a portion of income is set free to be spent on other goods and services;
n indirect price effects: due to lower electricity prices for industry costs (and
prices) of other goods and services decrease and disposable income increases
again.
5. Consumer Protection and Social Policy
Consumer protection affects all major fields of government policy. In some countries,
in the United Kingdom in particular, current electricity market policies contain provisions
aimed at a wide range of social issues such as fuel poverty7 , helping disabled or indebted
customers, etc.
Electricity suppliers incur costs to meet social obligations such as offering special
rates or services for disfavored consumer groups. They often pass these costs on to
consumers and if, for example, due to fierce competition they do not succeed in doing
it, their profits shrink. Thus, the financing of social obligations is secured either by
customers or by the shareholders of electricity supply companies. For consumers that
cannot choose among suppliers and have regulated prices, it is up to the regulator to
decide to which degree these social costs may be passed on to the regulated consumer
groups.
Issues such as fuel poverty and support to disabled, low-income and indebted
7 Fuel poverty is a situation whereby households are not able to meet their electricity supply expenses or these expenses
constitute a large share of their income
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consumers are often considered to be essential elements of the social policy. Usually,
core social tasks are at least partly financed by the budget and thus by taxpayers.
The problems of low-income, disabled or indebted electricity consumers mostly
find their reasons in low dispensable incomes or physical or mental deficiencies of the
consumers. Mostly they are not electricity specific as they apply to other goods and
services as well. As a consequence one could argue that it is not the task of other
electricity customers to finance the social tasks rather than of the society as a whole.
Thus, one of the possible solutions to overcoming fuel poverty is not to oblige electricity
suppliers to offer lower rates for certain consumer groups but rather to provide them
with vouchers8 , with which the respective consumers will pay their electricity bills at
the price for all consumers. The electricity supply companies will be reimbursed for
the vouchers by the general budget.
6. Instruments for Consumer Protection
Within consumer protection policy, we can distinguish three main fields:
n Representation of consumer interests;
n Obligations to electricity supply companies to protect the economic interests
of consumers;
n Dissemination of information to consumers and their education.
Representation of Consumer Interests
Consumer interests can either be formally or informally taken into account in the
process of legal or regulatory decision-making.
Formally, the law governing the electricity market may demand the introduction of
an official, electricity specific consumer agency or committee (such as Energywatch in
the United Kingdom), or an ombudsman that serve as representatives of consumer
interests. These institutions may gain the right to a share in decisions or to be heard
before decisions are taken. This right may refer to legislative decisions or decisions
taken by a regulator. If the law does not require the creation of an official consumer
agency, it may provide general consumer associations or other non-governmental
8 Cash payments bear the risk that the money is used for other items rather than for the payment of the electricity bills.
17
organizations with the right to take part in the decision-making process where electricity
market regulation is affected.
Formal procedures for consumer participation in decision-making processes
comprise public hearings and the release of discussion/consultation documents.
Consumer representatives may write comments and make suggestions to consultation
papers issued by regulators or legal decision makers or take part in public hearings.
If general laws or electricity specific laws do not create a right for consumer protection
associations to take part in decisions, the latter may nevertheless act informally, for
example, through lobbying activities.
Because electricity supply companies are market actors such as electricity consumers,
there should be no special rights for consumers to take part in the business decisions of
the former. Companies may however let consumer representatives participate in their
business decisions.
Usually, consumer associations are not allowed to represent individual consumers
in courts. However, in some countries, as is the case in Germany and Sweden, they
have the right to bring cases of general interest before the court. Consumer associations
may as well provide electricity consumers with information on lawyers or legal advisors
who are specialized in electricity cases.
Provisions to Protect Economic Interests of Consumers
A genuinely competitive marketplace is crucial to the effective protection of
economic interests of consumers. A prerequisite for proper competition is that
consumers be granted access to the grid on an objective, transparent, non-discriminatory
basis. In addition, regulators and/or cartel authorities must supervise the behaviour of
market participants and take action if companies distort or hinder competition. Apart
from these general provisions, several specific instruments for consumer protection
have been made available in various countries:
n Obligation to connect and supply (supplier of last resort);
n Service quality standards and compensation schemes;
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n General terms and conditions for connecting to the grid and for electricity
supply;
n Complaints management.
These provisions can be codified in a law, ordinances, decrees, and/or licenses9  for
distribution and supply companies, such as occurs in the United Kingdom. Economically
equivalent would be to make the provisions part of the general terms and conditions,
which in return would form an integral part of the license. This option exists, for instance,
in Germany, where a federal decree defines the minimum requirements for general
terms and conditions of electricity distribution and supply companies. The different
forms of codification usually give consumers different opportunities to act, if they
consider a specific action of a supplier a breach of the provisions.
Even in a completely deregulated energy market, all consumers must be connected
to the grid to receive electric services. As the grid operation is a monopoly function,
there is a danger the distribution network company to refuse to connect e.g. households
in sparsely populated areas in which connection costs are high. Therefore, in order to
enable all households to gain access to electricity supply, distribution network operators
should be obliged to connect all households wishing so.
As in the case of connection to the distribution grid, suppliers might refuse to supply
electricity to specific consumer groups (e.g. low-income consumers), which results in
higher costs. Therefore, in addition to the obligation for distribution companies to
connect all households wishing so, public electricity suppliers should be obliged to
supply electricity to standard final household customers seeking supply based on general
terms and conditions and tariffs.
This obligation should not be placed on all electricity suppliers (for example, on
producers that generate electricity for their own use) rather than on the incumbent
public electricity supplier. The latter would often have been the only regional distribution
and supply company before the market opening and may continue to enjoy a quasi-
monopoly situation even after the liberalization. If the market is completely opened,
the obligation to supply makes the incumbent a supplier of last resort, i.e., if a household
has chosen a new supplier, which however is unable to supply (e.g., due to bankruptcy)
the old incumbent will be the default supplier.
9 Either there is a combined distribution and supply license or the distribution and supply require separate licenses.
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Distribution and supply of electricity should be based on general terms and
conditions, which must be published. In general, such conditions require a uniform
tariff for households throughout the area for which the public electricity supply company
is responsible. Tariff uniformity is mostly required to provide similar economic conditions
within the area.
The requirement for tariff uniformity has remained largely unchanged after
liberalization. One problem with uniform tariffs, however, is that they do not always
reflect costs accurately. Cost differences within a region are often based on different
grid costs, not on different supply costs. Therefore, it is not necessary to require uniform
supply tariffs. The regulation of transmission and distribution tariffs is sufficient to balance
network costs among network users.
The provision of similar economic conditions within a region may be considered a
social task. As such, it may be argued that it is the responsibility of the public purse
rather than of the average electricity customer to ensure uniform tariffs throughout a
network.
The obligation to connect and supply should be constrained and imposed only if the
associated costs are economically reasonable. Economically reasonable cannot be
given a precise, abstract definition. The definition is case dependent but inevitably
should include a system-wide analysis of costs and revenues.
No general agreement exists regarding whether customers poor creditworthiness
or insolvency should be considered in determining whether connection and supply
are not economically feasible. However, it is indisputable that electricity theft or non-
payments of electricity bills create costs that are absorbed by all customers. That is
why, electricity suppliers should be given the right to cut off supply to customers who have
either been convicted of electricity theft or not paid their electricity bills for a specified
time period. The right to cut off these customers from the grid protects the average
consumer from paying for costs caused by fraud or non-payment.
Electricity companies are responsible for providing a reliable electricity supply.
Specific quality standards should be included in their licenses as well as in the general
conditions for electricity distribution and supply. These service quality standards should
include:
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n The maximum acceptable number and duration of supply interruptions;
n The frequency and voltage stability that must be maintained;
n The time period within which delivery shall be restored after supply
interruptions;
n The minimum notification term in case of planned supply interruptions;
n The minimum notification term for planned meter readings or access to private
properties for other specified reasons (repair of technical equipment for
instance);
n The maximum time period within which a company must reply to a customers
complaint.
Unforeseen supply interruptions and further breaches of these service quality
standards may result in physical and financial damages to households (damage to
electronic equipment due to high frequency deviations, for example). Companies must
be given the responsibility of compensating customers for the incurred costs. Sufficient
compensation payments should be encoded in the general terms and conditions. Two
preconditions should be fulfilled for compensation claims to become eligible: (1) the
damage must be provable, and (2) the company must be shown to have caused the
damage.
Compensation payments should cover all damages that have been caused. However,
the assessment of the damage itself may create high transaction costs (for instance,
costs for visits at customer side or for legal proceedings, in case of disagreement of the
company). This provides reasons for introducing general compensation schemes in
case of minor damages that are embodied in the general terms and conditions (for
example, a lump-sum compensation if a supply interruption lasts longer than a specified
period).
In order to provide incentives for companies to fulfill and even to surpass minimum
requirements for service quality, distribution and supply tariff regulations should contain
mechanisms which enable companies to retain a certain profit if service quality standards
are surpassed.
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Purchase contracts for standardized goods and services contain general terms and
conditions in which rights and obligations of the contracting parties are laid out. As
electricity distribution and supply are standardized services in the household sector,
electricity companies should set up general terms and conditions as well. The latter
should be subject to approval by the regulating agency to ensure a minimum level of
standardization and consumer protection. In turn, the regulator should establish a clear
set of minimum requirements to these terms and conditions. Alternatively, public
authorities may prescribe minimum standards by a law or decree.
Apart from obligations regarding the service quality, the general terms and conditions
should also contain provisions concerning the obligations of consumers, such as:
n A term for notification of damages to maintain the right to compensation;
n To provide access for the distribution/supply company to private property
for specified cases (meter reading, maintenance of technical equipment);
n To ensure proper protection of technical equipment such as meters, that
remain in the ownership of the distribution/supply company;
n Penalties such as financial payments or disconnection from the grid in case of
manipulation of metering equipment.
The general terms and conditions should also address issues such as the provision of
information, terms of payment, conditions and period of notice of contract termination,
etc.
Consumers should be provided with information concerning whom to turn to in order
to launch a complaint with regard to billing or quality of service, for instance. Any complaint
should at first be addressed to the relevant company. In order to make it easier for
consumers to address the correct person, the companies general terms and conditions
should contain a contact (phone number) as well as a maximum time (in days), in
which the company has to reply to the complaint.
The customer either accepts the answer of the company or has to turn to another
institution. To relieve the general court system, the regulator may be given some extra-
juridical powers to propose ways to settle a dispute. Alternatively, an ombudsman
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system may be introduced to overtake the role of mediation. Depending on the general
legal provisions, the ombudsman may be granted quasi-juridical powers and suggest
solutions, which the parties have to accept10 .
While functioning as courts, regulators and ombudsmen should be independent of
the market participants in order to ensure the general acceptance of their suggestions/
verdicts. As a last resort, the general court system should be accessible, if the dispute
between a customer and the distribution/supply company can be settled neither directly
between themselves nor through the mediation of a regulator or ombudsman.
Dissemination of Information
One of the major hindrances to perfect competition is the asymmetric distribution
of information between those responsible for establishing the market framework
(government and regulators) and the market actors (generators, network companies,
suppliers, and consumers), as well as among the market participants themselves. In
order to overcome this problem, all of these groups should be obliged to provide
information to the relevant other actors.
Electricity regulations should be treated as any other governmental regulations and
respectively published in official journals. The regulator should make its decisions public
so that market participants may have direct access to the latest information. For non-
eligible households regulatory decisions concerning supply price controls are of special
interest and therefore they may be published or notified in mass media. Similarly,
electricity distribution and supply companies should be obliged to inform each consumer
about their general terms and conditions and amendments thereof by mail, daily
newspapers and/or Internet as well as to provide free access to them in their offices.
7. Institutions for Consumer Protection
The term institutions may be interpreted as the general rules of the society (laws,
contracts, habits, etc. - institutional environment) or as the organized players (companies,
parties, governmental bodies, etc. - institutional arrangements)11 . In the following we
10 For example, in the State of New South Wales (Australia) the electricity ombudsman has the power to settle disputes
with a value up to $20,000 AUS (12,000). If the defendant agrees however, the ombudsman may make legally
binding decisions up to a value of $50,000 AUS (30,000).
11 A more detailed discussion of the term can be found in North, D.C., Institutions, institutional change and economic
performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990, and Williamson, O.E., A comparison of alternative approaches to economic
organization, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), issue 146, p. 61-71, 1990
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will use the term in the latter sense. The two major institutions for consumer protection
in a liberalized electricity market are regulators and consumer associations.
Electricity Market Regulator
To ensure the existence of an efficient, fair and sustainable competition, which is a
crucial condition for protecting consumer interests, four basic conditions must be met:
n Abolishment of legal barriers to market entry (eligibility);
n Creation of structural preconditions for competition in generation and supply
(unbundling);
n Access to the grids on transparent, non-discriminatory grounds;
n Provision of sustainable incentives for investments into the grids.
Regulation plays an important role in ensuring the existence of these conditions.
Once a market environment has been created, regulatory tasks focus mainly on the
prevention of unfair market practices and regulating the natural monopoly functions of
the network (transmission and distribution).
Apart from the issue whether electricity market regulation is to be delegated to one
or several institutions, regulatory activities typically are faced with three main problems:
n How to ensure the independence of the regulatory institution(s)?
n How to exert control over the regulatory institutions?
n How to ensure the reliable enforcement of regulations?
The need for independent regulatory institutions is due to the risk of regulatory capture.
The government, the regulated firms, or other interest groups have incentives to
influence the regulator in order to make him take decisions in their favour.
In order to minimize the danger of such meddling at least three conditions should
be met:
n The regulatory tasks, competence, and guidelines of the regulator should be
well defined.
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n Reliable financing of the regulatory institutions should be guaranteed.
n The rules governing the appointment and structure of regulatory institutions
must be transparent, fair, non-partisan, and not subject to influence peddling.
If a regulator has broad competences for the design and functioning of the market
and a large discretion over the revenues of network companies and suppliers to non-
eligible customers, it has to be controlled. Regulators must be held accountable for
failures to achieve their mandate as well as for deviations from that mandate.
Transparency and free access to information regarding decisions are necessary to ensure
this accountability. Furthermore, the regulators mandate must be clearly defined and
regulation methods must be ex-ante determined; it would otherwise be impossible to
establish culpability for regulatory failures.
When the guilt of a regulator is proven, it has to be sanctioned. Without sanctions
regulators would lack incentives to fulfill their mandate.
Appeal mechanisms to a disinterested but competent third party should exist to
ensure fairness in important regulatory decisions. The participation of affected parties
in the decision making process may also be an effective means of ensuring fairness and
pre-empting the need for such appeals.
Future regulatory actions bring uncertainty for the regulated industry, especially for
monopoly companies, which are under direct price or revenue control. Energy
companies typically deal with this uncertainty by charging risk premiums that are
ultimately reflected in the prices paid by consumers. Regulatory risk in the network
industry is especially important as investments are often amortized over long periods
and involve huge sunk costs. A high regulatory risk will likely increase capital costs for
these companies and may even make debt-financing problematic. Thus, in order not
to increase unnecessarily regulatory risks (and capital costs respectively), regulation
should be transparent, fair and predictable.
Consumer Associations
Consumer associations may play an important role in consumer protection, especially
in the representation of consumer interests and the dissemination of information.
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To represent effectively consumer interests, associations may either provide input
to government decision makers and regulatory bodies or lobby these same bodies.
Associations disseminate information by acting as intermediaries between the
government, regulator and companies, on the one side, and consumers, on the other,
and by providing advice to consumers that improves educational level of the society
with regard to electricity matters.
To fulfill their tasks efficiently and effectively, consumer associations should meet
several conditions. They must build up sufficient expertise in electricity markets and know
well their rights within the regulatory framework. Otherwise there is a danger ineffective
measures for consumer protection to be applied and the credibility and standing of the
consumer associations in negotiations to be diminished.
Usually, there are several consumer associations within one country that are spread
across the territory. This decentralized approach serves consumers as they are able to
access the association operating in their neighbourhood. On the other hand, a more
centralized approach seems more suitable to reap economies of scale and scope. In
this respect, it might be reasonable one consumer association to specialize in energy
matters and at the same time to closely partner with other consumer associations. This
specialized association would then be responsible for representing consumers in official
cases, for spreading information among the other consumer associations and consumers.
It might serve as a central information hub, to which consumers may turn in case of a
complaint or when seeking advice. Alternatively, consumer associations may found an
umbrella organization, which would then create a committee (with representatives of
different consumer associations) responsible for energy matters, including representation
of consumer interest and spreading of information to the different consumer associations.
In order to effectively represent consumers interests and fulfill the function of a
source of advice and information, consumer associations should ensure that consumers are
informed about their existence. Therefore, information campaigns seem necessary, if the
general knowledge about consumer associations is low.
Without a stable financing, an effective representation of consumer interests is not
possible. Sources of financing for consumer associations include governments subsidies,
membership and service fees, donations, etc. If one rejects the pure neo-classical model,
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12 Indirectly this is the case in the UK, where the energy specific consumer association Energywatch is financed by
license holders. In return they pass on these costs to their customers.
which does not see any grounds for a specific consumer protection policy, and approves
the liberal model of competition and information or the concept of counter-force, it
can be argued that a basic part of consumer associations costs should be covered by
public budgets.
Electricity consumers that profit from and have access to the services of consumer
associations may be charged with a compulsory levy.12  If e.g. all households contribute
to a small extent to the revenues of an association, an effective representation of their
interests may be provided. This financing seems justified only as long as the interest of
households are not too disperse and consumers receive a net gain from the compulsory
levy.
EUROPEAN UNION REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Electricity plays a key role in the EU economic and social development. It is, in
itself, one of the largest economic sectors in the Union. From the perspective of large
industries, which are major consumers of electricity, a competitive market is crucial to
improving their international competitiveness. From the publics perspective, a
dependable supply of electricity is a vital necessity.
1. EU Policy in the Electricity Sector
In 1988 the European Commission released The Internal Energy Market report, in
which it identified the obstacles to the establishment of a single electricity market and
proposed solutions for their quicker overcoming. The idea of a common energy market,
meaning electricity market as well, was not new. Efforts to coordinate the national
energy policies on a European level were made as early as the 1950s. These early
efforts resulted in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and
the European Atomic Energy Community. The Single European Act (1986), which
declared the intention of establishing a single internal market with a free movement of
goods, services, capital and people, evidently envisioned the energy sector as well,
though that was not explicitly stated.
Despite the strong opposition of certain Member States in recent decades, the
Commission pursued this goal by maintaining the liberalization and integration of
electricity markets on the agenda of the European Community. In 1996, eight years
after the publication of the Internal Energy Market Report, the EUs energy ministers
unanimously supported a directive for the opening of the national electricity markets.
This directive establishes the rules for the functioning of the single internal electricity
market and incorporates the goals of the common energy policy.
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This document referred to as Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (Directive 96/92/EC)
constitutes the main elements of the Unions aquis communautaire in the field of
electricity. It establishes the framework for the development of electricity generation,
transmission, distribution and supply. It also defines the rules for the organization and
functioning of the single market, the access to the market, the criteria and procedures
for issuing permits for the construction of new capacity, and for the management of
electricity systems. The Directive 96/92/EC required most EU Member States to
progressively open their electricity market at least by February 19, 1999.13
Other EU documents which concern the common electricity policy, include:
n The Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community;
n The Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Community;
n The Agreements of the Trans European Energy Networks;
n The standards for efficient energy use, renewable energy, and innovative
energy technologies (European Community Communications for the Synergy,
SAVE, Altner, Joule-Thermie programs);
n Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
September 27, 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable
energy sources in the internal electricity market;
n Council Directive 90/547/EEC of October 29, 1990 on the transit of electricity
through transmission grids.
There is no specific chapter on energy in the Treaty of the European Community,
the Treaty of the European Union, and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Coal as a major
energy source has been a focus of the Community policy since 1952, and the
collaboration in the development of atomic energy has been a focus since the Treaty
of the European Atomic Energy Community (1958).
In spite of the absence of concrete clauses per treaty, governing energy alone, the
Community develops and applies a common policy in the field, including in the
electricity sector. This raises important issues regarding the competence of the
13 Belgium and Ireland had an additional one-year grace period while Greece had two.
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Community institutions to carry out such a policy because they are permitted to exercise
only the authority assigned to them. The institutions find grounds for their competence
in the set forth in the treaties (1) freedom to render services and (2) necessity of
harmonization of measures to ensure the functioning of the EUs internal market. Using
these grounds the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Directive 96/92/
EC and in December 1998 the European Council adopted a multi-year framework
programme for actions in the energy sector (1998-2002), which aimed at satisfying
demand, guaranteeing the security of energy supply, creating conditions for improving
competitiveness in the Community, and ensuring the protection of the environment.
The European Commission defines as a primary goal of the common energy policy
the guaranteeing of security of supply for European citizens and companies at
competitive prices while ensuring the protection of the environment. The main priorities
of the EU towards the attainment of this goal are:
n To decrease the dependence on imported energy resources in order to prevent
any problems in electricity supply in a long run. The EU currently depends on
imports for half of its primary energy resources.
n To establish a single, integrated electricity market to increase competitiveness
and create employment. The more competitive prices in the sector are
especially important for the European industry in terms of the globalizing
world economy because the European business pays for electricity far more
than that of the USA.
n To develop the electricity sector without compromising the protection of the
environment. In this regard electricity policy and measures are a key factor for
addressing environmental issues, especially with respect to the climate change.
In addition to these priorities, the Accession Partnership agreements have provisions
for the development of functioning electricity markets in the EU accession countries.
These provisions make assessments of the priority areas on which each country should
concentrate its efforts in preparation for accession. The Accession Partnership
agreements also contain provisions for ways in which the PHARE programme will support
these efforts. These include for instance recommendations and support for energy
efficiency improvements and the equalization of prices with market realities14 .
14 The regular EC reports on Bulgarias progress towards accession from 1998 to 2001 may be found at www.evropa.bg
(The 2002 report is expected in November).
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2. Consumer Protection Policy in the EU
Consumer protection first appeared in the EU legislation on April 14, 1975, with a
resolution of the European Council for a preliminary programme to inform and protect
consumers. The programme lists five fundamental rights which serve as the basis for
Community legislation in this area. These include: the protection of health, the
protection of economic interests, compensation for damages, right to information and
education, and right to representation.
A second action programme was launched in 1981. The Single Act followed this in
1987. The latter gave the Commission the authority to propose measures designed to
protect consumers, taking a high level of protection as a base. This provided the
foundation for the legal recognition of consumer policy. During the 1980s and early
1990s, several measures were taken which emphasized general product safety and
unfair contractual terms. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty enshrined consumer protection
as a fully-fledged Community policy. After the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty several
green papers concerning consumer protection were released. As a result of the BSE
crisis, particular emphasis has been placed on consumer health and food safety. The
Treaty of Amsterdam (1992) re-formulated the aim of consumer protection policy and
included into it the protection of the health, safety, the protection of economic interests
of consumers, the promotion of the right to information and education and of the right
to organize themselves to safeguard their interest. The areas and interests that are not
explicitly mentioned in the Treaty are considered a part of the economic interests of
consumers.
The Treaty of Amsterdam highlights the transversal character of consumer protection,
claiming that consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining
and implementing other Community policies and activities. For the purposes of
coordinating the EU policies, including the electricity policy, with the consumer
protection policy a Consumer Committee15  has been established. Among the functions
of this Committee are:
n To organize general discussions on issues concerning the interests of
consumers;
15 Resolution 2000/323/EU of the European Commission of May 4, 2000.
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n To give opinions on issues concerning the protection of the interests of
consumers in the Community;
n To provide consultations and directions to the Commission, when the latter
stipulates policies and activities regarding consumers;
n To inform the Commission about the development of consumer policy in
accession countries;
n To collect and submit information about the activity of the Community to
national consumer organizations of countries outside the EU.
In 1999 the European Union published a new action plan for consumer protection
(1999-2001)16  and in late 2001, released to the public a discussion paper titled Ideas
for a Consumer Policy Strategy which was approved in May 2002 as a Consumer
Policy Strategy (2002-2006)17 .
In October 2001, the European Commission published a Green Paper concerning
consumer protection with the aim of consulting with the public on the future direction
of EU consumer protection policy. In the Green Paper, the Commission suggested two
options on how to improve and harmonize consumer protection in Europe:
n A specific approach based on the adoption of a series of further directives, or
n A mixed approach of a comprehensive framework directive supplemented
by targeted directives where necessary.
In a hearing in December 2001, the EU Commission argued that the latter provides
improved legal certainty and a reduction in legal fragmentation. In addition, the mixed
approach would lead to a simplification of the regulatory environment by introducing
one harmonized set of rules. This would encourage the use of self-regulation by industries
that have a strong, common interest in retaining consumer confidence.
16 Between 1990 and 2001, the Commission published triennial action plans.
17 Consumer policy strategy 2002-2006, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Commission and the Commission of the Regions, COM(2002) 208, Brussels, May 2002
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3. Institutions for Consumer Protection
There are two main types of consumer protection bodies operating on a European
wide level: those that are a part of the European Commission and those independent
of it which nevertheless operate contiguously with it and of which we will briefly describe
only two that work across specific economic sectors.
In 1989, the Commission established an independent Consumer Policy Service which
was later transformed to a full Directorate-General (DG XXIV). Following the BSE crisis
in 1997, the Commission reorganized the directorates departments, and the
Directorate-General XXIV was assigned responsibility for consumer policy and health
protection. In 1999, the Commission renamed DG XXIV as the Directorate-General for
Health and Consumer Protection.
Prior to the establishment of the Consumer Policy Service, consumer interests were
represented by the Economic and Social Committee and the Consumer Committee. In
addition to these Committees, the EU invites consumer representatives to participate
in advisory bodies, hearings, etc.
In addition to this formal participation in decision-making, the informal access of
interest groups to decision-makers via non-institutionalized lobbying plays an important
role.
Since 1962, the European Consumers Organization (Bureau EuropØen des Unions de
Consommateurs - BEUC) has been operating as a federation of thirty-four independent,
national consumer organizations from twenty European countries. The Organization
defends the interests of European consumers in the EU policy process. It focuses on
issues that have direct economic or legal consequences for consumers and on those
that impact consumer health, safety, and the environment. The liberalization of the
electricity market is a high priority for the Organization which is striving to ensure that
the benefits of liberalization are passed on to households and that basic electricity
services are secured.
Founded in 1999, the Association of European Consumers (AEC) currently represents
the interests of thirty-three consumer organizations from seventeen countries. Their
work emphasizes social and environmental awareness, including sustainable
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development, the representation of consumer interests, food safety and collaboration
with Central and Eastern European countries.
4. Main Aspects of the Protection of Electricity Consumers
If only economic indicators were to play a role, electricity may turn out inaccessible
for a significant part of the population, such as people, living in remote or sparsely
populated regions. In this sense the issue of imposing public obligations for services of
general economic interest in a liberalized European electricity market is significant.
The very Directive 96/92/EC provides for imposing public service obligations on
companies operating on the European electricity market in order to ensure a balance
between market economics and social obligations. This includes for example, the
obligation to supply electricity at the same price to all consumers, no matter how remote
or sparsely populated their location is. The Directive 96/92/EC also creates a framework
for defining and imposing public service obligations. The exact definitions and
applications are then determined by individual Member States according to their needs
and circumstances. Because of the differences among the separate countries, this may
lead to the introduction of contradictory mechanisms hindering the functioning of an
integrated energy market. That is why the efforts of the European Commission are
directed namely to the establishment of milestones that to be used by the Member
States.
The opinions about the minimum legal obligations for the provision of public services
are multidimensional and even controversial. However, there is a consensus among
the EU Members that public service obligations may be implemented without causing
undue harm to the competition on the electricity market, although at first glance they
seem incompatible with it. The consensus extends to the following aspects of the general
framework for public services:
n A right of access to high-quality electricity supply at affordable prices must be
guaranteed.
n A right to electricity for all consumer groups must be ensured, including if
necessary special tariffs for vulnerable groups such as the poor and disabled
to be applied.
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n Consistent measures for environmental protection must be implemented with
an emphasis placed on the promotion of renewable electricity sources (through
the marketing of green certificates for example) and energy efficiency.
n Consumers must be kept informed; they must be informed about the source
of their electricity, the applicable price structure, and comparisons of their
potential suppliers.
n Regulatory bodies must function independently and their members must
possess technical expertise to assess problems and determine solutions.
n Funds for public service obligations must be collected in a transparent and
non-discriminatory procedure compatible with the functioning of a
competitive energy market.
Given the experience of the Member States, the Commission was worried about
protecting consumer interests in an internal energy market that is fully open to
competition. The goal of reforms in the electricity sector is the completely opened
market to bring real benefits to European citizens in terms of prices and quality. The
achievement of this goal requires the market liberalization not to be viewed without
criticism. That is why the following several significant issues were placed on the agenda:
n Will the new requirements for companies working in the competitive
electricity market allow for accurate comparisons between the prices and
quality of services offered today and in the future?
n Is there a risk the grouping and concentration of electricity operators observed
now on a generation level to lead to cartel agreements in a long run, thus
depriving the public of electricity supply at affordable prices?
n How will the market be organized and to what extent will large intermediaries
and suppliers account for the interests of end-users in their pricing?
n Will the liberalization of the electricity markets actually lead to a decrease in
electricity bills and improvement of services to low-income households or
the poor?
n What efforts and structural measures should be taken to prevent low-income
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and remote consumers from being excluded from the benefits of the market
opening?
n What organizational and financial mechanisms can ensure the public control
with regard to the protection of the right of all consumers to electricity supply
at reasonable prices and the social correction of the activity of private
operators, while simultaneously ensuring a reasonable rate of return for the
latter?
These issues have not been prominent until the present because of the active role
of governments in both administration of electricity markets and application of measures
for protection of electricity consumers on a national level. The measures employed
most often include the establishment of special social prices, introduction of guarantees
for minimum supplied quantities, social aid to households in debt to electricity suppliers,
the requirement of equal prices for all households, etc. Measures of separate countries
are often quite different and place European electricity consumers in different positions.
That is why it is of great importance for the EU to harmonize the social requirements
and measures with respect to electricity supply.
5. Challenges to the Protection of Electricity Consumers
The Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity that
has already been incorporated in the national legislations of the EU Members is the
basis for the liberalization and integration of the national electricity markets. The
liberalization is expected to lead to a drastic decline in electricity prices in the
Community. The main challenge confronting both the EU Members and the European
Commission is how to stimulate the faster harmonization and integration of the 15
separate markets, so as to establish a common market for all electricity companies and
consumers.
In March 2001 the European Commission prepared a proposal18  for a package of
measures to accelerate the establishment of the single electricity market. The proposals
of the Commission aimed at amendments to the Directive 96/92/EC, designed to
increase opportunities for competition and to liberalize the market for industrial and
18 A Directive to amend Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity was proposed
- Commission Communication COM(2001) 125, March 2001
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commercial consumers until 2003 and for households until 2005. Two measures are
regarded as requisites for the successful liberalization: (1) the establishment of
independent regulatory mechanisms and institutions, and (2) the separation of
transmission and distribution from generation and supply of electricity.
In the Directive 96/92/EC, the EU attempted chiefly to establish a framework for
competition in the electricity sector, while leaving issues of consumer protection to the
Member States. By contrast, the proposed amendments from 2001 put consumer
protection in a prominent position. Member States are required to introduce appropriate
provisions to ensure the attainment of the public service objectives. These include:
n Universal service is to be introduced and defined as the right of each European
consumer to receive electricity of high quality at an affordable price. This
may be achieved in different ways, for example, by incorporating an obligation
to render a universal service in the contract or in the license of the supplier of
electricity to households.
n The implementation of adequate measures to prevent unreasonable interruptions
in electricity supply to the elderly, unemployed, and disabled is to be ensured.
This may be regulated in the contracts or license agreements of suppliers as
well. In this regard Loyola de Palacio, Commissioner for the relations with
the European Parliament, transport and energy, argued that although the
attainment of this goal is delegated to the separate EU Members, it is necessary
that a comparative analysis be effected to identify the best practices.
n The protection of consumers, in particular, with respect to the transparency of
contract terms and conditions is to be ensured. The Commission proposed
that the identification of the supplier, the service rendered, and information
about prices and tariffs be specified in service contracts. In addition, the
Commission proposed that the Member States draw up two-year reports on
the approved measures for imposing public service obligations in order to
enable the better assessment of the progress of each country.
n Security of electricity supply is to be guaranteed to prevent the problems that
occurred in California. One of the proposed measures in this regard is to
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establish an institution to monitor the market functioning (the balance of supply
and demand, transmission capacity, competition level).
n The electricity sector is to be developed so that to ensure the protection of the
environment. This may be carried out by modernizing power plants with new
technologies enabling the reduction of pollution.
These basic issues were included in the European Commissions Consumer Policy
Strategy (2002-2006). The objective of this Strategy is to integrate the issues of consumer
protection in all the remaining policies of the European Union, to maximize the single
market benefits for consumers, and to prepare for Community enlargement.
Concrete decisions on the Commissions proposals were expected to be taken at
the European Council in Barcelona in March 2002. Instead, the ministers only urged
the Council and the European Parliament to adopt amendments, including a decision
on further measures taking into account the definition of public service obligations, security of
supply and in particular the protection of remote areas and of the most vulnerable groups in
the population19 .
The only significant achievement was the decision to open 60% of the total European
energy market to competition. The electricity market for industrial consumers is
expected to be entirely liberalized by the end of 2004. The deadline for the full
liberalization of the market will be determined on the basis of the Commissions
proposals by the end of 2002. It is significant that, after the Barcelonas Council, decisions
regarding these proposals may be taken with a simple majority and not a consensus.
During discussions regarding the liberalization of the energy market for households,
France alone opposed and blocked the proposal for households to freely choose their
supplier. The French ministers insisted on the adoption of a decision for additional
measures for determining public service obligations, security of supply, and protection
of vulnerable groups and consumers in remote regions.
Searching for an approval of the Member States on amendments to the Directive
96/92/EC, in July 2002 the European Commission reformulated its initial proposals.
The new proposals are in the spirit of the initial attempt of the Commission to improve
consumer protection, to ensure environmental protection, and to guarantee the security
19 EU, Barcelona European Council, March 15 and 16, Press release and document, 2002, http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/
NewMain.asp?LANG=4
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of energy supply. They account for Frances concerns, as well as other recommendations
received during the review and discussions of the initial proposals.
6. Conclusions for Bulgaria
Milestones for the Bulgarias Energy Policy
The agreements of the Community provide the framework with which accession
countries should coordinate their legislation in the energy sector and general objectives
of which they should incorporate into their national policies.
The development of a competitive internal energy market, the integration of the
Bulgarian energy sector and energy market into the European ones and the provision
of socially just reforms are defined as main priorities of the Bulgarian energy policy.
Therefore, the framework for the development of the European energy sector, the
goals confronting the separate EU Members and the common policy in energy and
consumer protection determine the development of the Bulgarian energy sector and
the policy and measures for protection of electricity consumers.
The harmonization of the Bulgarias energy legislation with that of the EU is occurring
through the transposition of the three main objectives of the EUs energy policy - security
of energy supply, greater competitiveness, and consumer and environmental protection
- into the national regulatory framework. The principal document that is to be transposed
in the Bulgarias legislation is the Directive 96/92/EC. As an accession country, Bulgaria
has to ensure a high quality electricity supply to all consumers at a fair and affordable
price. The country should coordinate its policy with the reference points, which serve
as a landmark to the Member States in the implementation of their policies in the
energy sector and which more particularly are related to:
n The right of access to high quality energy resources at affordable prices.
n The social aspects (including special tariffs for the poor and disabled people).
n Environmental protection.
n Information to and protection of consumers (origin of electricity, price
structure, comparisons).
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As part of its efforts to integrate the national electricity market into the common
European market, Bulgaria must apply measures to meet the following priorities in the
European policy:
n Guaranteeing the right of any person to receive electricity of high quality and
at an affordable price.
n Ensuring adequate protection against unreasonable interruptions in supply
to the elderly, unemployed, disabled, and other highly vulnerable consumer
groups.
n Providing a high degree of transparency in contract terms and conditions
regulating the electricity supply to households.
n Guaranteeing security of electricity supply through maintenance of sufficient
production capacity for the domestic market.
n Implementing a policy designed to decrease the harmful effects of Bulgarias
electricity sector on the environment as a precondition for sustainable
development of the country.
Expectations for the Effect of the EU Measures for Consumer Protection
on Bulgaria
An interesting aspect of Bulgarias preparation for the EU joining is the opinion of
the Bulgarians which of the EU measures in the field of electricity consumption should
be applied in the country with priority. The respondents in the national survey within
the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector on Consumer Protection Project render
a leading role to the social aspects of electricity supply: 63.8% favor the development
of social protections within the electricity sector as a priority. This function is not typical
of commercial entities such as electricity distribution companies in Bulgaria. It should
be integrated in the state policy and assumed by the state social funds.
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A comparatively smaller share of consumers indicated as a leading necessity the
measures related to security of supply (42.9%), consumer protection issues (32.4%),
introducing a simple, quick, and clear procedure for complaints (30.0%), and clearly
defined rules for electricity supply contracts (26.7%). To a great extent these lower
results are to be attributed to the poor awareness of the society of the sense of these
measures and the benefits of their implementation.
Only 47% of those surveyed expressed an opinion on the potential effect of European
requirements for consumer protection on the electricity sector in Bulgaria. Of these,
only 35% had positive expectations. 12% did not expect electricity supply to improve
(see Figure 1). Also striking is the fact that more than half of those surveyed (53%) did
not have any opinion, mainly as a result of their lack of knowledge of the issues. This
supports our contention that one of the priorities of those involved in the sector - state
bodies, consumer protection associations and other institutions and organizations related
to consumer problems, energy and social policy - must be to actively provide information
to households. It can be expected that by improving the knowledge of consumers,
most of them will better understand and support both the energy reforms and the
efforts of the administration for a quicker progress towards the fulfillment of the EU
requirements.
Source: National Public Opinion Poll within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector
on Consumer Protection Project, CED/ Vitosha Research, November, 2001
Figure 1: Expected Impact of the EU Measures for Consumer Protection
on Bulgaria
ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND
PRIVATIZATION IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
1. Characteristics of Organizational Restructuring and
Privatization of Electricity Sectors around the World
In recent years the development of the international electricity market has been
marked by immense structural changes directed towards the creation of an appropriate
environment for competition. These changes include the introduction of new forms of
market organization, the reassessment of commercial relations, privatization and
liberalization. Ongoing reforms are possible thanks to the development of new
technologies, the advance of economic analysis in electricity and most of all - the
ambition of the separate countries to replace the stately administered market with a
completely or partly regulated one.
A highly competitive market cannot exist if there is a market participant able to
impose its terms and conditions due to its market power. In electricity sector that
requires changes not only on a horizontal level but also on a vertical level because after
the Second World War vertically integrated electricity monopolies were established in
most countries. That is why the current organizational restructuring includes, on the
one hand, commercial spinning-off of electricity generation, transmission, distribution
and supply, and, on the other hand, provision of opportunities for several companies
to operate on generation and supply levels, where the best conditions for competition
exist. Electricity transmission and distribution are considered inappropriate for
competition because they require high investments and they do not provide good
rates of return. In addition, the performance of these functions requires a high degree
of coordination of electricity flows that could be interrupted by the introduction of
competition.
Reforms in the electricity sector in a number of countries have been accompanied
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by a change of ownership from state to private hands. It is worth noting that although
privatization is common during restructuring efforts, it is not a necessary element of
this process. Well-run state-owned companies can also operate in a competitive
environment, provided that their state ownership does not provide them with special
privileges that violate principles of free competition and equal position of all market
participants. Privatization favors operating efficiency because it leads to competition
in capital markets and gives greater guarantees that the government will not interfere
in favor of any corporate player. The benefits of reforms for society however result
from market liberalization rather than privatization.
Governments typically pursue the following objectives when they restructure
electricity sectors:
n To improve the efficiency of sector companies, especially with respect to
their costs and the appropriateness of their investment decisions;
n To attract private capital for financing new projects and expenditures for
maintenance of electricity supply equipment;
n To increase revenues to state budgets through the sale of state-owned assets
in the sector;
n To ensure funds for financing urgent state expenditures through elimination
of subsidies to electricity sector.
The achievement of these objectives and the transition from state administrated to
market relations is hindered by some restrictions. Common ones include:
n Imbalance in prices for consumers as a result of subsidies to some consumers
at the expense of other consumers;
n Political obstacles to rapid price increases for certain consumer groups, which
would be the result of the operation of market forces;
n The need to use local resource because of considerations related to national
security, level of employment, etc.;
n Social reactions to the loss of jobs in the sector as a result of the optimization
of activities related to electricity generation and supply.
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New commercial relations and the new ownership of electricity companies pose a
number of social issues such as: will electricity supply be accessible to all in technical
and price terms, how will vulnerable consumers be supported under the conditions of
market competition and how will the problem of energy poverty be limited under the
new circumstances. These threats to the quality and security of electricity supply can
be solved through proper regulation in the sector, adequate energy and social policy,
precautionary corrective activities on the part of organizations representing consumer
interests, and more consumer-oriented activities of supply companies.
2. Organizational Restructuring in the Bulgarias Electricity
Sector
The framework for structural changes in the Bulgarian electricity sector was prepared
in 1999 and included the Strategy for the Development of the Energy Sector in Bulgaria
till 2010 and the Energy and Energy Efficiency Act (EEEA). The two documents call for
socially responsible reforms, setting as their goals the provision of a continuous and
reliable electricity supply to consumers in the country at minimum social costs along
with sector liberalization and attracting new investments. The attempt to achieve social
tolerance of the changes underlies the new energy strategy of Bulgaria approved by
the Council of Ministers in April 2002.
Similarly to many other countries Bulgaria started the reforms in its electricity sector
from a market structure dominated by a vertically-integrated state-owned company -
National Electricity Company (NEK) - with a statutory monopoly in the transmission,
distribution, supply, import and export of electricity. Under a monopoly a company is
not motivated to pay special attention to consumer servicing because there is no
competition effect as a stimulus to improve the service quality, to completely satisfy
customers and to establish a good reputation among them.
The structure of the Bulgarian market did not provide for competition and a
restructuring of the electricity supply chain was necessary to ensure conditions for
decentralization of generation and supply to end-users. In 2000 the first step in that
direction was made: NEK was restructured by spinning-off its generation, transmission,
and distribution elements. Changes were made in the horizontal structure on the level
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of electricity generation and distribution/supply through the establishment of seven
independent power producers and seven independent electricity distribution
companies. NEK continued to be the only company which carried out the transmission.
At present the structure of the electricity market lacks businesses that deal only with
the electricity supply to end-users. The Bulgarian legislation does not include special
provisions for this activity and the latter is not subject to separate licensing but is
integrated in the distribution function. Hence supply is carried out by the electricity
distribution companies, which are monopolies on a regional level regarding households
and do not have large stimuli to improve their services and their image among customers.
This market structure and distribution of functions is not an unusual practice and
has been observed at the start of reforms in other countries as well because electricity
supply to households does not provide large opportunities for profit. In addition, the
distribution and supply serve one and the same market segment. Gradually, however,
with the introduction of new technologies, the application of measures for more efficient
electricity supply, the introduction of efficient regulatory mechanisms, and the
promotion of competition in supply to larger electricity consumers, household electricity
supply will become a market segment. This will stimulate competition among suppliers
and will require the separation of their commercial activities from the operation of the
distribution network.
The establishment of new structures in the Bulgarian electricity sector should be
accompanied by the introduction of commercial relations alongside the value added
chain, subjected to the single buyer model. In this model, independent power producers
and electricity distribution companies conclude trade contracts with the single buyer
whose role in Bulgaria is performed by NEK. The single buyer model is one of the
possible market organizational forms envisaged in the Directive 96/92/EC but it has not
been chosen for the entire organization of the market relations in any EU Member
State. The major drawback of this model is that it limits the possibilities for competition
because of the remaining monopoly of a single company (single buyer) for electricity
sales to large customers and distributors. The single buyer model in Bulgaria restricts
competition only at the stage of generation and to the extent that the single buyer
purchases the generated electricity according to the economical dispatch principle.
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The single buyer model has proven itself mainly in countries with a deficiency of
electricity, where investors in new generation capacity are attracted through the
provision of equal conditions for electricity sale to all producers. In Bulgaria production
capacity exceeds domestic consumption and in recent years the excess electricity has
been exported to satisfy demand in neighboring countries as well. Based on the
experience noted above this implies that Bulgaria does not have the best conditions
for the single buyer model. It is worth noting that in countries where independent
regulation and competition on the electricity market are unknown, such as Bulgaria,
this model may turn out to be suitable for preparing market agents to participate in a
regulated or liberalized market. Unfortunately the introduction of the single buyer
model in Bulgaria to a great extent proved itself to be a mechanic separation of the
electricity companies. It was accompanied neither by efficient activities for the internal
restructuring of these companies in compliance with market needs, nor by preparation
of a regulatory framework for the next stage of the transition to fully market relations,
nor by education of electricity consumers to market habits. In addition, this market
structure combined with the state ownership and the impossibility or lack of desire on
the part of consumers to pay their electricity bills, cause the government to act as a
buffer between the inability of electricity suppliers to collect in full their receivables
from end-users and the need to pay electricity producers so that the latter to remain
vital market agents. Though this interference maintains the stability of the sector and to
a great extent support consumers, neither electricity distribution companies, nor
consumers learn appropriate market culture and behavior with respect to electricity
supply.
After the establishment of the single buyer model, market agents from the neighboring
levels of the value added chain had to conclude written contracts for the purchase of
electricity. The rights and obligations of the parties to household electricity supply
should have been set forth in signed contracts under general terms and conditions.
This however did not take place. Amendments to the EEEA as of the end of 2001
imposed a new model for settling these relations: the rights and obligations of each
party must be defined in public general terms and conditions prepared by the company
and approved by SERC. Consumers who disagree with these terms and conditions are
entitled to conclude on an individual basis additional agreements with the supply
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company. Given that the general terms and conditions are prepared by the distribution
companies, they may tend to favor the supplier at the expense of the consumer. As
such, the role of the regulatory commission is extremely important for balancing the
interests of the two parties. It would be helpful in this respect for the general terms and
conditions and the potential amendments to them to be the subject of a public
consultation process in coordination with consumer protection associations. In this
regard we have the good example of the Sofia Electricity Distribution Company, which
organized a public discussion of its draft general terms and conditions of contracts with
households. Such acts will have at least two positive effects: first, they will provide a
means of achieving a balance between the interested parties prior to the submission of
the draft general terms and conditions to the regulatory commission; second, they will
increase consumer confidence in their supplier.
In Bulgaria the single buyer model is viewed as transitional and will be gradually
replaced by the so-called model of regulated third party access. The latter provides for
the transmission and distribution companies to transit electricity through their networks
according to rules defined by SERC. Eligible consumers and electricity producers/
suppliers negotiate between themselves the terms and conditions of supply without
negotiating any conditions for using the transmission and distribution networks.
Initially only consumers with an annual consumption of at least 100 GWh will take
advantage of this opportunity. That is the threshold stipulated in the Ordinance on the
Access of Independent Power Producers and Eligible Consumers to the Transmission
Network (April 2002). An enterprise becomes eligible only if it has no obligations to
other electricity suppliers. The general price conditions according to which the
transmission network will be accessed are set forth in the Ordinance on the Formation
and Implementation of Electricity Prices and Tariffs (March 2002).
Although the legal grounds for the liberalization of a portion of the electricity market
is already available, transactions will not be concluded until the beginning of 2003.
During the initial stage of market liberalization the organization of supply to
households will not change because they do not exceed the threshold of minimum
consumption and respectively will not be classified as eligible. Therefore, households
will again be supplied by one company, which will have a monopoly position.
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3. Privatization in the Bulgarias Electricity Sector
Development of the Privatization in Bulgarias Electricity Sector
The separated independent companies in the Bulgarian electricity sector are entirely
state-owned. Competition among them is unlikely to develop provided that enterprises
have the same proprietor. This is why the next step towards the establishment of
competition in the Bulgarian electricity sector depends on the dissemination of
ownership among a greater number of proprietors. In addition, it is expected that as a
result of private sector participation, funds for the improvement of the electricity
infrastructure will be ensured, new technologies will be introduced, and management
experience in both the enterprise process and relations between market agents will be
transferred.
The process of privatization in the Bulgarian electricity sector started in 2000 with
the offer for privatization of 11 small hydroelectric power plants (HPPs). By August
2002, 20 HPPs have been privatized or their buyer has been selected in a tender
procedure. These enterprises constitute an insignificant part of the electricity production
in Bulgaria, as they account for only 1.5% of the installed capacity and only 0.8% of
the generated electricity. As a result of this and of the fact that these companies do not
have a direct connection with households, no apparent consequences of this
privatization could be found.
In 1998 the government initiated negotiations with Entergy for the establishment of
a joint venture company to rehabilitate Maritza East 3 TPP as well as with CCC (the
majority share of its equity was later bought by AES) for the construction of new units
on the site of Maritza East 1 TPP. The expectations are that the realization of those
projects will start in September 2002 and at the beginning of 2003 respectively.
The insignificant progress in the electricity sector privatization is a direct consequence
of the mutual impact of a number of factors from previous years. These include the
lack of a complete and clear regulatory framework, an inefficiently functioning regulatory
body, and the lack of a clear, long-term strategy for the privatization in the sector. The
success of the privatization requires a good legal and regulatory framework to be
established prior to the ownership restructuring to assure potential investors that their
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interests will be protected in long run and that they will work in a stable and predictable
environment. The timely and successful formation of this framework is crucial before
the next big step in the sector privatization, which will encompass the seven electricity
distribution companies and will have direct consequences for households.
Attitude of Bulgarians towards the Privatization in the Sector
An interesting aspect at this stage of the privatization is the opinion of consumers
regarding the need to change the ownership structure of the electricity companies.
In order to better understand the attitude of Bulgarians towards the privatization of
electricity companies it is necessary to consider the dynamics of public trust in
privatization over the course of several years.
At the start of the process in 1993 the fear of the ownership change predominated.
As a result of the aggravating financial condition of state-owned companies, the bad
macroeconomic indicators, the escalating economic crisis, rising unemployment, and
the decreasing living standards, people realized more and more clearly the objective
imminence of the privatization.
The attempts to achieve social justice and broad participation of the public in the
process through mass privatization turned out unsuccessful and did not enrich many of
the participants. In addition, many of the enterprises whose capital was privatized in
the mass privatization continued to experience difficulties. In certain cases there were
internal tensions and disagreements among the equity owners themselves as well as
between them and minor shareholders. This further aggravated the conditions of the
respective companies. Whereby one majority owner subsequently consolidated the
capital, the consolidation process did not proceed quickly and fluidly.
At the same time, the condition of the companies that remained under state
ownership continued to worsen while unemployment soared. In 1999 strikes began
occurring with demands for faster privatization of certain enterprises as the only
possibility for their survival as economic agents. The decisive acceleration of the
privatization in the last four years was to some extent at the expense of the quality of
the separate transactions. Most enterprises were practically de-capitalized while the
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interests of strategic investors remained low. Some of the companies were sold to
management-employee companies and the lack of strategic investors further aggravated
the already difficult financial situation of most of them. As a result of these problems
many companies became insolvent. Meanwhile, steps were undertaken to terminate
dozens of contracts because of non-performance of the contract terms by the buyers.
Over the course of the last year there were a number of scandals, related to concerns
for corruption in certain privatization deals. This development led to a dramatic decline
in the public trust in the process and increased concerns for the next stage of privatization
which deals with the natural monopolies, including those in the electricity sector.
Along with the aggravation of the public trust in privatization, several other factors
directly influencing peoples expectations of the ownership change should be considered
as well: (1) the low living standard and low income of the predominant part of the
population20 , and (2) insufficient awareness of the particular steps in the restructuring
of the natural monopolies, of the experience of other countries, and of the protection
of consumers rights during the reforms. The influence of these factors has its natural
reflection on the attitude of Bulgarians towards the privatization of the electricity
companies.
According to the results of the national survey within the Impact of Reforms in the
Bulgarian Electricity Sector on Consumer Protection Project 25.4% of Bulgarians view the
privatization of electricity companies as necessary, while 41.4% consider it useless.
Among those who support the sector privatization in principle, 53.0% are of the opinion
that the process should impact electricity producers, 37.6% - the electricity transmission
company, 61.4% - suppliers. The share of those who felt incapable of judging whether
a sector privatization is necessary is relatively high (33.4%). Almost 80% of the latter
stated that they had no data about the reforms in the sector, and 55% did not know
their rights and obligations as electricity consumers. These data lead us to conclude
that the lack of a clear position among consumers is mainly the result of insufficient
awareness of the restructuring process.
Opponents of the privatization process and those who did not state an opinion on
the necessity of the process are typically between fifty and seventy-five years old, have
a primary or secondary school education, are in the countrys lowest income bracket,
20 The results of the national survey show that 68% of those surveyed consider their financial condition as bad or very
bad and 64.7% of them have monthly incomes of less than 300 BGN.
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Source: National Public Opinion Poll within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector
on Consumer Protection Project, CED/ Vitosha Research, November, 2001
Figure 2: Households Awareness of Electricity Sector Reforms in
Bulgaria
and typically live in rural regions and small towns. As a result they are the most vulnerable
group to any unfavorable changes in the sector for consumers. Consequently, an active
explanatory campaign should be carried out among them about the activities which
the government plans to undertake to protect their rights as consumers and to ensure
their access to electricity services after the changes take place.
4. Consumer Awareness of the Reforms in the Bulgarias
Electricity Sector
The results of the national survey demonstrate a low degree of awareness within
society of the reforms in the electricity sector. Only 27.3% of those surveyed have ever
heard of the separation of NEK from suppliers, 15.3% are aware that NEKs functions
are restricted to the purchase of electricity from producers and its transmission to the
distribution companies. 27.2% are aware that state participation in the energy sector
decreases due to the ongoing privatization and 7.4% - that an independent regulatory
body was established in the sector (see Figure 2). The degree of the unawareness of
structural reforms in the sector varies from 72.7% to 92.6%. More than 60% of the
respondents from any age group are not familiar with the reforms. The highest degree
of unawareness is detected in the groups under twenty-five and over fifty years.
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4.5% of those surveyed think that they have enough information about the reforms
in the sector, 18.8% have received some information but need more, 33.8% know
almost nothing and would like to receive information, 34.6% do not know anything
and are not interested. The degree of consumers lack of familiarity with the restructuring
in the electricity sector is especially high and an explanatory campaign needs to be
carried out as soon as possible. A more detailed analysis of the social-demographic
characteristics of the respondents experiencing information hunger and wishing to
satiate it, shows that these are mainly representatives of households with the lowest
income and social standing, living in rural areas, with primary and secondary school
educations, between fifty-one and seventy-five years old, who consider their financial
condition bad. In practice they are the most vulnerable to any changes, taking place in
the activity of natural monopolies, because they are least flexible with regard to the
financial conditions of the services, rendered by those monopolies. Therefore any
explanatory campaign should be directed mostly to them.
5. Projected Impact of Organizational Restructuring and
Privatization on Electricity Prices and Quality
One of the effects, expected as a result of the ongoing reforms in the EU electricity
sectors, is a decrease in prices for end-users. A similar effect can be expected in Bulgaria
as well but only in the long run. Before experiencing these consequences of the sector
reforms however, electricity prices for households will increase till they reach their
economically justifiable level. This is necessary to guarantee that the companies,
operating on the Bulgarian market and servicing households, will be able to reap
economic benefits from this activity without sacrificing their profit from servicing other
market segments.
Increasing prices undoubtedly raise issues relating to affordability. If the cost increases
quickly, low-income households may not be able to adapt to the changes. This could
lead to financial problems for an electricity supplier. This is why a gradual price increase
policy during the transitional period, accompanied by clear signals to consumers
regarding what price changes to expect should be pursued rather than an abrupt price
increase policy.
In the long run electricity prices for households may decrease mainly as a result of
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the more efficient use of resources by electricity enterprises attempting to maximize
profits. When the household electricity market is liberalized, competition among
suppliers will probably encourage the reduction of the unit rates for electricity supply.
Market competition and attempts by private operators to maximize profits may
lead to reductions in transmission losses, to more efficient uses of primary energy
resources, to the introduction of new high-tech and efficient systems through
investments, which the State cannot provide because of its limited financial resource.
These improvements may in turn reduce the number of unplanned interruptions and
the time needed to restore supply.
The practice in the EU shows that the market restructuring, the privatization and
the liberalization lead to internal restructuring of electricity companies. One of the
main aspects of the internal restructuring is the decrease of the number and relative
share of the employed persons with technical competence and the emphasized opening
of new workplaces for specialists in marketing and customer relations21 . Private
enterprises, especially those operating in a truly competitive environment, tend to
offer better customer services than government monopolies. Improvements may include
new possibilities for deferred payments, improvements of customers awareness of
their rights and obligations, provision of consultation services, etc.
One goal of the electricity market liberalization in Europe is to improve the efficiency
of participants through competition. The achievement of this goal in Bulgaria reveals
good perspectives for the improvement of competitiveness of both the electricity and
the other sectors. This will finally impact on the well being of society as a whole.
The opinion of Bulgarians about the impact of the privatization on electricity prices
and quality is another interesting point. 27% of those who support the privatization
think that quality will improve, 14.2% that it will deteriorate, 29% do not expect any
changes. As to price, 8.3% think that it will fall, 56.9% envision an increase, and 8.5%
do not expect any changes. The comparison between quality and price expectations
shows that 30.6% of those who envision a quality improvement think that it will be
accompanied by price decrease, 41.8% expect a price increase, and 17.9% do not
expect any price changes. Of those who expect quality to deteriorate 96.4% think that
price will increase. Of those who expect quality to remain the same 0.9% expect price
21 For more information about the qualitative changes in employment in the electricity and gas sectors due to the
restructuring in the European Union read the report The Effects of the Liberalization of the Electricity and Gas Sectors on
Employment, http://europe.eu.int/comm/energy/library/ecotecfinalreport.pdf
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to decrease, 80.2% expect it to increase, 12.8% do not expect any change. Special
attention is to be paid to the fact that over a half of the supporters of privatization
expect service quality to deteriorate and price to increase. Such an expectation
contradicts the elementary market logic and implies that these respondents view
privatization in the electricity sector as an end in itself, as something inevitable, which
they have accepted.
Those who think that the quality of electricity supply will improve typically have
above average incomes, enjoy an elevated position in the social hierarchy, live mainly
in the capital, and are between thirty-five and fifty years old. Respondents who think
that it will not change typically have below average incomes, low social statures, and
high school educations. They often live in rural areas and are typically under twenty-
five years of age. Those without an opinion are typically at the bottom of the social
hierarchy with very low incomes. They too live in rural areas where they are often
engaged in agriculture and are over seventy-five years of age.
Source: National Public Opinion Poll within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector
on Consumer Protection Project, CED/ Vitosha Research, November, 2001.
Figure 3: Households Expectations for the Impact of Privatization on
Electricity Service Quality
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People with the lowest income and social statures, living in rural areas, with primary
or secondary education, farmers and workers in commerce, at the age of between of
thirty-six and fifty years dominate the respondent group which expects price increase.
Respondents who do not have a definite opinion on the issue typically have no
educations, below the average incomes and low social statures. Most of them are at
the age of more than seventy-five years, reside in rural areas and are employed in
agriculture. Consequently, future efforts to inform those unfamiliar with the privatization
process should be directed above all to the above-mentioned target groups, with efforts
made to take into account their peculiarities.
6. Conclusions
The general framework for the reforms in Bulgarian electricity has been developed
but there is still more to be done with regard to the preparation of the organizational
restructuring and privatization. It is plausible that the social tolerance of the reforms
was one of the milestones in the development of this framework.
Source: National Public Opinion Poll within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian
Electricity Sector on Consumer Protection Project, CED/ Vitosha Research, November,
2001.
Figure 4: Households Expectations for the Impact of Privatization on
Electricity Prices
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Strengths
n Availability of a general frame-
work, assuming socially respon-
sible reforms
n Spinning-off of the separate ac-
tivities and their establishment
in separate companies
n Availability of normative and
regulatory grounds for conclud-
ing contracts between suppliers
and consumers
n Progress towards introducing
clear terms in the electricity sup-
plies
n Start of a dialogue between sup-
pliers and organizations, repre-
senting the interests of consum-
ers
Weaknesses
n Incomplete framework for
privatization in the sector
n Lack of experience in the regu-
lation and competition in the
electricity sector
n Highly limited competition in
the sector
n Lack of trade contracts between
suppliers and consumers
n Non-market behavior of suppli-
ers and consumers
n Lack of stimulus for educating
market culture among consum-
ers and suppliers
n Lack of social support for the
sector privatization
Opportunities
n Implementing and abiding the
new terms of the relationships
between consumers and
suppliers
n Establishment of independent
companies - brokers, dealing
with electricity supply
n Intensifying the dialogue
between the supplying
companies and consumers
n Transition from the single
buyer to a regulated access to
the market /market liberaliza-
tion for big consumers
n Price reform, accompanied by
measures to ensure the
tolerance of electricity bills
n Carrying out of scaly explana-
tory campaigns
Threats
n Unsuccessful privatization
n Inappropriate regulation of the
relationships in the sector
n Lack of measures, ensuring so-
cial tolerance of the reforms
n Lack of any change in the atti-
tude of consumers towards elec-
tricity supplies
n Lack of any behavior, orientated
to consumers, of the electricity
supplying
n Lack of any dialogue between
suppliers and consumers
n Lack of awareness, understand-
ing and support on the part of
consumers about the ongoing
reforms
Figure 5: Organizational Restructuring and Privatization in the Bulgarias
Electricity Sector from the Perspective of Consumer Protection
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Reforms in the sector are already taking place though progress has been slow. The
consequences for consumers have been limited to changes in price. Concerns about
security, quality and affordability of electricity supply are related to the future
developments in the sector.
Future stages in the restructuring and privatization of the sector must be characterized
by fairness to all participants, openness to their input, and transparency because of
their social significance. The transition period provides a unique opportunity to inform
consumers and to educate both them and suppliers in a more market-oriented behavior.
The degree of awareness among Bulgarians regarding reforms is currently low. This
causes uncertainty and a negative attitude towards the changes. Consumers have
expressed an interest in the reforms and a campaign should be undertaken to satisfy
their need for information to support the building-up of an active stance and positive
attitude towards the reforms. The experience, both positive and negative of other
countries with such reforms should be an important element of this campaign. Special
attention should be paid to the timely provision of information to the most vulnerable
groups and the procedures for the reliable protection of their rights and interests.
The reorganization in the electricity sector is significant for any Bulgarian. Any
mistakes in the restructuring carry the risk of transforming the state monopoly into a
private monopoly, which is maybe the most unfavorable alternative. Another important
problem concerns the social tolerance of reforms given the low living standard of many
Bulgarians, the thorough restructuring of the national economy and tight budget
restrictions. In other words, the ultimate goal of the reforms shall be rendering reliable,
qualitative and affordable services to electricity consumers under normal market
conditions.
CAPACITY OF THE STATE ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHTS OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS
The European Union requires its members to provide effective mechanisms to
guarantee electricity supply as a public service. Although competition has the potential
to eventually lead to improvements in service quality and decreases in prices, this does
not automatically occur at the beginning of the transition from a monopolistic to a
competitive market. This requires the establishment of regulatory bodies, which will
create an environment that encourages the achievement of these goals without
interfering in the daily activity of energy companies.
The objectives that regulatory agencies must strive for include:
n Protecting consumers from violations of their rights by companies with a large
market share;
n Encouraging investments while simultaneously protecting investors from
government interference;
n Promoting economic efficiency in the sector.
Most EU Member States have established regulatory bodies that are independent
of both corporate interests and daily political control though this independence is not
explicitly mandated by the Directive 96/92/EC.
The successful establishment and performance of the regulatory body in the Bulgarian
electricity sector is directly related to the protection of the rights and interests of consumers.
During the transition period certain market agents may be tempted to take advantage of
their monopoly position by increasing prices or not supplying to sparsely populated and
remote regions or to low-income consumers. The regulatory agency has an important
role to play in preventing such abuses and correcting them if they occur.
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1. Establishment of a Regulatory Body in Bulgaria
Structural changes in the Bulgarias energy sector, the desire of the government to
put the sector on a competitive basis and to gradually withdraw from both the ownership,
subsidizing and investing predetermined the need of a body to regulate the sector as
an independent institution. With the approval of the Energy and Energy Efficiency Act
(EEEA) in the middle of 1999 the normative conditions necessary for the establishment
of the State Energy Regulatory Commission (SERC) were created. The Commission
itself was established in the autumn of the same year with the Council of Ministers
Decree 181 (September 10, 1999).
The members of the regulatory body should be appointed as early as possible before
assuming their functions to be able to get acquainted with their new responsibilities, to
pass through adequate trainings and to ensure the preparation of its policies and
direction. During this initial phase the regulatory body should expand competence in
technical, economic, financial, and legal aspects of the energy sector, as well as in
public relations and negotiations. According to Richard Green22 , the preparatory work
necessary to prepare price regulations in the utility sector for instance takes
approximately two years. SERC had to assume its responsibilities in price regulation at
the beginning of 2002 but the two-year preparatory period turned out insufficient for
the adoption of legislation. Since the Ordinance on the Formation and Implementation
of Electricity Prices and Tariffs was adopted hardly in early 2002 SERC assumed its
functions in this regard in the midst of March 2002.
SERC is composed of experts with a wide range of relevant expertise. This forms a
good basis for the establishment of a functioning and competent body. Unfortunately,
during the formative training as a part of the regulatory agency little attention was paid
to the social consequences of the reforms in the electricity sector. The dominant
concerns during the preparatory period were technical questions relating to the
restructuring itself as well as the corporate aspects of the reforms. Only in recent months
has the effect of the reforms on households become a subject of a more thorough
analysis and discussion.
The regulatory body should use the adaptation period to establish connections and
relations with organizations and institutions in the country and abroad. With regard to
22 Green R., Utility Regulation - A Critical Path for Revising Price Control, Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note No. 127,
The World Bank
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the rights and interests of consumers this entails establishing contacts and possibilities
for dialogue with the state bodies involved in the energy sector, social policy,
competition, consumer protection. These include the State Agency of Energy and Energy
Resources/the Ministry of Energy and Energy Resources, the Ministry of Labor and
Social Policy, the Commission for Protection of Competition, the Commission for Trade
and Consumer Protection, as well as companies subject to regulation, and non-
governmental associations representing consumer interests. Progress in this area has
been limited to the distribution of functions in the energy sector between SERC and
the former State Agency of Energy and Energy Resources and to the establishment of
relations with companies concerning licensing arrangements.
The SERCs relation with international organisations provides some hope that the
organisation will eventually prove itself capable of meeting its social obligations. For
example, the SERCs participation in the Energy Regulators Regional Association (ERRA)
for Central and Eastern Europe23  is encouraging because it facilitates the exchange of
experience and information with countries undergoing similar reforms. The Association
is a voluntary organization of the energy regulatory bodies in the region and its goals
are to improve energy regulations in its Member States, to a large extent by encouraging
collaboration and the exchange of experience among them. Within the Association
information about regulatory practices in Central and Eastern Europe in pricing, licensing,
performance monitoring, quality control, etc. is exchanged.
2. Independence of SERC
We define independence of a regulatory body as a distant relationship with political
authorities and private interests subject to regulation and availability of the attributes for the
organizational autonomy, necessary to ensure that distant relationship and to develop the
necessary expertise for the bodys successful performance.
The independence of the regulatory body is a guarantee that all parties to electricity
supply will be treated equally. It should be a guarantee for electricity consumers that
prices are fairly formed and not influenced by political, economic or corporate interests,
that electricity supply will be dependable, that performance of public service obligations
will be impartially monitored and corrected.
23 www.erranet.org
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In the European legislation the independence of the energy regulatory body is not
required. In practice however, most EU Member States have established independent
regulatory bodies. One of the proposals of the European Commission for amendments
to the Directive 96/92/EC from March 2001 was the introduction of a requirement for
the independence of regulatory bodies. The Commission proposed that pricing and
the definition of rules for access to the network be included in the competences of
regulatory bodies. According to it this would introduce new guarantees that market
rules in energy sector will not be violated. In the Commissions revised proposals from
July 2002 only the explicit requirement for independence of regulatory bodies from
corporate interests has remained.
Warrick Smith summarizes the following formal criteria, which are obligatory
preconditions for the independence of the regulatory body24 :
n Clear obligations for its members that are incorporated in legislation and are
not subject to governments control.
n Preliminary defined requirements for the professional qualifications of
regulatory body members.
n Participation of both the executive and legislative power in the process of
appointing the regulatory body members.
n Clearly defined length of the appointment of regulatory body members, which
is not be subject to governmental interference.
n Overlapping terms of regulatory body members that do not coincide with
those of governmental bodies.
n Exclusion of the regulatory body from the rules for civil servants that would
prevent it from attracting and retaining highly qualified specialists.
n Ensuring reliable sources of financing to the regulatory body consisting of
fees collected by agents subject to regulation.
The overview of the SERCs status according to these formal criteria shows that
there is a relatively good but not sufficient ground to ensure its independence.
24 Smith, W. Utility Regulator - The Independence Debate, Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note No. 127, The World
Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/notes/127/127summary.html
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The SERCs functions have been specified in the EEEA and have been elaborated in
the Statutes of the State Energy Regulatory Commission and Its Administration. These
Statutes are subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, which offers some
concern about possible interference by the government.
The professional qualifications required of SERC members have been defined in
the Article 13 of the EEEA. They have been reduced to a minimum: the SERC members
must have university degree and at least ten years of work experience, of which at least
three years in the field of energy, and must not be sentenced. As the requirements are
related to a certain degree of education and certain duration of the general and special
experience, they fall entirely within the framework provided by the Administration
Act. The Statutes of SERC do not set further requirements though the Administration
Act establishes such a possibility. A positive step in achieving the SERCs independence
is the requirement that its members be not directly related (are not employees) to
energy companies.
SERC members are appointed for five-year terms by the Council of Ministers.
Consequently, these appointments depend on the political party in power. The balance
in the Bulgarian system is achieved by the different duration of terms of the initial
regulatory body members. When the SERC was established in 1999 the term of two of
its members was set at two years, two other members were appointed for three-year
terms, while the rest received five-year terms. Thus, in December 2001 two of the
SERCs members were replaced due to the expiry of their terms. This implies that only
two politically biases appointments can be made. At the same time, the SERCs decisions
require a majority of at least two thirds of its seven members, i.e. at least five of them
must support a proposal to become a decision.
The terms of the SERCs members last for five years, while those of the legislative
and executive power last for four years. Again, the formal condition for the
independence of the regulatory body is fulfilled.
SERCs members and their teams are civil servants and respectively all regulations
concerning civil servants in general, including remuneration, are applicable to them.
SERC is a state body subjected to the Council of Ministers. Initially it was a second
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level budget-spending unit and its budget was drawn up, approved, and overseen by
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works. With the 2001 amendments to
the EEEA SERC became a first level budget-spending unit. This was an important step
in distancing it from the governments control. These amendments however do not
provide for SERC to use a part of fees collected from regulated energy companies for
financing of its activities. If SERC is given the authority to use a portion of licensing fees
on companies operating in the energy sector, a high degree of autonomy and
independence from the political sphere will be ensured.
3. Human Resources of SERC
SERC is a relatively young institution, still in the process of its institutional
establishment. Though it had been created in the autumn of 1999, it started assuming
and efficiently performing its functions at the end of 2000. Replacements of SERCs
members turn to be one of the significant obstacles that prevent a more rapid assuming
of the functions. In May 2000 five of the seven SERCs members appointed in the
autumn of 1999 were replaced although their terms had not expired. In 2001 another
four members were replaced, some of them because of the expiry of their two-year
terms.
Apart from making it difficult for SERC to establish itself, the replacements slowed
the process of accumulating experience and expertise, and in part, endangered the
consistency sought in the Commissions policies.
The competences and the number of the SERC personnel are other important
characteristics that predetermine the ability of the regulator to cope with its functions.
There is not a universal rule to determine the relevant number of the regulators
personnel. Understaffed personnel rob the regulator of the ability to perform its tasks.
Overstaffed personnel create conditions for dilution and shifting of responsibilities
and increase costs.
According to the SERCs Statute, the Commission should employ seventy-eight
people, of which sixty-three were appointed by fall 200125 . Although its personnel
increased in recent years, SERC still does not dispose of the necessary human resources
to ensure its normal functioning. The timely recruiting is an important precondition for
25 See the Regular Report of the European Commission for Bulgarias progress in the accession process 2001.
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the SERCs successful operation because Bulgaria lacks practice in regulation of natural
monopolies and time is needed to develop expertise in the field.
To some extent the SERCs inadequate expertise can be compensated through the
use of external consultants in compliance with Article 11 of its Statutes. Such a practice
is provided for not only in Bulgaria but also in other countries all over the world. While
attracting external consultants SERC should be aware that the former counsel and
recommend but it is the regulator that takes the final decision and assumes the
responsibility for it. Thus, if an external consultant recommends for example a new
structure of household electricity supply prices, SERC must ultimately decide whether
to apply the recommendations given the sector development and the social
considerations. In addition, external consultants are not necessarily disinterested parties
to the energy sector. As a result, their recommendations may favor certain private
interests and breach the principle of equal treatment of all agents in the sector.
In order to fulfill precisely its regulatory functions the regulatory body must be
competent in a wide range of fields including economy, finance, social policy,
engineering, and law to name a few. Experience in transition economies demonstrates
that people with this much expertise are in short supply and often prefer the private
sector because of the possibility of greater remuneration than is available in the public
one. It is largely for the retaining of well-qualified, trained, and competent personnel
that SERCs employees are to be exempt from the salary restrictions that apply to other
civil servants. Bulgaria has not applied such a measure yet. Some progress was achieved
in late 2001 when the amendments to the EEEA allowed SERCs employees to receive
additional remuneration. This has been an important first step in attracting and retaining
qualified and competent personnel to the Commission and in encouraging more efficient
performance of the regulator.
4. Functions of SERC
The governing principles of SERC include, among the others, such that relate to
consumer protection, e.g. to ensure a balance between interests of consumers, suppliers
and producers, and to ensure that prices reflect only economically reasonable costs.
The SERCs mandate is defined in the EEEA and includes the drawing up of draft
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secondary legislation, the preparation, issuance, and review of permits and licenses,
price regulation, and control over the performance of obligations specified in the
legislation and in the individual licenses. With regard to household electricity
consumption, the SERC functions concerning the definition of the license terms and
the control over their compliance, the approval of the general terms and conditions in
the contracts for sale of electricity, and affirmation of prices are especially important.
In performing these functions SERC must guarantee a reliable, high quality, and
affordable electricity supply to the population.
One of the main issues confronting the Bulgarian energy sector in recent years
concerns the allocation of functions between SERC and the State Agency of Energy
and Energy Resources, whose successor is the Ministry of Energy and Energy Resources
(MEER). MEER has to create and implement the governmental electricity policy,
including to determine sector priorities and the general directions for its development.
It must also consider the need for new capacity for satisfying domestic electricity demand
and actively participate in attracting strategic investors. With regard to households the
Ministry must determine the measures necessary to ensure energy security and the
satisfaction of societys electricity needs. SERC is in turn responsible for the regulation
of the relations in the sector. Otherwise the assumption of independent regulation will
be broken.
Prior to privatization MEER will act as owner of the state assets in the sector, including
the seven large electricity distribution companies that enjoy regional monopolies over
electricity supply to households. If at the same time MEER regulates the relations
between suppliers and consumers, there will be an imbalance between the interests of
parties to electricity supply as the Ministry is interested as a proprietor of suppliers.
Consequently, SERC must be delegated formulation of requirements to energy
companies and control over their compliance in order to protect the rights and interests
of households.
Another interesting aspect of the allocation of responsibilities among institutions
concerns the implementation of social policy, especially with respect to electricity
price increase for households. Until the approval of the Ordinance on the Formation
and Implementation of Electricity Prices and Tariffs, household electricity prices were
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determined by the Council of Ministers. The Ordinance divided this responsibility
between the electricity distribution companies and SERC. SERC became responsible
for ensuring that all households paid the same prices. SERC also began to oversee
whether costs are indeed related to electricity supply and are within reasonable limits.
During the transition period, while the electricity price for households climbs to the
level covering the cost incurred for low-voltage supply, SERC must propose increases
to prices on an annual basis, according to a schedule prepared in coordination with
the International Monetary Fund.
Electricity price increase for households must be accompanied by the
implementation of measures for the protection of vulnerable consumers. This is beyond
the competence of SERC. This is why SERC must work with other institutions such as
MEER, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the state institutions responsible for
competition and consumer protection, consumer associations, and trade unions.
5. Structure of SERC
In structural terms SERC has a general and special administration, divided into three
directorates (see Figure 6). None of its units is directly responsible for consumer
protection, though the functions of the special administration include issues that directly
concern the protection of consumer rights. In addition, each directorate has the legal
jurisdiction to protect consumer rights.
The Economy and Finance Directorate is competent in the field of forming electricity
supply prices. It is responsible for researching and analyzing the pricing rules and the
influence of prices and tariffs on the electricity sector, for preparing proposals regarding
the rate of return of electricity companies, and for affirming electricity supply prices.
While performing these functions, the Directorate is able to guarantee fair and affordable
prices of electricity supply to consumers.
The Permits and Licenses Directorate carries out all activities related to the licensing
process, including subsequent amendments, and the supplement and termination of
licenses. It is within the competence of the Directorate to include in the licenses of
electricity companies requirements for electricity supply in remote regions, performing
public service obligations, and ensuring electricity supply to vulnerable consumers,
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Figure 6: Structure of the State Energy Regulatory Commission26
Source: State Energy Regulatory Commission, www.dker.bg
26 The figure in the bracket shows the number of the personnel in each unit
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including the elderly, infirm, and impoverished.
The Control Directorate has the widest competence with regard to guaranteeing
the rights and interests of end-users, because it controls compliance with the
requirements formulated in the licenses, the maintenance of the quality and security
of electricity supply, price formation, and application.
6. Mechanisms of SERC for Protecting Electricity Consumers
SERC disposes of an array of mechanisms, with which to regulate the relations
between households and their electricity suppliers and to guarantee the rights and
interests of both.
By issuing licenses to electricity distribution companies SERC may impose concrete
requirements on these companies to render services of a certain quality. By issuing
licenses SERC may also oblige electricity distribution companies to perform certain
functions, ensuring quality, regularity, and security of electricity supply. Under the
present organization of the Bulgarian electricity market, only the regional electricity
distribution company may supply households with electricity. As such, it is the regulatory
body that must prevent abuses and ensure quality and security. In this regard, SERC is
entitled to impose additional public service obligations on energy companies. Costs
incurred will be recognized as operational costs of these companies and will be included
in price. It is through the imposition of such requirements that electricity may be reliably
supplied to all households, including those in remote and/or isolated regions.
Another means, through which SERC may guarantee the rights of consumers, is by
approving electricity supply prices for the regulated consumer groups. SERC is responsible
for determining whether costs proposed by suppliers reflect the value of the service
offered, as well as for determining an acceptable profit margin.
Thirdly, by exerting control over electricity companies SERC must ensure that the
former live up to their commitments and meet their assigned responsibilities and to
apply sanctions in the event of non-performance. While controlling and announcing
the findings SERC provides guarantees to households that their interests are protected
and that there are working stimuli for protection of their rights.
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7. Popularity of SERC in the Society
In addition to establishing relations with the private sector and other government
agencies, during the first years of its existence the SERC must establish links with the
public and increase societys awareness of its purpose and activities.
The establishment of the regulator and its functions are still unpopular in the Bulgarian
society. To date, less only 7.4% of the public is even aware of the SERCs existence. It
should be noted that SERCs establishment is the least popular among the four reforms
in the Bulgarias, whose popularity in the society was tested within the Impact on Reforms
in Electricity Sector on Consumer Protection Project (see Figure 2). The low awareness
undermines the SERCs effectiveness in representing consumers interests. This fact is
further supported by the national survey within the above-mentioned project, which
demonstrated that only 1.5% of the population would turn to SERC with an electricity
problem.
The lack of enough information must be offset by more clarity and transparency
about the Commissions authority, decision and actions and more information about
the requirements, with which the electricity distribution companies shall comply. SERC
must play a leading role in improving the publics awareness of itself and its activities as
well as of reforms as a whole. Greater awareness of the changes taking place in the
electricity sector would lead to an increase in public support for reforms.
8. Conclusions
The establishment of regulatory bodies in energy is a part of the reform in the sector,
which has spread over all European countries. Efficient mechanisms for regulation and
control in the sector are crucial to ensure proper functioning of competition and a
balance between the interests of all market players.
The analysis give us grounds to conclude that, in terms of regulation, formal
preconditions for ensuring fair and affordable prices and qualitative electricity supply
to households are available. As the regulatory practice in the Bulgarias electricity sector
is too short, it is impossible to assess to what extent these formal preconditions can
indeed ensure good protection of interests of all market agents.
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Efforts to split SERC from Bulgarias political powers have been important steps in
securing its independence. However, more work is necessary to ensure that neither
the private sector nor unforeseen government meddling later undermine this
independence.
It bodes well that the MEER has stated that current legislation is inadequate for
ensuring the SERCs independence and that it will maintain the latter as a priority in
formulating new legislation for the sector. This new legislation is currently being
elaborated and is expected to be adopted by the end of 2002.
With respect to its human resources SERC is still building the necessary capacity to
be able to protect the interests of electricity consumers. Having its full complement of
qualified staff in a short term would take the SERC a long way towards achieving its
goals and should be a top priority. Preconditions for the improvement of human capacity
of SERC include recruiting of more specialist with large expertise, training and better
motivation of the regulators personnel and attracting external experts with sound
experience in development and implementation of regulatory mechanisms for
protection of electricity consumers in a transition period.
Functions delegated to SERC provide for good protection of electricity consumers
without disturbing the market or showing discriminatory attitude to electricity suppliers.
SERC is able to impact upon price policy in the sector, which is the most sensitive
element of the reform in the sector.
The SERCs structural units have the authority to ensure the protection of consumers
rights and interests. These units have yet to exercise this authority however. Changing
this is one of the largest challenges currently facing both SERC and the development of
the sector as a whole.
Finally, it should be noted that the role and influence of the Bulgarias regulator will
intensify from now on. The SERCs efficiency is key to ensuring the success of reforms.
SERCs strengths and opportunities suggest that it may be successful in achieving public
support and social affordability of the transition to market relations in electricity supply.
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Strengths
n Established contacts and good
opportunities for exchange of
information with countries at a
similar stage of reform
n The functional capabilities of
SERC to guarantee the interests
of households without disturb-
ing the equality of all partici-
pants on the market
n Availability of mechanisms to
guarantee the interests of house-
holds
n Availability of competence at all
structural units to protect the
interest of consumers
Weaknesses
n Delay in the capacity establish-
ment and affirmation of the role
of the Commission among Bul-
garian institutions
n Insufficient communication
with the remaining institutions,
competent in protecting the in-
terests of consumers
n Shortage of highly qualified staff
n Lack of solid experience in regu-
lating the relationships between
market agents
n Low public awareness of the
existence and activity of the
Commission
Opportunities
n Harmonization of national leg-
islation with the norms of the
European Union
n Use of the best practices from
transition countries and EU
member countries
n Affirming the independence of
the Commission on the basis of
the already present  formal pre-
conditions for its autonomy
n Clear division of the functions
and competence of the separate
institutions in the energy sector
n Desire of the public to receive
more information
Threats
n Unfavorable conditions for mo-
tivating and retaining the quali-
fied staff
n Strong financial dependence on
the political power
n Abilities of the political power
to influence the regulatory body
Figure 7: Features of SERC Related to Consumer Protection
THE IMPACT OF PRICE ON THE AFFORDABILITY OF
ELECTRICITY TO HOUSEHOLDS
1. General Principles of Electricity Price Formation
One of the main challenges to most regulators today is to create an adequate
regulatory framework leading to an increase in economic efficiency, to introduction of
competition and to improvement of service quality.
Wherever electricity prices are subject to regulation, regulators usually attempt to
establish fair prices through two principal means. The traditional approach is called
cost-of-service regulation, while the more advanced approach is known as price/revenue
cap regulation.
Cost-of-service regulation protects shareholder returns, thereby reassuring investors.
The main problems with this type of scheme are that it removes incentives to improve
efficiency and encourages over-investment.
Price/revenues cap regulation is designed to overcome this drawback. Under this
regime the regulatory body sets an initial maximum price, at which the utility can sell
its service. The goal is to imitate the performance of a competitive market where the
seller cannot raise his price above that of his competitors without losing so much market
share that the price rise becomes unprofitable.
The price/revenue cap should not be altered every time the utilitys costs change.
Otherwise stimuli for cost optimization would become non-working. To avoid this
problem, a price/revenue cap formula is typically fixed for a three- to five-year term. In
a competitive market, changes in costs, including those that result from improvements
in technology, are often transferred to consumers. To imitate this process, the price
cap is usually indexed to the consumer price index and annually adjusted to reflect the
expected rate of efficiency improvement. The resulting price must not increase in
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nominal terms by a greater margin than the consumer price index less the predicted
rate of efficiency improvement. If a utility improves its efficiency faster than the predicted
rate, its profits will increase and it will be able to distribute higher dividends to its
shareholders. Separating the price cap from actual costs in this way provides incentives
for utilities to innovate and cut costs in a way that is lacking in a cost-of-service regulatory
regime.
The price/revenue cap method is currently widely used in the energy sector. It
provides good incentives to cut costs and thus prevents consumers from facing
unreasonably high costs in a sector where modern society makes it almost impossible
to refuse the service being offered. The price/revenue cap method reawakens however
worries about failing to provide an adequate rate of return especially for new
investments. To allay these fears price/revenue cap is typically set at a level sufficient to
cover not only operating and maintenance costs but also a good rate of return on both
inherited capital and new investment.
2. Electricity Price Regulation Framework in Bulgaria
According to the Energy and Energy Efficiency Act (EEEA) price regulation in the
energy sector must be carried out on the basis of objective, non-discriminatory criteria
that ensure the balance of economic interests of energy companies and consumers.
Until January 1, 2002 the consumer prices were determined by the Council of
Ministers. The Ministry of Energy and Energy Resources in turn regulated prices between
independent power companies alongside the value-added chain in compliance with
price formation norms approved by the Council of Ministers and with principles
stipulated in the EEEA.
According to Section II, Chapter III of the EEEA, the Council of Ministers was required
to adopt an ordinance with methodological guidelines for price formation in the
electricity sector and SERC had to implement it as of January 1, 2002. The first
methodology was adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2000 as part of secondary
legislation to the EEEA. Due to some deficiencies found during the period of the
experimental implementation of this ordinance, SERC made significant revisions and
proposed to the Council of Ministers a completely new methodology incorporated in
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the Ordinance on Formation and Implementation of Electricity Prices and Tariffs (the
Ordinance) that came into force on March 7, 2002. During the transitional period
between January 1, 2002 and April 1, 2002 temporary rules for the formation and
implementation of electricity prices and tariffs were in force in accordance with the
Decree „298 of the Council of Ministers.
The Ordinance incorporates the price/revenue cap regulation approach for a given
regulatory period and thus, encourages improvements in efficiency rather than extensive
investments. The methodology provides consumers with certain guarantees for
reasonable prices as it envisages only costs necessarily incurred within the performance
of the regulated activity to be covered. Because these costs are not clearly defined
however these guarantees are not sufficient. Primarily because of this lack of clear
definitions in the Ordinance, the Supreme Administrative Court declared some of its
provisions to be illegal27 .
The Ordinance also allowed prices to cover only the return on those assets that are
used for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. The rate of return
is determined by SERC to correspond with the levels in countries, sectors and companies
with a similar risk rate. The goal is to attract investors to Bulgaria and to ensure the
health of the sector and through this, the security of supply.
The Ordinance provides for electricity companies to submit proposals for changes
in the set prices prior to the end of the regulatory period depending on the inflation
rate, their efficiency coefficient and the exchange rate dynamics. Companies will take
advantage of this right only if they derive a benefit from the changes. At the same time
SERC may not initiate such changes if, for example, the exchange rate changes lead to
a dramatic decrease in the costs of energy companies.
It should be noted that the Ordinance is in force only for those cases in which
buyers are not eligible or do not exercise their right to choose their supplier. With the
first step of the liberalization of the electricity market in Bulgaria all customers with an
annual consumption of at least 100 GWh will be given the opportunity to freely negotiate
27 In its decision dated July 18, 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court declared illegal Art.13, Para.2, Item 5 of the
Ordinance, which allowed for other costs that are not dependent on the quantity of generated electricity to be
included in the fixed costs of energy companies. The Courts decision states that the text of the provision contradicts
the requirement of the Normative Acts Law, which requires provisions of normative acts to be formulated in Bulgarian,
in brief, clear, and precise terms. In addition, the Court argued that Art.13, Para.2, Item 5 of the Ordinance is not an
objective criterion for determining the availability of capacity price and end-user price respectively. As a consequence
the Court held that Item 5 contradicts the requirement of the EEEA that requires the use of objective and non-
discriminatory criteria that ensure a balance between the economic interests of energy companies and consumers.
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prices with independent power producers. Given that the household electricity market
is only expected to open in 2007, prices for this consumer segment over next years will
be formed in conformity with the Ordinance.
Consumer prices are dependent on the performance of all companies in the sector,
including those engaged in generation, distribution, and transmission. That is why it is
worth reviewing the major issues in the price formation at each of these levels.
With regard to generation the Ordinance deals with:
n Availability of capacity, which is linked to the ability of the each generation
plant to make available to the transmission system operator capacity to
generate electricity. Regulated costs for availability consist of fixed operating
and maintenance costs and provisions for reasonable investments.
n Provision of electricity, which is associated with the ability of each generation
plant to produce electricity at the request of the transmission system operator.
Regulated costs for electricity provision consist of fuel costs, material costs,
and other variable operating and maintenance costs.
The availability price is subject to a cap during the regulatory period and thus
companies are encouraged to restrict their fixed costs and to improve their availability.
With regard to the price for the provision of electricity, no incentives have been provided
at this initial stage.
Proposals for availability and electricity provision prices are prepared by power
producers and submitted to SERC. SERC approves or rejects the proposed prices on
the basis of the principals stipulated in the EEEA and the methodology and procedures
envisaged by the Ordinance. In this way SERC exercises control over the costs
incorporated in the prices and is able to prevent any boosting of selling prices by
generation companies with, for example, unreasonably high increases in labour or
repair expenses, or with the incorporation of investments that are not directly related
to electricity generation.
Furthermore, generation companies can provide auxiliary services whose price they
negotiate directly with the transmission or distribution companies. Given that these
services incur costs for other companies involved in electricity supply, there it a threat
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for unreasonable price increase that is likely to be transferred to consumers.
An incentive for optimization of costs is incorporated in the Ordinance requirement
for the transmission system operator to perform economical planning and dispatch for
the electricity network while maintaining secure supply requirements. That is, while
purchasing electricity the operator gives priority to generators with lower selling prices.
The price of electricity sold by the transmission company consists of:
n Capacity price, which covers costs related to securing production and
transmission capacity, and maintenance costs, including investments.
n Electricity price which includes costs incurred for the purchase of electricity,
auxiliary services, and losses in transmission.
The costs of securing capacity and for the purchase of electricity are beyond the
control of the transmission company. Therefore, setting a cap on its selling price at the
beginning of the regulatory period provides incentives for it to increase its own efficiency
and to reduce transmission losses through upgrades and repairs.
With regard to market liberalization the Ordinance introduces an electricity
transmission tariff for contracts between independent power producers and an eligible
consumers. The tariff consists of a capacity charge, electricity charge, and system services
charge. It is designed to reflect the costs related to electricity transmission, technological
losses and auxiliary services. While optimizing the costs that it can directly influence
on, the transmission system operator is able to increase its profits as the transmission
tariff is fixed at the beginning of the regulatory period.
From the perspectives of households, electricity prices for which do not accurately
reflect their value, it should be noted that the Ordinance provides for transitional price
formation. This transitional period will last until the average electricity sale price to
households reaches the level of costs of low voltage supplies. During this period part of
the profits from electricity exports and sales of electricity to consumers connected to
the transmission network will be used to cover costs related to sales of electricity to
distribution companies. The aim of this approach is to ensure a smooth transition to
higher electricity price levels for households.
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The electricity price charged by distribution companies includes all reasonable costs
(including a return on assets) for distribution, supply and auxiliary services. SERC
approves operating and maintenance costs, distribution losses, an asset base, and a
rate of return. In conformity with the Ordinance electricity distribution companies
should present to SERC a statement of costs allocated to network maintenance, to its
development, and to end-user supply. Hence SERC controls costs for activities related
to secure system functioning and reliable electricity supply to consumers. Consumer
prices are proposed by all electricity distribution companies and are subject to SERCs
approval. They are in force for the entire regulatory period.
Tariffs, at which distribution companies sell electricity to households, are uniform
across the country, despite the difference in service costs by regions. This decision
reflects social considerations, such as ensuring affordable electricity costs to rural areas
where incomes tend to be lower.
Similar to price formation at the transmission level, the Ordinance provides for a
transitional period at the distribution level until prices cover the cost incurred for
household electricity supply. The formula determining the price for households during
the transitional period allows cross-subsidizing with revenues generated from non-
household customers. Again, this approach facilitates the smooth transition to higher
price level.
Household prices are differentiated according to the time of day. The tariffs will
increase during the transitional price formation period in accordance with the average
selling price of the electricity distribution companies.
Further improvements of retail pricing mechanisms are necessary to more accurately
reflect service costs for different consumer groups. As a first step distribution companies
must be split into two internal businesses: the distribution network business, undertaking
the distribution network functions; and the power sales business, carrying out the supply
functions.
Another important issue concerns how to help the poorest households who are
unable to pay even their current electricity bills. One possible approach is the scheme,
introduced on July 1, 2002, under which tariffs increase with the amount of electricity
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consumed. The scheme is self-funded insofar as consumers with higher electricity
consumption pay a subsidy to those with a lower level of consumption. It is unclear
however why larger consumers should pay higher rates instead of the contrary which is
normal in an open market.
3. Price Setting Mechanism
Aiming to establish incentives for efficiency and more predictable regulations, SERC
has adopted the price/revenue cap method described above, where appropriate. The
duration of the regulatory period for which the cap is in force is not explicitly determined
in the Ordinance and SERC may determine it on a case-to-case basis. It is
recommendable that the regulatory period last between three to five years, for the
effects of the price and revenue regulation to be achieved. The following two exceptions
should be taken into consideration:
n When a new market model is introduced, the duration of the regulatory period
should be restricted to one year for price regulations to adapt more precisely
to market performance.
n In the event of a new generation project, the regulatory period should last
longer and should correspond to the project payback period and to the
respective duration of any long-term power purchase agreements that have
been signed.
Prices may be updated annually to reflect changes in rates of inflation and exchange
rate. In these cases, improvements in efficiency that have been measured by a specially
designed methodology of SERC are taken into consideration as well.
SERC approves prices and tariffs at different levels of the electricity supply chain
based on input from energy companies regarding their costs and necessary revenues.
The electricity distribution companies are required to propose a uniform household
price. This must reflect the volume of expected sales, the costs of these sales, fixed
costs, and the status and expected changes in the capital structure of the company.
Because the companies prepare the proposals, which may be assumed to reflect their
interests, SERC must act as an advocate of consumers interests. In this role, it may take
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advantage of the following rights that the EEEA and the Ordinance delegated to it:
n To collect any relevant information from the regulated companies;
n To seek written evidence from the regulated companies;
n To recommend penalties for breaches of the EEEA and the Ordinance;
n To require attendance of specified individuals from regulated companies at
meetings with SERC;
n To commission relevant studies;
n To consult affected parties.
All the SERCs decisions are subject to appeal before the Supreme Administrative
Court. This is a normal procedure addressing all acts of the state administration. The
Courts current practice in this sphere is to make decisions exclusively with regard to
formal observation of law.28
4. Price Effects of Liberalization in the EU
A competitive market requires a large number of end-users to be able to freely
choose their supplier and to negotiate the terms and conditions of electricity supply,
including the price. In order to encourage the establishment of a functioning electricity
market within the EU, the Directive 96/92/EC introduces minimal thresholds for market
opening for end-users in each Member State. The Directive does not impose an
obligation for complete market liberalization. At the summit in Barcelona in March
2002, however, the liberalization of supply to all customers was one of the key issues,
though a consensus on the deadline has not been reached.
Only in countries where the electricity market is fully liberalized can all customers,
including households freely choose their supplier. As a result, direct effects on the
prices charged to household can be expected only in these countries. Moreover, the
28 In the autumn of 2001, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria and the Podkrepa Labour
Confederation challenged the household electricity prices that came into force on October 1, 2001 in the Supreme
Administrative Court. In its decision, the Court argued that the prices were not legitimate because the Labour Code
requires that representative organisations be consulted on regulations affecting the standard of living, such as electricity
prices. The Court also argued that the decision of the Council of Ministers for the household electricity price increase
did not contradict the legally defined purpose of satisfying societys electricity needs. They argued that the aim of the
law is not restricted only to the protection of life and health but includes also a balance between the interests of
producers and consumers, improvement of energy efficiency, establishment of an energy market, securing investments,
protection of the environment, and national security.
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extent of such effects largely depends on the acceptance of new suppliers by households.
In countries where the liberalization does not include households end-user price effects
may emerge either because reduced generating prices are passed on to consumers or as
a result of the application of price cap rules that also cover the captive market or both.
A comprehensive analysis of price effects shows that regulatory reform in the
electricity sector not only has a direct effect on consumer prices but to the extent that
electricity serves as an input to other sectors of the economy it also affects production
costs. This triggers a number of indirect price effects such as lower prices of industrial
products. In this way, fluctuations in electricity prices may be passed on to consumers.
In general, increased competition results in price reductions in the liberalized
electricity industry. Competitive pressures lead to productivity gains and thus to lower
costs. In addition, competition stimulates innovation which often also reduces costs
through increased efficiency. The introduction of competition also affects the price
structure, as tariffs across market segments (for example, industrial versus household
consumers), are recalibrated to reflect costs more accurately. In some cases, price
increases may be necessary, if power companies were to stop receiving public subsidies
for example. Similarly, if only a portion of the electricity market is subject to competition,
incumbents may try to use monopoly rents earned in the sheltered market segments to
cross-subsidize electricity generation and supply in the competitive segment. If the
regulator does not accurately perform its functions and obligations, power companies
may unreasonably increase their prices for the regulated market and to ensure additional
financial resources to cover their losses on the liberalized market. In these ways, both
tariff rebalancing and cross subsidizing may result in partial price increases.
Another factor that affects electricity prices in the European Union is the creation of
opportunities for cross border electricity trade between producers and suppliers of
one country and eligible consumers in another country. Though this trade is still limited
- accounting for only 8.0% of the total electricity generated in the EU in 2000 - it
appears to be on the rise (from 6.5% four years earlier). This is encouraging, as cross
border trade tends to lead to lower prices through increased competitive pressures on
national suppliers, while forcing the latter to improve their price competitiveness in
order to keep their customers and to enlarge their markets, including to perform
successfully on external markets.
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Table 2 illustrates changes in the sub-index for electricity of the Harmonized Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP) in the European Union. As of 1999 a downward price trend
is observed in most countries. This can be regarded as the first impact that regulatory
reform is having on electricity prices. In the United Kingdom the electricity sector was
liberalized earlier than in the rest of the EU and the HICP sub-index for electricity
shows a continuous downward trend since 1996.
Table 3 provides an overview of price levels in July 2000 for four different types of
electricity consumers, defined in accordance with their consumption volume. It shows
Source: Price Effects of Regulatory Reform in Selected Network Industries, ECB, March 2001, http://
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb200109en.pdf
Table 2: Evolution of the Electricity Sub-Index of the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 % change between % change between
1996 and 2000  1999 and 2000
Belgium 100.0 100.4 101.4 100.7 98.9 -1.1 -1.8
Germany 100.0 100.5 101.7 105.7 100.5 0.5 -4.9
Greece 100.0 101.5 104.9 97.1 91.3 -8.7 -6.0
Spain 100.0 98.9 98.9 96.2 92.8 90.6 -9.4
France 100.0 97.8 95.7 91.4 89.5 -10.5 -2.1
Ireland 100.0 101.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 2.9 0.0
Italy 100.0 96.8 98.4 94.4 102.2 2.2 8.2
Luxembourg 100.0 101.0 101.2 101.5 100.2 0.2 -1.3
Netherlands 100.0 102.9 103.6 110.7 128.9 28.9 16.5
Austria 100.0 102.7 102.7 101.9 101.4 1.4 -0.5
Portugal 100.0 101.0 102.4 97.6 97.0 -3.0 -0.7
Finland 100.0 101.7 102.3 99.9 98.8 -1.2 -1.1
Denmark 100.0 104.1 113.7 117.5 122.2 22.2 4.1
Sweden 100.0 106.4 109.8 104.9 102.2 2.2 -2.6
United Kingdom 100.0 95.2 90.9 89.8 87.9 -12.1 -2.1
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that there are significant price differences between them. Prices for small private
households are significantly higher than those for industrial users, and small-scale users
pay significantly more than large-scale users, both in the household and industrial
segments.
Table 3 also highlights significant price differences between the EU Member States.
The main reasons underlying these differences can be summarized as follows:
n First, the differences are largely predetermined by the differences in primary
Country
Small-scale
households (600
kWh annual
consumption)
Large-scale
households
(7500 kWh
annual
consumption)
Small-scale
industry
(50 MWh annual
consumption)
Small-scale
industry
(50000 MWh
annual
consumption)
Small-scale
households/
large-scale
industry ratio
Belgium 15.1 11.1 14.8 5.1 3.0
Germany 19.9 12.2 14.1 5.5 3.6
Greece 6.9 6.3 8.3 4.4 1.6
Spain 12.0 8.6 10.3 5.4 2.2
France 13.9 9.6 8.8 4.55 3.1
Ireland 13.8 7.6 12.6 5.3 2.6
Italy 7.7 17.8 15.4 6.2 1.2
Luxembourg 21.0 10.2 13.1 4.4 4.8
Netherlands 14.8 11.8 9.8 5.1 2.9
Austria 13.3 11.1 14.1 5.6 2.4
Portugal 12.1 10.6 11.9 4.7 2.6
Finland 12.3 6.1 5.9 2.7 4.6
Denmark 24.3 14.7 6.2 4.2 5.9
Sweden 18.4 7.9 5.3 3.1 6.0
United Kingdom 20.1 9.3 11.5 5.3 3.8
Table 3: Price Levels of Electricity in the European Union in July, 2000
(EUR/ 100 kWh, net of taxes)
Source: Price Effects of Regulatory Reform in Selected Network Industries, ECB, March 2001, http://
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb200109en.pdf
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fuel prices, such as the cost of natural gas. The fact that different countries
pay different rate for these resources is due to factors such as geographical
proximity to their source and available means of transportation.
n Second, electricity prices reflect the underlying technology of electricity
generation and the resulting mix of primary energy sources.
n Third, the different level of privatization in each country also contributes to
price level differences.
n Finally, there are additional country-specific differences. The favorable
evolution of prices in France for example, appears to be at least partly linked
to the maturity of the French nuclear program of the 1970s.
In the future, differences in electricity prices between EU countries may trigger
more intensive cross-border electricity trading that would in turn result in a more
competitive market at the European level. This may lead to a higher degree of
convergence of pre-tax electricity rates across Europe, particularly for large users.
Electricity price changes affect households disposable income both directly and
indirectly. A study undertaken by EWI in 1997 concluded that within the household
sector of the surveyed countries29 , more than half of all increases in disposable income
are attributable to indirect effects, i.e. to lower prices of other goods and services due
to lower electricity prices for industry. This can be explained by the fact that although
electricity often represents only a relatively small part of total household budgets, it is
used in the production and delivery of virtually all other goods and services consumed
by households.
Unfortunately, data regarding household expenditures on electricity is currently
scarce or out of date. The available information reveals different patterns of changes in
mean consumption expenditures for electricity (see Figure 8). As such, a general trend
of the direct impact of liberalization on prices and the related effects on disposable
income in the EU cannot be elaborated at this stage.
In France where the household electricity market has not yet been opened the
share of household expenditures for electricity has decreased from 2% in 1988 to
1.6% in 1999. By contrast, in the UK, the share rose between 1988 (1.5%) and 1994
29 Countries included comprise Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
the UK.
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(2.4%), returning to its 1988 level again in 1999. This development can be attributed to
the price changes (including taxes) after liberalization. The share of household
expenditures for electricity of total expenditures in Finland has decreased, however
compared to Germany, only to a lower extent. In both countries, household electricity
markets are open to competition. The discrepancies in the share of household electricity
expenditure may be related to:
n Differences in disposable income (EU-wide data is not yet available);
n Differences in electricity prices caused by liberalization and changes in
taxation.
As we can see in Figure 9, electricity did not increase its share of total household
expenditures in all countries between the observed times. The only exception is the
UK, where the share rose between 1988 and 1994 due to the increased real household
prices for electricity.
It is worth noting however that the decrease of electricitys share was always greater
than the decrease in real electricity prices (in Finland, the share of electricity expenditures
fell from 1994 to 1999, even though real electricity prices increased). The reasons for
Figure 8: Mean Consumption Expenditures for Electricity by House-
holds in some EU Member States; 1988, 1994, 1999; % 
Source: Data provided by Eurostat. The data are based upon a Household Budget Survey made
every four - five years (1988/1994/1999).
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this are either rising disposable incomes, or lower electricity consumption.
Finland demonstrates that a lower disposable income caused by higher household
electricity prices may at least partly be offset by decreasing prices of other goods and
services caused by lower electricity prices for the production sector (indirect effect).
5. Electricity Market Liberalization in Bulgaria
The actual liberalization of the electricity market in Bulgaria has not yet begun though
it has reached the phase of regulatory preparation. For the time being, the market
relations are subject to the single buyer model under which prices for electricity sale
are subject to the approval of SERC.
The Government of Bulgaria declared in its program the development of a
competitive energy market as a top priority in the energy sector. A new energy strategy
has been adopted in order to speed up the reforms towards market liberalization and
promotion of competition. The market liberalization and the competition in production
and supply levels are related to expectations for:
Figure 9: Development of Real Household Electricity Prices (incl. taxes)
and Share of Expenditures for Electricity of total Expenditures of House-
holds in some EU Member States; 1994=100; % 
Source: Own calculations of Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne based on
data of Eurostat.
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n Cost reductions and restrictions of price growth;
n Improvement in the reliability and quality of supply;
n Transparent and fair allocation of the benefits of the market.
The first step of the market liberalization is for consumers with an annual consumption
of more than 100 GWh, to be permitted to freely contract with independent power
producers and to freely negotiate the prices of electricity supply. Households will not
be part of the liberalized market at this stage and therefore will not be subject to any
direct effects. Better prices for industrial consumers however will have effects on the
whole Bulgarian economy, especially given its high-energy intensity. Thus, the effects
for households will likely include:
n Reductions in the costs of Bulgarian industrial enterprises. In sectors with
very intense competition this will lead to reductions in the prices of their
goods and services on the internal market.
n The price competitiveness of Bulgarian enterprises, especially of those with
high electricity consumption, will improve on the international markets
without any quality deterioration. This will ensure increased employment
opportunities, economic growth, and better financial provision of the social
functions of the Government.
It should be noted that household prices will increase over the next years until
subsidies are phased out. For example, costs for electricity supply to low-voltage
consumers are estimated at 0.084 BGN/kWh30 , VAT excluded, in October 2001, while
the average household price is 0.067 BGN/kWh. At the same time high- and medium-
voltage consumers pay higher rates than low voltage ones despite costs related to their
supply are lower. The introduction of fair rates for each consumer group and the
prevention of cross-subsidization are among the SERCs responsibilities. In the long
run it can be expected that the ratio between prices for industrial consumers and
households will reach one to three, as it is in the European Union.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has required the Bulgarias former
government to implement extensive price reforms in the electricity sector. The
30 The figures are taken from the Energy Strategy of Bulgaria (2002)
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As of
01.01.1999
As of
05.07.1999
As of
01.08.2000
As of
01.01.2001
As of
01.01.2002
As of
01.07.2002
Table 4: Real Tariffs for Electricity Consumers in Bulgaria, BGN/kWh, VAT Included
Households
Daytime 0.069 0.078 0.086 0.089 0.098 0.098/0.127*
Night-time 0.039 0.042 0.046 0.048 0.053 0.053/0.068**
Industrial consumers - high voltage
Three-scale measurement
Peak   0.128   0.128 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122
Daytime   0.076  0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Daytime   0.076  0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Night-time   0.432  0.432 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
Two-scale measurement
Daytime 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098
Night-time 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
One-scale   0.098       0.098 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093
measurement
Industrial consumers - medium voltage
Three-scale measurement
Peak       0.138    0.138 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
Daytime       0.083    0.083 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085
Night-time       0.048    0.048 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Two-scale measurement
Daytime 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109
Night-time 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
One-scale 0.105 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
measurement
Industrial consumers - low voltage
Three-scale measurement
Peak    0.162       0.162 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163
Daytime    0.100       0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101
Night-time    0.576       0.576 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
Two-scale measurement
Daytime 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130
Night-time 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
One-scale 0.124      0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124
measurement
* - the first tariff is paid for the first 75 kWh and the second tariff is applicable for the remaining consumption
** - the first tariff is applicable to households that are not equipped with central heating access during the heating period; the
second tariff is applicable to all other households and periods.
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requirements were discussed at each review of the three-year stand-by agreement but
there was not a political will for their implementation. One of the main aspects of
these requirements was the increase in household prices. In 1998, upon consultations
with the IMF, an action plan was adopted, where an incremental price increase was
proposed. The plan was designed to equalize the average tariff rates for households
and industrial consumers at 0.072 BGN/kWh. As can be seen in the table, those
commitments have not been met.
The Energy Strategy adopted in April 2002 proposes similar incremental increases,
which will have the following results:
n In 2002 the average household price will be raised to exceed the average
price for industrial consumers.
n In 2003 the average household price will equal the average price for non-
household consumers connected to medium and low-voltage network.
n In 2004 the average household price should cover the costs of supply at low-
voltage levels.
n In 2005 household price should be set in accordance with the cost-plus
method.
Incremental increases in electricity costs will be tied to so that to facilitate the
transition to higher prices for households. Nevertheless, there are still concerns whether
households will be able to afford the projected price increases. That is why the new
strategy proposes the introduction of protective social tariffs to ensure that electricity
for covering basic needs remains affordable.
6. Affordability of Electricity Supply and Social Policy
Public Opinion and Expectations
Electricity networks are comparatively well developed in Bulgaria and from a
technical point of view the service is accessible to everyone. Price affordability depends
very much on the tariff levels and households income. If tariffs are quite high compared
to the level of households income, payments collection decreases, causing financial
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troubles to electricity suppliers. If tariffs are quite low and do not reflects the costs of
generation, transmission, and distribution they send misleading price signals to
consumers. This in turn leads to inefficiency, electricity waste, and difficulties in meeting
demand.
This is confirmed by the national survey within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian
Electricity Sector on Consumer Protection Project which demonstrated that with relatively
low electricity prices, 22% of those surveyed used electricity for heating, with over
20% of them having switched in the last five years. Less than 2% of the others indicated
likelihood to make the same change, perhaps because of the coming price hikes.
Approximately 70% of those surveyed spent up to 40 BGN per month on electricity
during the winter and half this amount in the summer months. More than half of the
respondents stated that their bills for electricity are high or too high given their budget
constraints. These findings are not surprising given the level of households income
and respondents forecasts about economic situation in the country and their own
financial status. Just over 10% believed that Bulgarias economic situation was
improving, with only a fraction of these (8%) believing that this would lead to
improvements in their own economic situations during 2002. 70% considered their
own financial status bad or very bad, with 66% considering their social status to be low
or very low. 65% declared their combined household income to be below 300 BGN.
Very low household income is the main problem in terms of affordability of electricity.
Despite these indicators, electricity prices will likely increase significantly as the reforms
to continue cross-subsidies need to be eliminated. Effectively addressing this issue is
one of the greatest challenges that the government and the SERC will face in the coming
years.
The difficulties that households meet with regard to their electricity expenses make
them apply different measures for controlling their bills. The most frequent means (in
85% of the cases) that households apply in reducing their electricity bills is to economize
on their consumption. This implies that the upcoming price increases will introduce
effective stimuli to limit electricity waste. For instance, more than half of those surveyed
claimed that they experience difficulties meeting the 10% increase in electricity prices
that took effect on October 1, 2001. 58% of the respondents stated an intention to
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reduce their consumption in the event of a further 10% increase, climbing to almost
84% in the event of a 20% increase.
Social Policy
The implementation of market reforms in the sector is undermined by electricity
prices for households, which fail to reflect the actual costs of the electricitys generation,
transmission, and distribution. These unnaturally low prices are the result of cross-
subsidies from industrial consumers. Phasing out these subsidies while replacing them
with some sort of assistance program for vulnerable consumers is critical for ensuring
the success of the current reforms.
Reforms in energy sector always are governed by economic motives. The strong
economic focus tends to overshadow the social policy with the hope that the social
problems will be solved once the competition is introduced.
As a part of its efforts to join the EU Bulgaria must apply measures to meet the
priorities of the European policy. Guaranteeing the right of any person to receive
electricity of high quality and at an affordable price to satisfy his or her basic needs
constitutes one of these priorities. Consequently, the reforms in the Bulgarian electricity
sector must be accompanies by measures for social protection of vulnerable consumers.
To date, the social issues raised by the reforms have been paid extremely limited
attention by the government which has dedicated only the scarce resources available
within the system for assistance to low-income households. This system failed to provide
adequate and efficient protection. With regard to the heating aid, the systems
shortcomings are mainly related to the insufficient amount of the aid, the incorrect
inclusion of child aid in the income basis for clustering eligible households, and the
opportunities for using energy aid for other purposes.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy is working to overcome these problems
with a new program whose main features are:
n A 21.5% increase of the maximum amount of social aid for heating to 45.38 BGN
monthly. This is designed to fully compensate low-income households for
the increase of 20% in electricity prices and of 11.4% in central heating
prices.
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n Aid for heating will be increasingly targeted with respect to the energy resources
used, to better reflect actual costs for heating.
n Ensuring that the basic energy needs of all Bulgarians are satisfied. For instance,
the monthly, targeted aid for the poor is equivalent to 450 kWh of electricity.
According to ministerial experts, these quantities are enough to cover the
basic energy needs of the population.
n Paying the full amount of energy aid to all eligible households. To date, only 45%
of eligible households received the full amount. The change will relieve the
budgets of the rest eligible households, allowing them to direct additional
funds for the purchase of other goods and services.
n Changes in the calculation of household income for the purpose of clustering those
eligible for aid.  Assistance for children (in accordance with the Family Aid for
Children Act) and allowances for children (in accordance with the Protection,
Rehabilitation and Social Integration of the Disabled Act) will not be included
as a part of the income of households. This will protect the right of households
to use the aid in accordance with their initial purpose.
n Paying energy aid directly to energy companies in order to facilitate their collection
of payments and to prevent the use of the aid for other purposes.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy has calculated that during the heating season
beginning in November 2002, about 650,000 households will be eligible to receive
energy aid. This will result in a 23% increase in the amount of aid required compared
to last year31 . This is the result mainly of low household income levels compounded by
high unemployment in the country. The availability of funds to cover this increase
must be ensured to satisfy the basic energy needs of households, including of electricity.
The new two-scale tariff scheme, under which certain electricity consumption is
paid at a lower rate, can be regarded as a social protection measure as well. Its social
orientation however is limited because it does not differentiate households according
to their income or number of members. An example of the type of flaw that this system
might generate is that a one-person household with a high income is more favored
than a five-person household, consisting of one pensioner, two unemployed parents,
31 http://www.government.bg/PressOffice/WeeklyBulletin/2002-07-15/2426.html
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and two children of a school age.
Despite this potential problem, the scheme has the potential to encourage the
adoption of waste reduction practices and more efficient technologies. This is especially
important given that per capita consumption of electricity in Bulgaria is higher than
almost anywhere else in Europe, while income levels are among the lowest.
7. Conclusions
The analysis enables us to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the reforms
in the Bulgarian energy sector from the perspective of their overall impact on customers,
national economy and energy sector itself. The changes in the energy sector are complex
and their impact on household tariffs must be considered within the context of the
reform as a whole. The potential success of the reforms is directly linked to the way in
which they are implemented and their negative impacts addressed.
 The experience of the EU Member States demonstrates that both direct and indirect
price benefits can be reaped as a result of electricity market liberalization. In Bulgaria,
the direct effects will begin to be felt in the medium term at the earliest, while the
indirect ones will take effect even in the short term. Before these effects take place
however, it is necessary for prices to accurately reflect costs. The next thing that must
occur is the enactment and implementation of a transparent and fair price formation
law. SERC must likewise begin to efficiently perform its functions. Finally, both suppliers
and consumers must be made aware of their rights and responsibilities in a reformed
energy market.
Price changes affect all the consumers. As a result, the effects that reform has on
affordability must always be taken into consideration. If tariff increases are not
incremental, and does not accurately reflect real income and inflation, real dangers to
society may materialize. Consequently, in the years to come both energy and social
policy must be directed to ensure that electricity expenses account for an acceptable
share in household budgets (especially during the heating season) and that each citizen
receives enough electricity at affordable price to meet his or her basic needs.
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Strenghts
n Correct price signals to consum-
ers via reflecting price formation
for electricity supply
n Incentives for efficiency im-
provement in electricity compa-
nies
n Better competitiveness of the
Bulgarian economy and eco-
nomic growth due to lower tar-
iffs for industrial consumers
n Better conditions for supply as
a result of the competition
among electricity producers and
of the opportunity to choose
among suppliers
Weaknesses
n Lack of experience of both SERC
and energy companies in appli-
cation such a pricing system
n Significant increase in house-
hold electricity prices
n Lack of experience of market
players in operating in a liberal-
ized market that might initially
result in inefficiencies and poor
financial conditions of some
companies
Opportunities
n Optimization of electricity con-
sumption by households as a
result of cost-oriented price for-
mation
n Optimization of the utilization
of the existing capacity and in-
vestments in new ones as a re-
sult of the commercialization
and establishment of a competi-
tive market
n Improvement of the operation
efficiency, service quality and
companies management as a
result of the privatization in the
sector
Threats
n Unwillingness of some market
players to take part in the initial
stage of the market liberalization
n Threat to the security of supply
in case of possible problems of
energy companies due to lack
of experience and lack of pre-
cise rules for the initial stage of
market liberalization
n Unfavorable social conse-
quences as a result of unreason-
able price increases for house-
holds and inadequate social
policy
Figure 10: Challenges to Electricity Price Changes with regard to the
Affordability of Electricity Supply
QUALITY OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN BULGARIA
The quality of electricity supply has many different dimensions, which may be
classified into two main groups: commercial relationships between suppliers and
consumers (herein referred to as service quality), and technical characteristic of the
electricity supplied.
Economic theory states that there are perfect stimuli for changes in quality if prices
change in accordance with the level of the supplied quality. Theoretically, there may
be such correspondence between quality and price if we include a component,
accounting for the quality level in the price formula. In practice, however, this is hard
to achieve because of the relatively large number of quality indicators on the one
hand, and the need to ensure at least minimum quality of electricity supply to consumers,
on the other. This is why high quality is achieved through different mechanisms that
are primarily regulatory. Among those, the most frequently used are:
n Service standards;
n Comparative analyses of electricity supply companies with regard to their
compliance with the adopted standards;
n Reductions of tariffs or imposition of fines or other sanctions for non-
compliance with standards. These sanctions are generally adequate to ensure
compliance and are often paid to the affected consumers or deposited at
special funds for financing programs which encourage improvements in service
quality;
n Imposition of other sanctions to electricity suppliers such as written
notifications, amendments to or even termination of their licenses;
n Introducing stimuli for the gradual improvement of electricity supply quality.
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1. Service Quality
According to the current license contracts held by electricity distribution companies
in Bulgaria, licensees are obliged to meet service quality criteria by planning, exploiting
and developing the distribution network in compliance with network rules and in
coordination with a plan approved by SERC. This plan specifies service quality indicators
that govern activities of electricity distribution companies. The latter must develop and
propose to SERC a plan for the annual monitoring and control of their service quality
and of network development. The plan must be updated annually in coordination
with SERC. After one year in operation as a licensed distributor, and after consultation
with SERC, companies must specify binding indicators for service quality that will be in
force until the end of the first plan. These indicators become an inseparable part of the
license. Companies submit to SERC annual reports that describe the indicators used
for license implementation and for ensuring the safety and security of the electricity
distribution network and the service quality.
Relations between distribution companies and their customers are governed by
general terms and conditions for sale of electricity. Article 80, para.1 of the Energy and
Energy Efficiency Act (EEEA) stipulates that electricity distribution companies are not
obliged to conclude individual contracts with household consumers. Rather, the
electricity sale is governed by a set of publicly announced general terms and conditions
proposed by the electricity distribution companies and approved by SERC. These terms
and conditions define:
n The rights and obligations of the electricity distribution company and its
customers;
n The procedure and manner of measuring, billing, and paying for the electricity
consumed;
n The responsibility in case of non-performance of obligations;
n The procedure and manner of interruption and termination of electricity
supply.
Any amendments to the general terms and conditions must be approved by SERC.
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SERC may propose amendments to the general terms and conditions insofar as this
is required by any law or by the terms of the license or if they are necessary for consumer
protection. In this case SERC requires a written opinion on the proposed amendments
by the electricity distribution company. If it does not receive a response within thirty
days, the companys approval is assumed.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 80 of the EEEA stipulate that electricity distribution
companies must publish the general terms and conditions approved by SERC at least
in one national and one local paper. These become effective within one month of
their publishing without a written approval from consumers.
Customers who wish to dispute these terms and conditions may submit alternatives
to their distribution company within thirty days of their publication. Those offers
approved by the electricity distribution company are registered in additional written
agreements.
The general terms and conditions apply to all consumers equally. They include
provisions which establish:
n The scope of the contract and rights and obligations of the parties;
n Conditions, procedures, and terms for interrupting the electricity supply;
n Obligations in case of electricity supply interruptions;
n Right of access to the network;
n How measuring, billing, and verifying meters will take place;
n A billing regime, including procedures and sanctions for non-payment;
n Conditions for interrupting electricity supply and its re-launching;
n Rights and duties in the event of non-performance.
Electricity distribution companies are required to place these general terms and
conditions in a visible place in their offices and to enable consumers to receive a copy
of them. Detailed information regarding electricity prices and tariffs must be presented
to consumers. The electricity distribution company must also present detailed bills
upon request. Regular bills must at least include the quantity of electricity sold, the unit
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price, and the total amount due. Companies must keep relevant documents to be able
to justify to consumers the amounts billed for electricity.
Article 80, paragraph 4 of the EEEA defines cases in which the distribution company
may interrupt the electricity supply after having provided a preliminary notification to
consumers. These are:
n If a customer has failed to pay his bill ten days after the deadline has passed;
n If a customer interferes with the functioning of their electricity meter or his
consumption is not measured at all.
Article 237 of the Civil Procedures Code establishes how electricity companies may
collect their dues.
Electricity distribution companies must have customer service departments with
sufficient qualified staff.
Within six months of being issued a license electricity distribution companies must
establish rules governing consumer relations and present them to SERC. These rules
must at least contain the following information:
n Data on the work organization of the specialized unit, including its location,
time schedule, working time for consumers, contact telephone;
n The terms and procedures for connecting consumers to the electricity
distribution network;
n The minimum technical requirements for connecting installations or networks
of consumers to the electricity distribution network;
n The terms and procedures for concluding contracts for electricity sale upon
general terms and conditions;
n The terms and procedures for submitting complaints, requests, and proposals;
n The conditions for review, verification, and reply to complaints, requests and
proposals.
After the rules for consumer relations have been coordinated with SERC they are
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attached to the license and reviewed as a part of its conditions.
The electricity distribution company shall inform consumers about the consumer
relation rules, and for the amendments to them:
n By publishing them in a national newspaper;
n By placing a copy of them where consumers are served (e.g cashiers desks);
n By presenting the latest version upon demand.
The electricity distribution company must review and, if needed, to amend its
customer relation rules and the manner, in which they are applied upon requests from
national or regional consumer associations.
Electricity distribution companies must reply in written to a customer complaint
within a month of the date it is received. Failure to do so gives the customer the right to
appeal to SERC provided that his or her complaint concerns denial of network
connection, denial of a contract for electricity sale or denial of access to the electricity
distribution networks. If, after receiving an opinion from the electricity distribution
company, SERC deems a given complaint as reasonable it provides obligatory
instructions.
Electricity distribution companies must ascertain a system for receiving and processing
of complaints, requests and proposals. All the received ones and the replies to any of
them must be kept for three years.
Electricity distribution companies must present to SERC an annual statement
containing detailed information regarding:
n The total number of complaints, requests, and proposals during the previous
calendar year;
n Classification of complaints, requests and proposals in categories such as:
inability too satisfy requests for services, service quality, etc.;
n The manner in which complaints were dealt with;
With respect to the protection of consumer interests, electricity distribution
companies are obliged:
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n To ensure the protection of the interest of consumers and society, while
performing its obligations and ensuring reliable, qualitative and continuous
electricity supply in compliance with applicable legislation;
n To have long term investment strategies for the distribution network
development to meet new demand and ensure the adequate servicing of
existing customers;
n To develop the electricity distribution network in accordance with their
business plan, their existing contracts, and the interests of society.
2. Technical Indicators for Electricity Supply Quality
From a technical aspect the electricity quality is determined in the Bulgarian State
Standard BDS 10694-80, effective as of July 1, 1981. The Standard determines the
following indicators for electricity quality for networks with alternating current:
n The frequency deviation and fluctuation;
n The deviation, fluctuation and non-sine curve of voltage;
n Non-symmetry of voltage and shift of neutrality upon three-phase voltage.
The most important electricity quality indicators to households are:
- In a normal mode the voltage deviation of all electric consumers should be
within +/-5%, and for electric engines - from -5% to +10%. In after incident
modes there can be an additional voltage decrease of 5%.
 - In a normal mode when the system works independently the frequency
deviation should not be greater than +/- 0.1Hz, while the energy system can
temporarily work with a frequency deviation of +/- 0.2Hz
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3. Households Attitude to and Expectations for Electricity
Supply
One of the most important conditions for efficient communication with consumers
is their good awareness of their rights and obligations. Otherwise, the communication
breaks and negative consequences for both suppliers and customers appear. Without
enough information there is distrust and preconditions for frequent conflicts.
The survey within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector on Consumer
Protection Project indicates that 6.1% of those surveyed know well their rights and
obligations and 29.6% are only partly acquainted with them (see Figure 11). 64% are
unaware of their rights and obligations. Of these 36.6% would like to receive such
information, while 17.7% are not interested at all.
Similar results were obtained in an Internet survey carried out among the users of
the economic portal www.econ.bg in February 2002. Only 16% of the respondents
indicated that they knew their rights and obligations in full or in part, 75% did not
know them but expressed a desire to become acquainted with them, while 5% either
did not know or were not interested.
Figure 11: Awareness of Consumer Rights and Obligations among
Bulgarians
Source: National Public Opinion Poll within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector
on Consumer Protection Project, CED/ Vitosha Research, November, 2001.
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These surveys reveal a disappointing level of awareness of consumer rights among
Bulgarians. This could seriously hinder the reforms through a negative public attitude
to the changes as a result of the inability for proper judgment of the environment.
Many Bulgarians however demonstrated a high level of interest in reversing this situation
and the government should capitalize on this to a maximum extent.
The reason for the poor awareness of consumers could be attributed to the fact that
they do not know where to search for such information rather than to its lack.  Almost
half of those surveyed within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector on
Consumer Protection Project (48.6%) would like to get informed but do not know to find
information. At the same time a fourth of the surveyed (25.8%) stated that they are not
interested at all. Almost one fifth do not know where to find information about their
rights and obligations.
The information vacuum concerning rights and obligations is only a part of the
unawareness of the Bulgarian society about the processes in the energy sector. The
majority of those surveyed are not informed about the main aspects of reforms. The
share of those who have never heard of these varies from 72.7% to 92.6% (see Figure 2).
The lack of information leads to confusion among consumers. Asked whether their
consider the number of institutions protecting the rights of electricity consumers to be
enough, 58.9% of those surveyed respond that they have not ever heard of such bodies.
The number of these people is more than two times the combined number of
respondents who answered positively or negatively to the question.
The vast majority of customers are satisfied in whole (80.9%) or in part (12.1%)
with the technical quality of their electricity supply (see Figure 12).  The share of
consumers that are not satisfied with the quality of the delivered electricity is not
insignificant (5.2%). Those consumers who are not satisfied or are partly satisfied with
their electricity supply complain of frequent voltage changes (51.3%), lower voltage
(32.0%) and interruptions to their electricity supply (41.3%). Approximately a third of
all the surveyed claimed that damages resulting from a single interruption (such as
spoilt food, damaged electric devices, etc.) cost them up to 100 BGN, and 2.4% - over
BGN 100. 63.3% of respondents cannot assess their damages.
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4. Conclusions
Good regulations are provided in the EEEA, the license agreements for electricity
distribution and the related to them documents to govern the relations between
electricity distribution companies and their household customers. There are clearly
defined obligations for providing information to consumers, receiving and processing
consumers complaints, and establishing departments to work with consumers. This
provides a good normative environment in the relations between SERC, distribution
companies and electricity consumers. The main problems are related not so much
with the lack of qualitative documents and regulations but more with their inefficient
application.
Technical problems in electricity supply do not concern a great share of consumers.
Most households are pleased with the technical parameters of the delivered electricity.
That however does not mean that they are aware of the technical requirements to
electricity supply.
Surveys have demonstrated a low level of awareness among households of their
rights and obligations as electricity consumers and of the restructuring of the Bulgarian
electricity sector. Consequently, the public may appear to oppose the changes in the
Figure 12: Households Satisfaction with the Quality of Electricity
Supply
Source: National Public Opinion Poll within the Impact of Reforms in the Bulgarian Electricity Sector
on Consumer Protection Project, CED/ Vitosha Research, November, 2001.
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sector. Therefore, there is urgent need that a purposeful campaign to inform consumers
be undertaken.
Strenghts
n Availability of a good legislative
framework for the technical and
commercial quality of electric-
ity supply to households
n Incorporation of requirements
to electricity suppliers with re-
gard to consumers in their li-
censes
n Consumers satisfaction with the
technical parameters of electric-
ity supply
Weaknesses
n Lack of general terms and con-
ditions for contracts for electric-
ity supply to households
n Low awareness of Bulgarians of
their rights and obligations as
electricity consumers
n Low awareness of Bulgarians of
all aspects of the energy reforms
n Lack of knowledge of the rel-
evant information channels
n Lack of practice in Bulgaria in
regulating and encouraging the
improvement of the quality of
electricity supply
Opportunities
n Desire of the prevailing part of
households to get acquainted
with their rights and obligations
as electricity consumers
n Conducting purposeful informa-
tion campaigns among house-
holds
n Introduction of stimuli for elec-
tricity companies to continu-
ously improve the technical and
commercial quality
n Better awareness of the EU prac-
tices for securing the quality of
electricity supply to households
Threats
n Further delay in the introduction
of general terms and conditions
for contracts for electricity sup-
ply to households
n Instability and frequent amend-
ments in the regulatory frame-
work for the quality of electric-
ity supply to households
n Lack of improvement of the
awareness of Bulgarians of their
rights and obligations as electric-
ity consumers
n Lack of customer-oriented per-
formance of electricity compa-
nies
Figure 13: Overview of the Quality of Electricity Supply to Households
in Bulgaria
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Electricity distribution companies must be stimulated to introduce new services.
The latter are likely to improve the relationships among the market agents and to
optimize companies activities.
In sum, future efforts to improve consumer protection should focus on improving
the transfer of information and rates of communication between the SERC, the electricity
distribution companies, consumer protection associations, and consumers, rather than
on making amendments to the legislative framework.
THE CAPABILITY OF CONSUMER ASSOCIATIONS TO
PROTECT ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS IN BULGARIA
1. Legal Framework
The Consumer Protection and Rules for Trade Act, in force as of July 3, 1999, provides
the main legal grounds for consumer protection. It stipulates the main consumer rights
and rules for trade. It introduces the terms consumer, trader, importer and
producer and defines their meanings:
n Consumer is any person, who acquires goods or uses services for his/her needs
or for the needs of his/her relatives, and not for sale, production or practicing
a profession or craft.
n Trader is any person, who sells or offers for sale goods or renders services to a
consumer, producer or importer; the trader sells or offers for sale goods directly
to a consumer.
n Producer is any person, who produces or renovates goods or parts of goods or
offers services, extracts or processes resources or presents himself/herself as a
producer by putting his/her name or company name, logo or other distinctive
sign over the good, its package or the related to the good technical or
commercial documentation.
n Importer is any person, who has first acquired the right of property over an
imported good on the customs territory of the Republic of Bulgaria or has
acted as an intermediary for acquiring such rights.
The Act serves as a basis for the institutional framework for consumer protection in
Bulgaria. It creates consumer protection agencies, such as the Trade and Consumer
Protection Commission (attached to the Minister of Economy), the National Council
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for Consumer Protection (a consultative body also attached to the Minister of Economy)
as well as consumer protection agencies at the municipal level. These bodies carry out
the states policies in the field of consumer protection. These consist primarily of
exercising regulatory control over the market and developing normative pieces
concerning consumer protection.
The Consumer Protection and Rules for Trade Act also creates rights and obligations
for private (non-governmental) consumer associations. The latter constitute a separate
category of organizations whose establishment and existence is voluntary and
independent of the government. The government grants special rights and opportunities
to these associations because of their international reputation for efficiency and
importance. They are able to provide assistance to the government or even to free it of
some of its functions. To exploit these rights and opportunities, an association must
have at least 300 members and be registered as a non-profit organization whose mandate
requires it to act in societys interest. The rights granted to the associations include:
n Access to draft legislation concerning the rights and interests of consumers;
n To inform controlling bodies as per Consumer Protection and Rules for Trade
Act if consumer rights are violated;
n To approach the court if consumer rights are violated in pursuance of the
Consumer Protection and Rules for Trade Act.
In addition to these general rights, associations may also make claims for the
protection of the collective interests of consumer groups. In many cases this is the only
form of protecting consumer rights.
In addition to the Consumer Protection and Rules for Trade Act, the Foods Act, the
Technical Requirements to Products Act, the Vet-Medical Activity Act, the Tobacco
and Tobacco Products Act, the Tourism Act, the Competition Protection Act and the
Insurance Act play a significant role for consumer protection. With regard to electricity
supply the Energy and Energy Efficiency Act and the secondary legislation in the sector
also play important roles.
The existing legal framework incorporates the European norms for consumer
protection, encompasses a wide range of consumer problems, introduces and
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guarantees consumer rights and enables the representation of consumer interests.
Nevertheless there is still not sufficient coordination between the separate elements of
the legal framework. The latter can be improved through a better horizontal
harmonization. This however should not imply incessant and unreasonable amendments
because stability of the legislation concerning consumer protection is one of its major
advantages so far. Foreign experience may be drawn upon here in order to improve
the horizontal harmonization of the various entities. It should however not be adopted
automatically because not always it is adequate for the Bulgarian reality.
Still, the level of familiarity with the legislation is insufficient. The lack of practice
further threats the efficient protection of consumer interests.
2. Organizational Infrastructure
Consumer associations are civil non-government non-profit organizations, whose
main functions concern the protection of consumer rights and interests.
Presenting information to consumers is one of their major functions. This includes making
legislation accessible to people, presenting market information, and answering
consumers inquiries. Consumer associations also publish specialized journals that often
include comparisons between products and services to help consumers make informed
choices. Such information is also disseminated through monographs, brochures, and
leaflets. The Internet has also become an important source of information in recent
years. Associations supply consumers with information by publishing articles,
participating in broadcasts, etc.
Providing support to consumers through consultations or direct assistance is another widely
spread function of consumer associations. They typically act as intermediaries to resolve
disputes in the latter case. There are three forms of intermediation - negotiations with
a trader or manufacturer, participation in a reconciliation procedure (reconciliation
commission) or assistance in court proceedings. In addition, associations may file with
the court collective claims, whereby they represent the collective consumer interest.
Consultations may be carried out on the phone, in person, in writing, by mail or e-
mail.
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Association represent consumer interests to state bodies involved in consumer
protection policy or to business representatives. This includes assistance in drafting
normative acts, in drawing up contracts with consumers according to general terms
and conditions, and even in determining the long-term policy of the government or of
private companies.
As of May 2002, there were nine unions registered with the Ministry of Economy,
which comply with the formal requirements to be considered consumers associations
under the Consumer Protection and Rules for Trade Act. Arranged in alphabetical
order these are:
n The Bulgarian Academy of Consumers was established at the beginning of 2002.
It has a presence in eight Bulgarian cities. The Academy publishes a catalogue
of misleading labels on consumer products such as cooking oils and alcohol.
n The Bulgarian National Consumer Association was founded in 1998 and has 19
territorial sections in the country. It operates consulting services in Sofia,
Plovdiv, Varna, Rousse, Shumen, and Vidin. It has designed Bulgarias first
web page designed for consumers. It is a member of the National Council for
Consumer Protection, of the National Council of Standardization, and of the
European Consumer Association. It participates in the activity of reconciliation
commissions and publishes a bi-monthly bulletin and a number of specialized
publications dealing with consumer protection issues.
n The Consumer Centre for Data and Research was established in 1998 in Plovdiv.
It has one permanent and several temporary offices. It carries out training
programs for consumers in unequal bargaining positions, such as gypsies,
pensioners, and the deaf. It produces information pamphlets and participates
in the activity of reconciliation commissions.
n The Federation of Consumers in Bulgaria was established in 1990 and disposes
of eight regional offices. It offers direct assistance to consumers with
complaints, oversees consumer issues in the food industry and also participates
in reconciliation commissions. The Federation publishes a bulletin analysing
consumer protection issues in Bulgaria and abroad, and the Accreditation
and Notification bulletin. It also trains volunteers to counsel the public and
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organizes seminars on food and quality issues. The organization is a member
of Consumers International and of the Balkan Consumer Centre.
n The Independent Union of Consumers in Bulgaria was established in 1999. The
Union is headquartered in Pleven but has territorial structures in the rest of
the country. It has nine offices in Sofia, Burgas, Blagoevgrad, Varna, Dobrich,
Lovech, Kurdjali, Pleven, and Yambol. The organization publishes a
Consumer Reference Book and  European Directives Brochures. It
participates in the activity of reconciliation commissions. It has links with the
Association of Young Lawyers, the Retailers Union, the Union of the Blind in
Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Chamber of Craftsmen, and the National Green
Alternative Union. The organization has applied for membership at the
European Consumer Organization (BEUC).
n The National Association for Consumer Information and Advice to Citizens was
established in late 2001. It disposes of 10 advisory offices in Bulgaria. It assists
consumers in different areas including public utilities, taxes and fees,
alimentary and non-alimentary goods, and complaints. It produces and
distributes bulletins on consumer problems and on challenges Bulgaria is facing
for its accession to the EU.
n The National Association of the Insured in Bulgaria was established in 2000. Its
activity is limited to protecting consumers in the field of insurance services.
n The Regional Consumer Union98 was established in Vidin in 1998. It participates
in the activity of reconciliation commissions, and organizes training and
information campaigns in Vidin and in the surrounding area.
n The Regional Consumer Union has offices in Plovdiv and Purvomay. It assists
consumers in resolving disputes, participates in reconciliation commissions,
and organizes consumer training programs for students.
The goals of all associations are similar and are focused on the protection of consumer
rights and interests. The only association that states more specialized priorities is the
National Union of the Insured in Bulgaria. It limits itself to the protection of consumer
rights only with regard to the insurance services. The remaining associations aim at
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protecting consumers in all areas and business sectors. That assumes that the protection
of electricity consumers is not excluded from the significant directions and priorities of
their activities.
Most of the associations have been established in only the last few years and are still
busy acquiring experience, human and administrative resources, and funding. Only
the Federation of Consumers in Bulgaria has a history of over ten years, which is a
precondition for accumulated data and practice concerning the development of the
electricity sector and consumer problems, generation and recruiting of expert potential,
and developed capabilities for wider regional coverage.
One of the main problems to consumer protection in Bulgaria is the lack of complete
national representation of consumer interests. Outside of the large urban areas, there
is little active support for consumer interests. Even more, the predominant part of the
opportunities for consumers to receive assistance, advisory and information are
concentrated in Sofia. Consequently, a great deal of the population is deprived of the
opportunity to take advantage of the services rendered by consumer associations. This
problem is particularly acute in the electricity sector where many of the most vulnerable
consumers are those that live in the rural areas with low concentrations of people. The
media is the only forms for access to the associations activities for people in settlements,
where there are no active consumers structures. In this case, however, the
communication is only in the one direction and limited in time, which makes it very
lowly efficient.
Consumer associations want to expand their activities in the country and have the
support of the local populations. To succeed this expansion they must raise the necessary
finances, establish a constructive dialogue with local authorities, and explain their
functions and capabilities to the local population.
Associations experience in protection of electricity consumers is limited and sporadic
mainly due to their short history and expert potential in the specific problems. We
shall not underestimate the low dialogue culture in Bulgaria. That is the main reason
for companies not to turn to associations for opinions and recommendations of mutual
interest. In this regard the appearance of good practices deserves paying attention. At
the beginning 2002, the Sofia Electricity Distribution Company presented its draft general
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terms and conditions for the sale of electricity to consumers for public comment. Both
consumer associations and state bodies participated. As a result, a considerable number
of amendments were made to the draft, to the benefit of electricity consumers in Sofia.
It is important to note that according to sociological polls consumer associations are
not much popular among Bulgarians. In the survey within the Impact of Reforms in the
Bulgarian Electricity Sector on Consumer Protection Project only 1.3% declared that if their
rights concerning the electricity supply are violated, they would turn to an association.
The share of those who prefer to turn to the media is much higher (7%). The media
can popularize a problem and accelerate its solution but are not legally granted
opportunity to participate directly in its overcoming. The surveys results could be
explained only with the low awareness of Bulgarians about consumer associations.
This prevents consumers to a great extent from taking full advantage of the possibilities
for collective protection and unifying. At the same time, low awareness robs associations
of consumers support which would make them strong and influential.
There are several ways that the service provided by consumer associations in Bulgaria
can be improved. First, enough financial resource for their activities must be ensured.
Potential sources consist of membership fees, international financing programs (for
project implementation), subsidy from the state budget, and income from sale of
information materials, training activities and consultations.
Second, associations services may be improved by accelerating the training and
skills development of associations human resources. Both the government and
associations can provide necessary training through seminars, conferences, and
workshops. International experience should not be ignored and many international
consumer associations could likely provide assistance in this respect.
Third, better coordination and collaboration among associations can only make
them stronger. Because of their limited capacity and disunity they cannot affirm their
place in the society, and that hinders their communication with administration and
corporate agents.
Finally, it is crucial to the success of consumer associations to enjoy the support and
trust of those they represent. This is directly related to the establishment of an active
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consumer culture and to the defence of consumer interests.
In an institutional aspect, the consumer associations can conduct a dialogue with
administrative bodies through the National Council for Consumer Protection, which is
a consultative body subject to the Minister of Economy. The Council includes
representatives from the Ministry of Healthcare, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry
of Finance, and representatives of consumers associations. At present the following
organizations are represented in the Council: the Bulgarian National Consumer
Association, the Independent Union of Consumers, the Consumer Centre for Data
and Research, the Vidin and Plovdiv Regional Consumer Unions, and the Federation
of Consumers in Bulgaria. Unfortunately the Ministry of Energy and Energy Resources
does not yet have a representative at the National Council for Consumer Protection,
thereby reducing opportunities for a dialogue on the issues particular to electricity
consumers in an important national forum.
The National Council for Consumer Protection:
n Makes proposals through the Minister of Economy for amendments to the
laws governing consumer protection;
n Makes proposals to the state bodies for the efficient application of legislation
for consumer protection;
n Gives opinions on draft legislation related to consumer rights.
The National Council for Consumer Protection provides an excellent forum through
which associations may represent consumer interests to the government. Through it
consumer associations can make proposals for legislative amendments, or improvement
of the system for consumer protection, or harmonization of the consumer policy with
the other state policies. Because the state energy policy is effected by MEER, the
participation of its representative at the National Council for Consumer Protection will
allow a better horizontal coordination of the energy and consumer policy.
Since the National Council for Consumer Protection has not a long practice, it
experience is rather limited. Its role may become more significant in the future, given
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that the government is indeed committed to ensure consumer protection and that
consumer associations are effectively functioning.
3. Instruments for Consumer Protection and Their Application
Supply of Information
The dissemination of information by associations often has significant impacts on
consumers behavior and on the establishment of active consumer culture. Through
providing specialized consumer information, associations support households to defend
their rights and to be demanding. When first established, consumer associations focussed
on disseminating information about the existence of consumer rights. This has evolved
to include much more specific information, including ways of dealing with concerns
and complaints. Associations do have ability to find and deliver specific information to
consumers. In terms of electricity supply, they can disseminate useful information on
consumer rights and procedures for their defending. To date, however, the experience
of associations in providing electricity specific information is insignificant.
The primary constraint faced by consumer associations in this role is their lack of
financial resources (for dissemination of free-of-charge information materials) and the
limited capacity of the information market (for dissemination of non-free-of-charge
materials). Media is the main channel they use for delivering consumer information.
Predominantly, disseminated information is under the guise of news, thus insignificantly
contributing to the formation of consumer culture.
Consulting and counselling
Consumer associations consult and advise individual consumers when their rights
and interests have been breached (or when this has been perceived to be the case).
This may take place over the telephone, through meetings, or through written advice
(via mail or electronic mail). The advice that is offered is typically used to clarify legal
rights and procedures.
Among all mechanisms of associations in Bulgaria, consultations are the most popular.
They provide immediate contact with an expert in the field, often free of charge.
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Consultations are often the first step that a consumer makes on the way to defend his
or her rights. In many cases, this initial consultation is sufficient to resolve the customers
concerns. This is fully valid for consultations in electricity matters. Sometimes however
associations may find it difficult to provide consultations, especially if thorough
engineering knowledge and highly specialized expertise are required, and they do not
possess such.
Efficient application of this mechanism for consumer protection is hindered by the
unpopularity of associations, especially in smaller settlements. Consequently, there is
a strong need to improve the awareness of consumers about their associations and to
set up trust in their activity.
Negotiations with traders and producers
Negotiations are a very efficient means to immediately defend consumer interests
with traders and producers. In general, they are used upon introduction or amendments
to contract terms or upon settlement of disputes, whereby associations assist certain
consumers. In Bulgaria however companies are not accustomed to the habit of
negotiating contractual terms with their customers. For example, at the beginning of
2002 all the electricity distribution companies in the country drew up new contracts
with consumers using general terms and conditions. Only the draft of the Sofia Electricity
Distribution Company was discussed and amended in public. That eloquently shows
that still the dialogue and collaboration among the business, state and consumers are
not developed.
The lack of experience in negotiating with producers and traders is a main drawback
of consumer associations because it does not foster the formation of specialists with
proven expertise in this regard. It also feeds up distrust of consumers for their
representative organizations. The establishment of precedents and improving the culture
of dialogue between traders and consumers will bring benefits to both consumer
protection and the image of suppliers in the society.
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Court trials
Seeking the protection of the court is a last resort for consumers seeking to protect
their rights for two reasons: First, the relatively high costs and time delays. Second,
because courts are limited in settling the dispute that is brought before them. They
cannot address the wider context in which the dispute occurred and can therefore
rarely address the policy questions that a trial may raise.
Citizens or consumer groups may raise individual court trials. Trials may be collective
as well, if a consumer association files a claim in the name of a large group. These
claims are most often directed at unequal clauses in contracts with consumers or
misleading and unfair advertisements. In the field of electricity claims against
advertisements are exceptions because of the lack of the latter for the time being.
Successful trials against unequal clauses have a huge effect on consumers. They result
in a change to the general terms and conditions of electricity contracts and consequently,
concern all consumers.
To date, only few such trials have occurred, mostly as a result of the ambiguity and
uncertainty characterizing the relevant legislation. Once the general terms and
conditions for electricity contracts are drawn up and are given legal weight, it is expected
that much of this problem will be resolved.  Other significant reasons include the low
legal culture of consumers and their limited financial resources for covering the incurred
costs. The latter strongly restricts the access to justice of a considerable part of consumers.
In this regard associations can contribute by negotiating with companies upon drafting
of general terms and conditions and by providing financial and methodical assistance
to consumers in court proceedings.
4. Conclusions
The analysis gives us grounds to state that consumers associations in Bulgaria are
provided with the formal preconditions to carry out their public functions and protect
electricity consumers in the course of the sector reforms.
Problems arise mainly from weakness of associations themselves and less from
disadvantage of the external environment. Insufficient financial and human resources
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combined with limited experience and low degree of collaboration deprive associations
of the possibility to be an efficient advocate of the interests of electricity consumers.
Practically, consumers associations are in a vicious circle. Neither are they popular
in the society, nor have they proven their efficiency to consumers and electricity
Strenghts
n High commitment to the prob-
lems of consumers
n Legally guaranteed rights for
protecting the interest of con-
sumers
n Wide opportunities for direct
contact with consumers
n Available mechanisms for pro-
tection of consumers
n Institutionalized dialogue with
the state administration
Weaknesses
n Lack of sufficient experience
and practice in performing their
functions
n Low developed collaboration
between the unions
n Difficulties in communicating
with the administration at all lev-
els
n Low degree of coverage on the
territory of the country with ac-
tive activities to protect consum-
ers
n Lack of financial resource for
efficient work
n Lack of sufficient specialized in-
formation and expertise in elec-
tricity
n Low popularity among society
Opportunities
n Desire to expand their activity
in new geographic regions
n Improving popularity and form-
ing social trust towards the con-
sumers unions
n Improving ones expertise in the
field of electricity
n Establishment of precedent and
accumulation of positive expe-
rience
n Improving the culture of dia-
logue with the very unions and
between the unions, corporate
agents and state bodies
Threats
n Continuous disunity and lack of
collaboration between the con-
sumer unions
n Distrust and unpopularity
among the consumers unions
n Lack of financial and human re-
source for the consumers unions
n Lack of dialogue or useless dia-
logue with the central and local
officials
n Insufficient dialogue with corpo-
rate agents
Figure 14: Abilities of Consumer Associations to Protect Electricity
Consumers
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distribution companies. Consequently, households and electricity suppliers turn to them
sporadically, thus preventing associations from accumulating experience and
competence in protection of consumer interests in electricity supply.
Overcoming this vicious circle depends to a great extent on the will and efforts of
the very associations. Measures that they can use are various. They can for example
unite their efforts and establish a unit specialized in energy sector or in sectors that
render services of general economic interest to consumers (telecommunications, energy,
water supply and sewerage). More frequent production and dissemination of specific
electricity information is another way, in which associations may improve their expertise
and increase their popularity in the society.
Consumers associations can be efficient only if their counterparts, represented by
electricity distribution companies, MEER and SERC, are willing to actively work with
them. Their participation in decision-making would have a positive effect on all
participants in the process.
CONCLUSIONS
For the past decade, an essential reappraisal of energy policy has been taking place.
More specifically, a review of the governments role in the provision of energy services
has been undertaken. Radical institutional, regulatory, and structural reforms are being
carried out around the world with the aim of replacing highly regulated regimes with
competition, and improving industrial efficiency and service quality. The countries
where such reforms have been implemented are reaping significant benefits - both
economic (reductions in costs) and social (shift of the savings to end users). At the same
time liberalization of energy sector is part of the broader philosophy for modernization
of the national economies and for free movement of goods and services.
Since 1999 the EU Member States have been making decisive steps towards the
liberalization of their energy markets, while pursuing the common goal of establishing
of a single competitive market. Their efforts are being coordinated by the EU which,
through its documents, imposes requirements to ensure the attainment of this goal.
Similar to all other accession countries, Bulgaria has to take these requirements into
account in its preparation for joining the EU.
For many years the Bulgarian energy sector has been subject to a state monopoly
and high subsidizing of household prices. Bulgarians started to perceive electricity supply
not as a market service but as a social privilege that was guaranteed by the government.
The former vertically and horizontally integrated state-owned monopoly company did
not have stimuli to apply measures to improve its economic and technical efficiency as
well as to establish normal commercial relations with its customers.
Under those circumstances structural reforms in the Bulgarian electricity sector were
put many times off, thus making it too complicated for the government to perform
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them and for the citizens to understand them. Each postponement increases the threat
to the social affordability because it entails more radical changes. It threatens the security
and efficiency of electricity supply as well because delays new investments and
improvement in the governance of energy companies.
In recent years Bulgaria developed the framework for the restructuring of the
organization and ownership in the sector. New legislation was adopted, new institutions
were created, generation, transmission and distribution were separated. The core
reforms however are still to be implemented.
The ongoing and upcoming changes pose the question of the affordability of
electricity supply to many Bulgarians.  They arouse concerns whether each Bulgarian,
regardless of his social status, will be guaranteed the right to receive enough electricity
of high quality and at a reasonable price to meet his minimal needs.
Bulgarians are mainly concerned with the price aspect of electricity supply, especially
given the projected price increases over the course of the next years. It is worth noting
that the basic reason for these concerns lies not in the price levels themselves but in the
low income and high electricity consumption of Bulgarian households. As a result
electricity expenses account for a significant share in household income, and new
price increases pose serious financial difficulties for consumers. This is why urgent and
targeted measures for decreasing the financial burden must be taken. It would be helpful
if both governmental and non-governmental institutions redouble their efforts for
improving the efficiency of household electricity consumption. Energy commercial
entities may as well contribute to the alleviation of the financial burden of electricity
supply by offering a wide range of new services such as short-term credits for consumers
in winter and consultations on the application of energy efficient technologies and
energy management. Special attention is to be paid to consumers with the lowest
income standing in the society, as often they cannot cover even the minimal electricity
expenses. Namely these households rather than all electricity consumers must the target
of any energy social aid.
Both technical and commercial quality of electricity supply are not a major concern
of Bulgarians for the time being. This situation is to be attributed not to the lack of any
problems but rather to the significance of the price of the service. Adequate regulation
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and control are required to ensure the quality of electricity supply in the years to come
and to encourage companies to improve the servicing of their customers.
The three factors that ensure consumer protection - market competition, regulation,
and representation of consumer interests - are almost unknown in the Bulgarian
electricity sector and still cannot guarantee the interests of electricity consumers.
Competition on the electricity market is to be introduced in the months to come
but only for the largest industrial consumers. Hence its impact on households over the
next years will be indirect and under the guise of lower prices of other goods and
services, higher competitiveness of electricity intensive industries, creation of
employment, and introduction of market relations.
The incremental market opening brings the question whether companies will try to
pass some of their costs for non-regulated consumers on to regulated ones, while striving
for higher competitiveness. This threat makes the efficient regulation obligatory. The
lack of experience in the country in the regulation of monopolies during the transition
to a competitive market challenges the successful performance of the regulatory body.
In addition, the efforts during the last years have turned insufficient to ensure a good
environment for the SERCs performance. As a result, a number of unclear and non-
transparent practices have taken place and have raised the distrust of Bulgarians in the
fairness of the regulatory process.
Representation of consumer interests is not popular in Bulgaria mainly because
consumer associations have not proven their efficiency, especially in terms of
monopolies. As a result consumers seldom turn to these organizations, and companies
and the government do not view them as a partner in their decision-making. The lack
of enough and secure financing, human and financial resources, and expertise restricts
the activities and efficiency of consumer associations. The concentration of the latter
in large settlements deprives many Bulgarians of access to their services. With regard
to electricity supply households without access are among the most vulnerable
consumers.
The cooperation between companies, the government, the regulatory body and
consumer associations is still making its initial steps. Its necessity is determined by its
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capacity to prevent many future problems. In this respect, the participation of consumer
associations in decision-making would have a positive effect on all participants in the
process. SERC would have access to additional expert opinions. Electricity distribution
companies would be more be aware of the opinion of consumers about discussed
measures before the latter become effective and thus could avoid potential conflict by
taking precautionary measures. Consumer associations would be motivated to get more
deeply acquainted with procedures for electricity sale and to defend actively the rights
of consumers. As a whole communication between the different agents would improve,
most of the conflicts would be preventatively solved and end-users would receive
services of better quality.
Finally, we should pay attention to the very low awareness of Bulgarians regarding
the reforms, their necessity, advantages and disadvantages and their importance for
both the national economy and the countrys EU accession. In addition, households
do not know their rights and obligations as electricity consumers. The lack of information
provides for misunderstanding, fear of and opposition to the reforms. The low awareness
of the existence and functions of the institutions involved in the protection of electricity
consumers raises distrust in the former. Therefore, information campaigns and public
surveys must be regularly held and all institutions must take active part in them.
Information services must be delivered with priority to the most vulnerable consumers
- the elderly, indebted, poor, and those residing sparsely populated regions because
they feel mostly threatened by the reforms.
APPENDIX 1: PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS OF
ELECRICITY IN SWEDEN
1. Development of Consumer Protection
Sweden was one of the first countries in Europe to implement an active consumer
protection policy. Studies on consumer protection issues were first undertaken in the
1960s. These resulted in the creation of a public consumer ombudsman system in
January 1971. The ombudsman was initially created to intervene against unfair business
practices. Since 1976 however, he was given the additional responsibility to act against
dangerous products and was appointed to the presidency of the National Board for
Consumer Policy.
In the 1980s new measures for consumer protection were proposed. In 1986, the
parliament passed a bill aiming at helping households to make the best use of their
money and to strengthen their position in the market. In 1995, the government presented
a new bill Active Consumer Policy, in which the objectives of the Swedish consumer
policy were highlighted32 . Extra priority was given to consumers who are economically
or socially vulnerable or who for some other reasons have special needs.
In 1999 the Swedish government created a Committee to study consumer protection
policies for the 21st century. The Committee published its final report a year later. It
made the following important recommendations:
n Obligatory establishment of local consumer advice centres in all districts;
n Establishment of a Ministry for Consumer Affairs in order to highlight the
consumer and food issues in the governments work;
n Allocating more resources to the Swedish Consumer Agency for investigation
and analysis work, and giving the Agency increased powers as well as the role
of co-ordinator in developing consumer policy;
32Households shall be provided with the best possibility to use their economic and other resources in an effective way;
consumers shall have a strong position in the marketplace; the consumers health and safety shall be protected; and
long-term sustainable consumption and production patterns shall be developed.
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n Ensuring more public financing of consumer organisations;
n Enhancing consumer knowledge;
n Better means of dealing with advice and complaints, especially with regard
to real estate and the delivery of electricity and telecommunication services;
n Extension of the Consumer Services Act to cover more services, especially in
the deregulated industries.
The Committees proposals were taken into account in the Ministry of Justices
publication of a new Action Plan for Consumer Policy. The action plan proposed the
following objectives:
n Consumers are to have a stronger position and more influence on the market;
n Households are to be able to use their economic and other resources
efficiently;
n The health and safety of consumers is to be protected;
n Patterns of consumption and production are to be developed to reduce the
burden on the environment and contribute to long-term sustainable
development;
n Consumers are to have the right to good advice, information and education.
2. Institutions for Consumer Protection
Until 1988 the responsibility for consumer affairs was at the Ministry of Finance, later
shifted to the Ministry of Public Administration. On the federal level, two ministries bear
the responsibility for consumer protection. While the Ministry of Justice is responsible
for consumer protection policy in Sweden and has created a separate department for
consumer affairs, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the Swedish Consumer Agency
(KOV).
The latter was founded in 1973 and is headed by the Consumer Ombudsman, who
represents the collective interests of consumers in the market. Its activities mainly relate
to advertising and contracts terms, consumer information and education, domestic
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finances, product safety and quality, and environmental impact. Consumers may turn
to KOV with complaints about traders, though KOV does not generally resolve individual
consumer disputes.33  Rather, the Ombudsman tends to use class action lawsuits to
represent the interests of large groups of consumers before the Complaints Board (ARN),
a specialized tribunal set up to deal with such matters. The Ombudsman can also bring
lawsuits through the traditional court system and can create precedents through
agreements with industry representatives.
The National Board for Consumer Complaints (ARN) is responsible for individual
consumer complaints and settles disputes outside the court. ARN is a national authority
directly responsible to the government (Ministry of Finance) and is currently the only
extra-judicial body in Sweden. It is divided into 11 departments. It may be noted that
complaints concerning electricity supply are dealt with by the Housing Department.
The tasks of ARN include:
n To investigate conflicts between consumers and traders about goods, services
or other utilities intended primarily for private use (consumer disputes) and
to recommend solutions;
n To provide expert opinion to courts, upon request;
n To support the mediation role of local consumer organisations in consumer
disputes, through training, advice and information;
n To inform consumers and traders of the Boards practice.
Municipal consumer advisors are a vital part of the consumer protection network in
Sweden. The scope of each advisor varies depending on the financial situation and the
political priorities of the municipality. Their main task is to provide advice, free of
charge, to individual consumers. They may:
n Advise consumers on purchases;
n Inform them of their legal rights;
n Mediate in claim disputes;
n Monitor the local market;
33 In financial matters, the ombudsman may represent individual consumer if the case will serve to test a novel principle
or point of law.
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n Work together with other local government bodies.
The staff of the municipal consumer advisories are trained and supported by the
Swedish Consumer Agency.
In addition to the above-mentioned institutions, there are several consumer bureaus
that deal with specific sectors (e.g. banking, insurance). In April 2002, a consumer
bureau for electricity was founded in Stockholm.
3. General Procedure for Handling a Consumer Complaint
If a consumer is not content with a purchased good or service he must give notice
to the trader as soon as possible. According to the Swedish Consumer Act, a trader is
under obligation to address complaints and to rectify faults that are brought to his
attention.
If a trader fails to respond to a complaint or if it is not possible for the consumer to
achieve an amicable agreement with the trader, the consumer may bring the dispute
to the attention of the ARN. This must be done within six month of the trader having
completely or partially rejected the claim. The claim must have a certain value (135 for
issues concerning electricity). The ARN process is a purely written procedure. Special
forms for notification are available at the municipal consumer advisors, at the Board,
or at the Boards Homepage.
The Boards decision is typically a recommendation to the parties regarding how to
settle the dispute. They are not legally binding and cannot be appealed.  Nevertheless,
approximately 75% of traders have undertaken to follow these recommendations. If
unsatisfied with the recommendation, consumers may take the case to an ordinary
court.
The ARN will normally consider disputes that involve:
n Any Swedish trader;
n Foreign traders with places of business in Sweden;
n Foreign traders if the agreement affecting the goods or services has been
reached in Sweden;
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n Foreign traders if the agreement relating to the goods or services has been
reached abroad but the marketing took place in Sweden, the consumer lives
in Sweden, and there is no reason to suppose that a recommendation will be
simply ignored.
In 2001 the ARN received 105 complaints concerning the supply of electricity.34
4. Electricity Specific Consumer Protection
The Swedish electricity market was opened in 1996 with the Electricity Market Act.
Major provisions of the Electricity Market Act include:
n Complete market opening as of January 1, 1996;
n Hourly metering requirements for customers wishing to switch supplier;
n Legal unbundling of generation and transmission as well as distribution and
supply;
n Network access based on regulated TPA;
n Ex-post regulation by the Office of the Electricity and Gas Regulator, which is
part of the National Energy Administration.
The use of hourly metering for household customers resulted in an absence of
competition in the household sector. Consequently, the hourly metering requirement
was abolished in November 1999. At the same time, the regulator stopped overseeing
final electricity prices and now concentrates on monitoring network tariffs.
A major concern in the functioning of the Swedish market is related to the ex-post
regulation, which is considered weak and insufficient to avoid cross-subsidies between
supply and distribution.
With respect to end-users, the Swedish Consumer Agency has identified the following
major problems related to market liberalization:35
n Problems with switching supplier, including delays, double invoices or in some
cases none at all;
n Communication problems between the network company and the supplier,
34 ARN, March 2002.
35 Swedish Consumer Agency, March 2002.
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for instance with respect to reporting meter readings;
n Problems when consumers change their residence and fail to advise their
supplier;
n Problems when companies present their prices and services in ways that make
them difficult to compare;
n Companies that do not give correct information about prices and contractual
terms.
The Electricity Market Act (1998) created an obligation for the system operator to
connect all consumers seeking access to the grid. Electricity suppliers operate under
similar obligations. In every region there is a supplier who must offer electricity supply
to all consumers at a price regulated by the National Energy Administration. Electricity
consumers without a supplier are to be assigned a supplier by the network operator.
More specific provisions concerning consumer protection and consumer obligations
are found in Chapter 11 of the Electricity Market Act. They comprise:
n Contractual terms, which disadvantage consumers relative to the provisions
of Chapter 11 are invalid;
n Electricity supply may be interrupted if a consumer neglects his obligations
and the neglect constitutes a substantial breach of contract. Before the
interruption consumers must be requested to rectify the fault within a
reasonable time;
n Consumers are granted a three-week grace period for payments before the
supplier is entitled to stop supplying them. If a consumer does not or cannot
pay, the municipal welfare board is informed. In certain cases, the welfare
board will take over the payments for the consumer;
n Owners of network concessions and power suppliers are entitled to reasonable
compensation from consumer for the costs incurred by the latters breach of
contract;
n If the supply is interrupted for reasons which are not attributable to the
consumer, the latter has the right to compensation, unless the distributor can
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prove that the interruption did not result from any fault of their own;
n Compensation for damages may includes compensation for costs incurred,
loss of revenues and other losses caused by the interruption. If the damages
are considered unreasonably burdensome given the economic situation of
the person liable to pay compensation, it may be reduced. Insurance policies
and foreseeability are taken into consideration;
n The consumer must make a claim within two years of when the damage was
incurred. Failure to do so will annul his right to compensation.
The Action Plan for Consumer Policy  (2001) proposed the creation of a Consumer
Advice Bureau for Electricity. In May 2002, the latter began operating in Stockholm.
In addition, the Action Plan provides for the Swedish Consumer Agency to perform
systematic studies of deregulated and regulated markets from a consumer perspective
in co-operation with the Swedish Competition Authority and various sector authorities.
5. Development of Household Electricity Prices
Real electricity prices for households dropped consistently throughout the 1980s in
Sweden, resulting in a 28% drop between 1980 and 1991. Following a brief increase in
the first half of the 1990s, prices have resumed their downward trend (see Figure 15).
Figure 15: Real Electricity Prices for Households in Sweden; 1980 -
2001; Ore/kWh
..
Source: Own calculations of EWI, data taken from IEA.
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Sweden experienced much stronger price reductions in the 1980s compared to the
EU average, though the trends in the 1990s have more closely resembled those of the
other countries (see Figure 16).
Figure 16: Household Real Electricity Prices Index in Sweden and
EU; 1980 - 2001; 1995=100 
Source:  Own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA.
APPENDIX 2: PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS OF
ELECTRICITY IN FINLAND
1. Development of Consumer Protection
As in Sweden, active consumer protection policy began very early in Finland. In
1962, the Council of State appointed a Consultative Board for Consumers, the first
body actually responsible for managing consumer issues in the central administration.
In 1973, the National Board of Trade and Consumer Affairs was founded. Its main
responsibilities were overseeing prices, competition, and consumer affairs. The
Consumer Protection Act was enacted in 1978. The Act concerns offers and contracts
for sale and marketing of consumer goods and services. The main issues covered by
the Act are regulation of marketing and contract terms, sale of consumer goods, liability
for defective goods, door-to-door selling and distance selling, and consumer credits. In
each of these sections specific compensation schemes or rights to withhold payments
are described.
In the 1990s, consumer policy gained further importance. Two Consumer Policy
Programs were developed. A third Programme for the period 2000-2003 was completed
in 2000. It was drawn up by the Advisory Council on Consumer Affairs36  acting in
conjunction with the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
According to the third Consumer Policy Program, the Finnish consumer protection
policy is supposed to strengthen citizens position in the society and the product markets,
to ensure the stability of market conditions from the economic and sanitary point of
view, and safeguard Finnish citizens right to make informed consumer choices. A
further aim of the consumer policy is to avoid and settle disputes arising between
consumers and suppliers.
Currently, the most important legal provisions for consumer protection are found in
36 The Chairman of the Council is the Minister in charge of Consumer Affairs. The Vice-Chairman is the Minister of
Justice.
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the Consumer Protection Act, the Product Safety Act and the Product Liability Act, of
which the latter explicitly refer to electricity.
2. Institutions for Consumer Protection
In 1978 new institutions for consumer protection in Finland were founded: The
Consumer Ombudsman, the Market Court, the Consumer Complaint Board and the
Municipal Consumer Counselling Scheme. In 1990, the National Board of Trade and
Consumer Affairs was replaced by three agencies: the National Consumer
Administration, the National Consumer Research Centre, and the National Food
Administration.
These offices are assisted by the local Provincial Administrative Boards.
In 1994 the revision of the Consumer Protection Act took effect, while in October
1995 the Ministry of Trade and Industry assigned a working group to draft a report on
how consumer administration supervised by the Ministry could be re-organized as
Finlands membership in the EU involved new challenges. Following the report, a new
institutional structure of consumer protection was implemented in 1996. Again, in
1999 a re-organisation took place and the National Consumer Administration and the
Consumer Ombudsman were combined into one Consumer Agency, with the
Ombudsman serving as a Director General.
Currently, the primary Finish institutions that deal with consumer protection issues
are: the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Consumer Agency and the Consumer
Ombudsman, the Consumer Complaint Board, the National Consumer Research
Centre, and the New Market Court.
Traditionally, the Ministry of Trade and Industry has led the development of consumer
protection policies. In 1993 and 1994, the general administration of consumer affairs
in the Ministry was re-organized. Since then, the Competition, Consumer and Food
Policy Division of the Trade Department is responsible for developing relevant consumer
protection legislation in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice.
The Consumer Agency and the Consumer Ombudsman promotes the legal and economic
position of consumers and implements the consumer policy. It is responsible for
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supervising product safety, disseminating consumer information, carrying out consumer
education and operating the municipal consumer counseling service.
The Consumer Ombudsman supervises marketing aimed at consumers and the contract
terms used by businesses. He has also been assigned supervising tasks in the creation
of other legislation such as the Electricity Market Act. The Consumer Ombudsman can
also conduct negotiations with businesses, impose injunctions and conditional fines,
bring matters to the attention of the Market Court, and report matters to the public
prosecutor. The Consumer Ombudsman can assist individuals when it is considered to
be important for the application of a law or for the good of the public. Since 1999, the
Consumer Agency has been able to pay all the legal costs incurred by consumers in
specific cases. This ensures that test cases can be brought to trial and legal precedents
set.
The Consumer Complaint Board recommends settlements of complaints made by
consumers with regard to the quality of products or services that they have contracted
for. It also submits expert opinions to the courts on disputes relating to consumer goods.
It differs from the other consumer authorities in that its purpose is not to promote the
direct benefits of consumers.
The National Consumer Research Centre operates under the supervision of the Ministry
of Trade and Industry and is responsible for conducting objective research relating to
domestic consumption and consumables. Its primary duty is to produce and disseminate
research data that can be used to enhance the well-being of consumers and households
and strengthen their influence and decision-making. Other aims include improving
co-operation between consumers and different branches of the economy, supporting
the development of user-oriented technologies, promoting sustainable economic
development, and improving national competitiveness.
The Market Court acts as a specialized court for any matters falling under it by virtue
of the Consumer Protection Act in the field of marketing and contractual regulation or
under the Unfair Business Practices Act. Created in March 2002, it was later merged
with the National Competition Council. As such, the Market Court also promotes
initiatives made by the Finnish Competition Authority to remove barriers to competition.
It also serves as the first court of appeal for decisions of the Finnish Competition
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Authority.
In addition to these national bodies dealing with consumer protection, there are
regional and local authorities. As of 1992, all municipalities had to organize Municipal
Consumer Counseling Offices in their territories. At the end of 2000, there were 153
consumer counseling districts and 182 municipal advisors in the field of consumer
affairs employed in 160 offices. Approximately 37% of the counselors worked on full-
time, and the rest are part-timers.
However, not all citizens have the same access to consumer advice as some
municipalities have a full-time advisor, while others have an official who performs this
task in addition to other duties, or share an advisor with neighboring municipalities. At
present, approximately 80% of the population lives in municipalities which have full-
time advisors. Roughly two-thirds of these have relatively easy access to the advisor.
But even in some of these municipalities service is considered deficient because
resources are not in line with demand. In the worst position are those who live in
municipalities where advice is arranged only pro forma: the advisor has other duties to
perform and lacks the necessary skills to handle the job, and information on service is
inadequate.
Finlands municipal consumer counselors handle approximately 100,000 contacts
a year. Two-thirds of these typically concern private disputes for which the consumer
counselors provide a mediation service. The remainder are general inquiries about
consumer goods. Municipal consumer counseling thus plays an important role in
ensuring the protection of consumers rights in Finland.
In addition to these government-run consumer organizations, there are two major
voluntary consumer associations in Finland: the Finnish Consumers Association and the
Local Consumer Association. Both organizations receive some government funding.
The Finnish Consumers Association is an independent promoter of the interests and
rights of consumers. Its functions include the protection of consumer interests, local
and regional consumer activities, consumer education, production and dissemination
of information, as well as national and international co-operation. It reinvented itself in
1990 as a national umbrella organization, with seven national groups and sixty-two
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local ones. It is represented in many international organizations and bodies, including
the European Consumer Organization (BEUC) and the Nordic Advisory Council on
Consumer Affairs.
The objectives of the Finnish Consumers Association are:
n To encourage consumers to work actively for their interests and to promote
their co-operation;
n To promote and advance consumer interests in society and on the market by
means of informal action;
n To further the principles of fairness and sustainable consumption;
n To promote consumer awareness;
n To work for environmental protection.
 The Local Consumer Association was founded in 1965 and has 750 individual members
and 7 collective members. It also produces information, organizes campaigns, and
delivers public statements.
Finnish consumer organizations are represented on all the major committees
responsible for consumer affairs, such as the Consumer Affairs Commission, the Product
Safety Commission, the Foodstuffs Commission, the Consumers Standardization
Commission. They are also often represented on preparatory bodies, committees,
commissions and working groups responsible for consumer policy or consumer
protection. The consumer organizations views on major legislative projects are regularly
elicited. Parliament also consults representatives of consumer organizations when
examining the Consumer Policy implications of important bills.
3. Electricity Specific Consumer Protection
The Finnish electricity market was opened by virtue of the Electricity Market Act
(1995). The major provisions of this Act include:
n A gradual opening of the electricity market with customers whose power
requirements exceeded 500 kW being the first to have access in 1995, while
the total market opening was delayed until 1997;
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n Introduction of regulated TPA based on a case-by-case ex-post price control;
n Creation of an electricity exchange (EL-EX), which was later incorporated in
the Scandinavian electricity exchange Nord Pool (1997);
n Establishment of licensed areas for distribution without exclusive supply rights;
n Accounting unbundling of generation, wires business and supply;
n Introduction of an electricity market regulator;
n Establishment of Fingrid as a Finnish transmission network operator, which
started operations on September 1, 1997.
In 1998, the Electricity Market Act was amended to include the load curve profiling
method for small customers. Because of the hourly metering requirement, no household
changed initially its supplier. With the introduction of load profiling, which took effect
for households towards the end of 1998, prohibitive metering costs for a change of the
supplier were abolished. In 1999, a further amendment to the Electricity Market Act
included specific provisions concerning the protection of small consumers.
Since being amended in 1999, the current Electricity Market Act includes several
specific provisions for consumer protection:
n Electricity supply prices and terms must be public and easily accessible to
consumers;
n An electricity retailer who is in a dominant market position in the geographical
area of responsibility of a distribution network operator is obliged to supply
at a reasonable price (standard service offer);
n The price for the standard service offer is supervised by the regulator;
n The Energy Market Authority serves as the first source for appeals for electricity
disputes;
n The Consumer Ombudsman supervises the legality of the terms of the contracts
on the electricity market;37
37 In the beginning of the market opening for households in 1998, the Consumer Ombudsman intervened in advertising
of electricity to consumers. The price information in special offers, in particular, had been unclear; no clear information
had been given on electricity transmission prices and the comparisons of potential savings had been inadequate. Also
in 1998, the Consumer Ombudsman intervened in case of two electricity companies that charged a fee for reading
electricity meters when customers moved house. The Ombudsman found the rate given in the price list to constitute
unreasonable contract terms.
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n A distribution network operator may not terminate a connection contract or
a consumers power network contract;
n Specific periods of notice: the notice period for terminating an electricity
sales contract is two weeks for the user of electricity and three months for the
retailer;
n Distributors must provide itemized invoices to their customers;
n Consumers have a right to withhold payments as compensation for damages
caused by delayed connections to the network;
n Consumers are entitled to price reductions in case of low quality of electricity
supply. In case supply disruptions, minimum compensation is equivalent to
two weeks share of the annual network service fee;
n Entitlement to compensation payments for damages suffered because of a
fault in electricity supply;
n If a retailer fails to deliver the distribution network operator must notify the
consumer and continue to deliver for at least three weeks after sending the
notification;
n Supplier has the right to disconnect a consumer for failure to pay invoices (or
other breaches of contract) according to contractual terms.
Before interrupting the electricity supply the company must send the consumer a
written notification of the default on payment or of the breach of contract and a separate
warning preceding the interruption of the electricity supply. The latter may only be
sent two weeks after the initial notification is sent. The electricity supply may then in
turn be cut at the earliest five weeks after the payment has fallen due or after the
consumer has been informed of some other breach of contract for the first time.
If the default on payment is caused by consumers financial difficulties that are the
result of serious illness, unemployment, or some other cause for which he is not at
fault, electricity supply may be cut at the earliest two months after the due date of the
payment.
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Electricity supply may not be cut because of default on payment between the
beginning of October and the end of April in a building or in a part of a building that is
used as a permanent residence, if the building is heated by means of electricity, until
four months have elapsed since the due date of the outstanding payment.
Since the electricity market opening for households, the Market Court intervened
in two prominent cases.
In 1999, with the opening of the electricity market to competition, companies tried
to attract consumer attention with environmental claims. The Consumer Ombudsman
studied ads placed by Kainuu Electricity, which appeal strongly to consumer concern
for the environment and the welfare of future generations. Helsinki Energy has claimed
in its ads that the electricity, which it markets, helps to keep the air cleaner. According
to the Consumer Ombudsmans guidelines on environmental marketing, environmental
claims should be accurate and the impact of individual consumers decisions on the
environment should not be exaggerated. The Market Court prohibited the two
companies, under threat of a fine, from giving the overall impression that by insulating
houses in excess of official building standards, consumers can substantially promote
environmental protection and slow down the greenhouse effect. They also prohibited
the companies from using marketing phrases such as insulate before the last pine
needles fall.
In November 1999, the Market Court held that electricity cannot be advertised
with side benefits. The Market Court banned Helsinki Energy from using side benefits
and discounts on petrol and home insurance in its advertising. The Market Court noted
that the purpose of deregulating the electricity market was to allow customers to benefit
from cheaper prices as a result of competition. Comparing prices should not be made
more difficult by linking side benefits to electricity agreements.
4. Development of Household Electricity Prices
Finland experienced a strong reduction in real household electricity prices during
the 1980s. During the 1990s prices increased, peaked in 1996 and resumed their
downward trend afterwards (Figure 17).
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Compared to other European countries household electricity prices were more
volatile in Finland. They fell much faster in the 1980s, but increased in the early 1990s,
when they were falling in most other countries. After liberalization they decreased
somewhat faster than the average (Figure 18).
Figure 17: Real Electricity Prices for Households in Finland; 1980 -
2001; Euro-Cent/kWh
Source: Own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA.
Figure 18: Household Real Electricity Prices Index in Finland and the
EU; 1980 - 2001; 1995=100
Source: Own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA.
APPENDIX 3: PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS OF
ELECTRICITY IN GERMANY
1. Development of Consumer Protection
Since the late 1950s, German consumer protection policy has relied predominantly
on the existence of competition. The two primary pieces of legislation that govern the
sector are the General Competition Law and the Law Against Unfair Competition. The
former provides cartel authorities and the ministers the authority to control the
functioning of the markets. The aim of the latter is to protect competition, competitors,
and the public against unfair competition. It provides general binding rules on
competitors behavior.
Since the 1970s, consumer information has been considered another means of
consumer protection.38  In order to disseminate information the Ministries rely on
predominantly publicly financed consumer associations, rather than on their own public
relations departments.
In 2002, the government proposed a Consumer Information Act. It was designed to
enable consumers to act in a sovereign matter in the marketplace and to protect their
health and economic interests. According to the proposed law, selected public
authorities were supposed to be required to provide information upon request
concerning food and selected consumer goods (private companies were not concerned).
The proposed law foresaw a special federal agent for the access to consumer information,
to which any citizen may turn if he felt that the specific public authority is not acting
according to its information requirements.
In May 2002, the German Upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat) rejected the
proposed law, as the provisions would create unreasonable costs for the public bodies,
which would mostly not be able to deliver the required information. In addition, the
38 See Hippel, E. v., Verbraucherschutz, Tübingen, 1986 for more stakeholder statements concerning consumer protection
in Germany in the 1970s.
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Bundesrat criticized the national independent initiative, and proposed a EU-wide action.
2. Institutions for Consumer Protection
There are several different institutions for consumer protection in Germany:
n Institutions within the federal government,
n Consumer Agencies on state level,
n Private (umbrella) organisations for consumer protection.
Germany relies on cartel authorities at both federal and state levels to ensure the
efficient functioning of competition because of its importance in ensuring the protection
of consumers.
In the 1970s, Germany created the Consumer Council within the Ministry of Economy
which was generally responsible for consumer protection in Germany. The crisis in
2001 in the food-sector as a result of BSE and foot-and-mouth disease led the
government to replace the Council with a Ministry for Consumer Protection, Food and
Agriculture. Although consumer protection lies within the responsibility of the new
Ministry, health issues have recently dominated the agencies agenda. Since responsibility
for consumer protection is shared by a variety of ministries, there is an inter-
governmental committee as well as a Federal-State Committee on consumer affairs to
assist them in coordinating their work and exchanging information.
At the state level, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria have own ministries for
consumer protection. In the other fourteen states the State Ministries of Economy are
responsible for consumer protection. Each state also has a consumer agency. These are
mostly financed by the relevant state governments. To a small extent their budget is
also financed by fees for special advisory services or by selling information booklets. In
some cases, local authorities co-finance the consumer agencies. In economic terms
consumer organizations act as a counterpart to commercial and industrial organizations
supporting private consumers, so that they can act in the markets on an improved
information basis and with strengthened consumer rights thus encouraging competition
which may lead to better product and service quality at appropriate prices.39 .
39 Meinel, H., Challenges and Choices of Liberalization for Consumer (and for Consumer Organizations), http://
www.energiestiftung.de
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Until November 2000 there were two consumer umbrella organizations at the federal
level: the Union of Consumer Associations and the Consumer Protection Association.
The tasks of the Union of Consumer Associations were:
n To promote the rights and interests of consumers to the private sector and to
legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies, both on a national and
international level;
n To co-ordinate the activities of their members. These included the sixteen
state consumer agencies as well as other specific consumer agencies, such as
the German Tenant Association.
The task of the Consumer Protection Association was to undertake legal action
against companies unfair competition practices and deceptive advertisement, as well
as against companies general terms of trade (potential violations of the Law against
Unfair Competition). Since 1976, the Association also had the right to act as legal adviser
for consumers and as plaintiff in specific cases. However, it was not entitled to represent
individual consumer complaints in the courts.
In November 2000, the Union of Consumer Associations, the Consumer Protection
Association, and the Consumer Institute Foundation merged into the Federation of
German Consumer Organisations. The latter is a non-profit and politically non-partisan
organization with approximately eighty employees. It finances its work through funds
from the Federal Ministry for Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture as well as
project funds from the European Commission, and earnings from the proceeds of
publications, and project funds. The governments support for the Federation in 2002
amounted to 8.75 m. 
The Federation of German Consumer Organisations is engaged in advocacy for
consumer interests. It is the parent organisation of 35 consumer-oriented associations
(16 state consumer agencies and 19 private consumer organisations). The objective of
the Federation is to enforce transparency on production methods, features, and the
quality of goods and services to establish precautionary consumer protection as a key
political objective. Its mandate includes the following:
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n To represent consumer interests in politics and economics;
n To co-ordinate the activities of member organisations related to consumer
policy;
n To protect consumers by taking collective legal action;
n To promote consumer information to foster the highest standards for consumer
counseling;
n To provide professional qualification for the staff of consumer organisations
in a variety of fields.40
In addition, the Federation is an active member of the European Consumers
Organization (BEUC). It is also represented in the International Council of Consumers,
the global federation of consumer organizations.
3. Electricity Specific Consumer Protection
The German electricity market was opened on April 1, 1998 with the new Energy
Industry Law. All consumers were granted a free choice of supplier at once. Households
were not required to have hourly metering. Their consumption is determined based
on load-profiles. Access to the network is based on a negotiated third-party access
(TPA).
The Energy Industry Law contains only general provision for consumer protection.
Its aim is to lead to a secure, reasonably priced and environmentally sustainable
electricity (and gas) supply.
A license is required for the supply of electricity. Licenses are not granted if the new
supply will lead to less favorable conditions in electricity supply.
Integrated distribution and supply companies have a general obligation to connect
and supply. They have to publish general terms and tariffs, which will be applied to
everyone seeking supply. The obligation is not applicable if it leads to unreasonable
costs for the company. Thus, the integrated distribution and supply company (the former
monopoly supplier) acts as supplier of last resort.41
40 These fields include advertising, agricultural policy, building & housing, care, competition, e-commerce, energy,
environment, ethical consumption, financial services, food safety, health policy, indebtedness, insurance, international
trade, investment, leisure time, new media, nutrition, old age provision, post, product description, product safety,
retail, sustainable consumption, telecommunications, tourism, transport, water.
41 Currently it is unclear what will happen if distribution and supply functions will be corporately unbundled and there
is no area-supplier left.
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The government may (via ordinance) prescribe suppliers general terms and
conditions and tariffs or make them on the basis of governmental authorization. This
has been done in the case of the Federal Tariff Regulating Electricity. In addition, the
government may release general terms of trade for electricity companies supplying
consumers at general tariffs.
Obviously, there are few direct instruments encoded in the German Energy Industry
Law. In accordance with the general attitude towards consumer protection, the effective
functioning of the market is considered to be one of the most important aspects of
consumer protection.
Currently, the access to the grid is based on a negotiated TPA. Whereas in general
this means that network access can be negotiated individually, several stakeholder
associations42  have agreed upon a general (legally non-binding) agreement for network
access and the calculation of network fees43 . Consumer associations, though not officially
signatories of the Association Agreement, took part in the negotiations.
With the negotiated TPA system, there is currently no sector-specific regulator in
Germany. Regulatory oversight is undertaken by the general Federal and State
competition authorities. Nevertheless, there is a special task force within the Ministry
of Economy which closely follows developments in the liberalized electricity market.
Before liberalization, the government had released an ordinance concerning General
Terms of Trades for the Supply of Electricity to Tariff Customers, which made these
terms part of every contract between a monopolistic supplier and a tariff consumer.
With the enactment of Energy Industry Law, the government did not change the general
terms after liberalization. Even though the latter contain certain provision with respect
to consumer protection, their origin stems from pre-liberalization conditions. The general
terms are sometimes considered unfavorable (with respect to liabilities, period of notice,
etc.) compared to the general terms which apply to non-tariff customers.
In the first years after liberalization households willing to switch supplier encountered
a variety of problems. These problems included threatened or actual refusal of access
to the local grid for new customers, non-existent or unfair contractual terms for new
customers, lack of public announcements regarding whether and when the change in
42 The original Association Agreement (Verbändevereinbarung I) was signed in December 1998 and has been amended
twice since (Verbändevereinbarung II from December 1999 and the current Verbändevereinbarung II+ from December
2001
43 Verbändevereinbarung II+ from December 2001.
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supply would happen, flopping new sellers (who may have been paid a deposit or a
first rate already), ending with threats to cut off the electricity supply to those consumers
wishing to change suppliers. To address these issues, the Ministry of Economy set up a
telephone service for customers that seek information on switching their suppliers. In
addition, in 2002 the Ministry published best-practice regulations concerning the
exchange of information between suppliers and network operators in case of customers
switching suppliers.
4. Development of Household Electricity Prices
In Germany, real household electricity prices increased slightly during the early and
mid-1980s. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the prices decreased and
remained almost stable until 1998, after which they initially fell sharply but rose again
in 2000 (Figure 19).
Compared to other countries household electricity prices were above average in
the mid-1980s. After liberalization they did not decrease as much as the average (Figure
20).
Figure 19: Real electricity prices for households in Germany; 1980 -
2001; Euro-Cent/kWh
Source: Own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA.
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Figure 20: Household Real Electricity Prices Index in Germany and the
EU; 1980 - 2001; 1995=100 
Source: Own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA
APPENDIX 4: PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS OF
ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
1. Development of Consumer Protection
In the early 1960s, a central consumer protection agency as well as local consumer
advice services were created in the UK. Based on a government Commissions report
from 1962 (Molony Report), a Ministerial department for Consumer Affairs within
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was founded. In 1973, the Fair Trading Act
called for a Director General for Fair Trading as head of the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT). He is responsible for supervising competition laws as well as for protecting
consumer against unfair competition. Between 1974 and 1979 a separate ministry for
consumer protection (Department of Prices and Consumer Protection) was created.
During the 1980, more specific laws in the context of consumer protection were
released, e.g. the Consumer Protection Act in 1987, which dealt mostly with product
safety, liabilities for damage caused by defective products, and misleading price
information.
In 1999, the UK government published a white paper Modern Markets: Confident
Consumers, which set the framework for consumer protection policy for the 21st
century. Major proposals in the White Paper include:
n A hallmark for consumers to identify at a glance those companies that have
signed up to a code of practice which guarantees high standards of customer
service, including proper redress for complaints and which have received the
Office of Fair Tradings (OFTs) seal of approval;
n The publication of international price comparisons;
n New powers for trading standards officers and the OFT to stop traders
defrauding the public;
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n New powers for the courts to ban from trading those who repeatedly cheat
consumers;
n The development of a new advice network, building on existing advice
agencies, to give people easier access to a high quality resource;
n A consumer gateway on the Internet and a trial local consumer help-line
which will direct people to the best sources of advice;
n New measures to ensure information is accurate, comprehensive, and easy
to understand, including clearer prices and tougher controls on inaccurate
descriptions of services;
n A rolling review of all consumer protection legislation to see whether it is still
effective in meeting the needs of consumers or whether it has become a
burden on business with no apparent benefit;
n The re-launch of the National Consumer Council as a dynamic and effective
voice for consumers;
n A full review by the Director General of Fair Trading of his consumer protection
functions.
The White Paper stresses the idea of fair competition to provide consumers with
appropriate consumer protection. In the Consumer White Paper, the government reiterated
its belief that effective codes of practice will benefit consumers and business alike. DTI has
been working with the OFT to develop a scheme that will give approval to codes of practice
that put core principles into effect. This will help consumers recognize a good code and make
it easier to find a reliable business.44 .
2. Institutions for Consumer Protection
There are several governmental and non-governmental institutions in the UK
responsible for consumer protection. The most important include the UK government
ministries, the Office of Fair Trading, National Consumer Council, National Association
of Citizens Advice Bureaux, and local Trading Standards Departments45 .
In the United Kingdom individual governmental departments and agencies are
44 OECD, UK - Annual Report on Consumer Issues 2000, Paris.
45 The Citizens Advice Bureaux and the Trading Standards Department form the Consumer Support Networks on a local
level.
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responsible for the protection of consumers in areas in which they have expertise as
policy makers.46  The HM Treasury for example has overall responsibility for the
protection of consumer interests relating to the provision of banking, insurance, pensions,
and other financial services, while the Department of Health is responsible for consumer
protection in the field of public health. The Home Office is responsible for consumer
protection in the field of fire safety. The Department of Environment, Transport and
the Regions is responsible for consumer protection in such areas as road, aviation and
shipping safety, public transport safety, and building construction standards.
Policy responsibility for general legislation on consumer product safety and consumer
rights in the sale of goods and services falls to the Department of Trade in Industry (DTI).
Within the DTI, the Consumer Affairs Directorate takes the lead within the Government
on consumer policy and helps formulate new consumer legislation in the UK.
In April 2002, the Consumer Affairs Directorate was merged with the Competition
Policy Directorate into the Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate. The Directorates
main job is to deal with UK and international consumer and competition policy issues.
Individual company and consumer enquiries are not dealt with at the Consumer
and Competition Policy Directorate but are referred to the Office of Fair Trading.
The Office of Fair Trading plays a major role in protecting the economic welfare of
consumers and in enforcing UK competition policy. It is a non-ministerial Government
Department whose main objective is to promote the economic interests of consumers.
Its Consumer Affairs Division seeks:
n To keep the market for goods and services under review and identify potential
problem areas for further investigation;
n To empower consumers through information and advice;
n To promote high standards of consumer protection;
n To tackle trading malpractices through regulatory action for example.
There are also other non-ministerial governmental services which deal with the
privatized utility industries. These include for instance, the energy markets regulator
OFGEM.
46 The different responsibilities are not exercised jointly except to the extent that, where more than one Department has
an interest in a consumer policy issue, the Department with the majority interest and expertise will lead and co-
ordinate policy.
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The National Consumer Council is an independent, non-departmental public body
set up by the UK government in 1975. A large part of the Councils funding is grant aid
from the DTI. The Councils mandate is to promote action for furthering and safeguarding
the interests of consumers, to ensure that those who take decisions which will affect
consumers have a balanced and authoritative view of the interests of consumers before
them, and to insist that the interests of all consumers, including the inarticulate and
disadvantaged, are taken into account. Special emphasis is placed on disadvantaged
consumers as well as on industry sectors, which are not open to competition. However,
the National Consumer Council does not deal with the electricity sector, as this has
been undertaken by the sector specific Electricity Consumer Council until 2000.47  Since
then, Energywatch is acting as consumer agency in the field of electricity and gas.
The Citizens Advice Bureau Service (CAB) offers free, confidential, impartial, and
independent advice. Currently, there are 2,000 CAB outlets in England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland. Each CAB is an independent charity, relying on funding from local
authorities, the private sector, charitable trusts and individual donations. Each bureau
belongs to the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux, which sets standards
for advice, training, equal opportunities, and accessibility. The National Association
also co-ordinates national social policy, media, publicity, and parliamentary work.
The Local Trading Standards Department is represented by the Trading Standards
Institute, and based on a membership organization. It provides services and support
for its members, and makes submissions relating to national and international legislation
that concern consumer affairs.
Further consumer protection institutions in the UK include the Consumer Congress,
the National Federation of Consumer Groups, the Consumers in Europe Group, as
well as the Consumers Association.
3. Electricity Specific Consumer Protection
The electricity market in the UK was liberalized with the introduction of the Electricity
Act of 1989. Major provision, which came into force in April 1990 include:
n The separation of the Central Electricity Generating Board into three generators
(National Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Electric), and a transmission
47 In the 1960s and 1970s, National Industry Consumer Councils (e.g., in the electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications
sector) were founded. These specialised in consumer issues within their specific industry.
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company (National Grid Company), and for the privatization of these
companies;
n Privatization of the twelve Regional Area Boards, responsible for distribution
and supply, and formation of twelve Regional Electricity Companies;
n Implementation of a mandatory wholesale electricity pool;
n Incremental market opening: as of April 1, 1990 customers with more than
1 MW demand became eligible, as of April 1, 1994 customers with more
than 100 kW of demand, and from April 1st, 1998 all customers were allowed
to freely choose their supplier;
n Introduction of the Office of Electricity Regulation as an independent sector
specific regulator.
In June 1999, the electricity market regulator and the gas market regulator were
merged into the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM). The principal objective
of OFGEM is to protect the interest of consumers, wherever appropriate by promoting
effective competition.
Due to criticism of the old pool system,48  New Electricity Trading Arrangements
(NETA) were introduced in the UK based on the Utilities Act 2000. The Arrangements
began functioning on March 27, 2001.
Major elements of New Electricity Trading Arrangements include:
n Introduction of trading based on bilateral contracts between generators,
suppliers, traders and customers;
n Abolishment of the central dispatch through the pool run by the National
Grid Company and introduction of decentralized dispatch through generators;
n A new balancing mechanism as a core element of the Arrangements;
n Forwards and futures in order to hedge against price risks may be traded
bilaterally.
With the Utilities Act (2000) changes towards consumer protection in the electricity
market took place. The Act, which was the legal basis for the New Electricity Trading
48 Criticisms focused on price manipulations, the lack of demand-side participation, and the difficulties of changing the
pool rules due to institutional inertia.
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Arrangements, introduced the legal unbundling of distribution and supply. For each
function a separate license is now required. With respect to consumer protection, the
most important provisions from the Electricity Act (1989) and the Utilities Act that
apply to the electricity market include:
n An obligation to connect for the distribution network company;
n A requirement for suppliers to supply domestic customers on request (subject
to certain exceptions) and to offer a standard contract;
n A requirement to publish prices, and to provide a range of payment methods,
including cash and other credit terms;
n A requirement for licensed suppliers to provide and publish codes of practice
and customer service codes. OFGEM has to approve the codes of practice,
and the suppliers have to consult with Energywatch prior to seeking regulatory
approval. The codes have to lay down rules concerning:49
• payment methods for customers,
• treatment of customers in debt,
• treatment of customers with specific needs (elderly, disabled or
chronically sick customers). The services that have to be offered to
these customer groups include special passwords, meter repositioning,
etc.),
• providing advice concerning energy efficiency;
n Introduction of minimum service quality standards for distribution companies
(standards of performance) and amended incentive regulations: OFGEM has
defined certain minimum standards for the number and duration of supply
interruptions, as well as the quality of telephone advice to customers. Those
distributors who exceed the standards receive bonuses, while those who fail
to meet the minimum standards are penalized;
n Consumers right to compensation payments in case of several supply
interruptions per year50 ;
n Foundation of Energywatch as the new gas and electricity consumer council.
49 These license modifications were introduced by OFGEM according to its Social Action Plan 2000
50 If the supply is interrupted four times in one year, for a period of longer than three hours each time, consumers have
the right to receive a compensation of £ 50.
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With the privatization of the electricity sector in 1990, the Electricity Consumers
Committee was introduced. With the Utilities Act, the Electricity Consumers Committee
and the Gas Consumers Committee were dissolved and Energywatch as a joint
consumer organization of the electricity and gas sector was founded. Energywatch is a
non-government body, independent of the government, of the regulator OFGEM, and
of industry interests (Figure 21). Energywatch is financed by license fees paid by
distributors and suppliers.51
51 Ultimately, these fees will be passed on to the final customers.
Figure 21: Structure of Consumer Representation in the Energy Sector
Source : Simmonds, G,: Consumer presentation in Europe policy and practice for utilities and
network industries, Part I: Consumer Representation in the UK, Centre for the Study of Regulated
Industries, Research Report 11, Bath, January, 2002
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Energywatch represents the interest of all consumers, specifically (but not exclusively)
individuals who are disabled or chronically sick, those over 65 years of age, with low
incomes, or who reside in rural areas. More specifically, Energywatchs major tasks
include:
n Ensuring the fair and effective functioning of the competitive market;
n Representing consumers interests towards public authorities, licensees, etc.;
n Providing information to gas and electricity consumers;
n Serving as a central organisation, to which consumer may turn in order to
seek information, launch a complaint, or resolve a complaint that was not
dealt with to their satisfaction by the relevant licensee.
Energywatch is headquartered in London, has seven regional offices across Great
Britain, and supports up to twenty-four local area teams. The latter are encouraged to
work closely with the local, non-electricity specific consumer agencies such as the
Consumer Advice Bureaux.
Although Energywatch is independent of the regulator, the Utilities Act grants both
institutions certain authorities with respect to consumer protection. In a Memorandum
of Understanding52 , OFGEM and Energywatch agreed to share specific information
necessary to enable both to carry their respective functions. They also agreed to work
together on complaints management, the alleviation of fuel poverty, as well as the
improvement of quality of services.
The Utilities Act 2000 only provided a general framework for handling complaints,
and left the detailed procedures to Energywatch. Figure 22 shows the procedural
framework for handling complaints in the electricity sector. Complaints submitted to
Energywatch are dealt with by the relevant regional office. Complaints received by
OFGEM will in most cases be referred to Energywatch. If Energywatch is unable to
resolve a complaint about matters for which OFGEM has powers, it will formally refer
the case to OFGEM.
52 OFGEM, Memorandum of Understanding, The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority and the Gas and Electricity
Consumer Council, November, 2000
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Energywatch cannot compel companies to resolve individual complaints, as these
rights have remained with OFGEM. Some authors see this lack of authority as a major
weakness of the system. Energywatch itself relies on the deterrence effect caused by
the negative publicity due to their ability to publicize the poor performance of a supplier
or distributor.
In 2001, Energywatch received over 85,000 gas and electricity complaints,
representing an increase of over than 3% from the year before53 . In its forecast for
2002-2003, Energywatch hopes to resolve 75% of complaints within 35 working days
and 95% of complaints within 66 working days.
In March 2000, OFGEM promulgated a Social Action Plan54 . Based on this Plan, the
DTI launched a nation-wide campaign to fight fuel poverty in November 2001.
Households in the UK are defined as fuel poor if they have to use more than 10%
of their disposable income for energy. The number of fuel poor households has been
reduced from 5.5 million in 1996 to 4 million in 2000. Two thirds of the reduction can
be attributed to lower electricity prices. The goal of the UK government is to end fuel
53 Energywatch, What we plan to do - Year 2, published by Energywatch, 2002.
54 OFGEM, Social Action Plan 2000, March, 2000
Figure 22: Procedural Framework for Complaints Handling
Source : Simmonds, G,: Consumer presentation in Europe policy and practice for utilities and
network industries, Part I: Consumer Representation in the UK, Centre for the Study of Regulated
Industries, Research Report 11, Bath, January, 2002
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poverty completely at least for vulnerable households by 2010. In order to achieve this
target, a range of programmes and measures has been put in place. These mainly
include programs to improve energy efficiency in fuel poor households and actions to
maintain downward pressure on fuel bills, ensuring fair treatment for the indigent.55
4. Development of Household Electricity Prices
Real household electricity prices increased slightly in the early 1980s and fell by
19% between 1982 and 1989, one year before the liberalization. Prices rose by 10%
from 1989 to 1992 and then fell continuously until 2001 (Figure 23). Real household
prices in 2001 were about one third lower than in 1992. The average revenue figures
show no acceleration in the price reduction after the opening of the market to small
customers in 1999.
In comparison to the European average, household prices in the UK fell faster dur-
ing the 1980s and (after a brief increase from 1990 to 1992) during the period 1992 -
2001 (Figure 24).
Figure 23: Real electricity prices for households in UK; 1980 - 2001,
Euro-Cent/kWh
Source: own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA.
55 www.dti.gov.uk/energy/consumers/fuel_poverty/index.shtml
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Figure 24: Household real electricity price index in UK and EU; 1980 -
2001; 1995=100
Source: own calculation of EWI, data taken from IEA
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